What the Gulf States Hope to Gain in Post-War Gaza

As the war in Gaza entered its second year, the fate of the residents of the strip hangs in the balance. Despite numerous failures over the past year to achieve a ceasefire, Arab countries primarily Jordan, Egypt, and Qatar continue to actively seek an end to the war. Nonetheless, participation in post-war Gaza governance and reconstruction has become a major sticking point between Arab countries, the United States, and Israel. Although the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and in particular the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, agree on the need for a Palestinian state, they hold conflicting opinions on how to manage international engagement in Gaza, or even what a post-conflict governance model in the Palestinian territories looks like.

Varied Interests

Saudi Arabia’s position on the Gaza peace process and post-war reconstruction derives from Riyadh’s unique political, economic, and security considerations. As the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites and a prominent power in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia feels obligated to support the rights of Palestinians in order to maintain its religious legitimacy and leading role in the Arab world. It is no coincidence that Riyadh spearheaded the 2002 “Arab Peace Initiative,” which, with the support of the Arab League, advocated for diplomatic normalization with Israel in exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the post-1967 occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Arab Peace Initiative marked a clean break with the Arab League’s previous unwillingness to deal with Israel—exemplified by the “Three Nos” policy formulated in 1967—and thereafter gave other Arab state political cover for further negotiations with Israel.

Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 also influences Riyadh’s involvement in post-war Gaza. To successfully execute Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia requires regional peace—and thus a calm environment for attracting foreign capital. Saudi leaders also see security benefits in closer ties to Israel because Tel Aviv is the key to secure a mutual defense treaty with the United States, a major goal of Saudi policymakers for many years. Indeed, it has been widely speculated that one of the driving motivations behind the October 7 attack was a desire by Hamas to throw a wrench into Israel-Saudi normalization plans. And although the human cost of the war has led Saudi leaders, including the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the Foreign Minster Faisal bin Farhan and recently the Saudi ambassador to the United Kingdom, to insist on a two-state solution as a prerequisite for normalization, Riyadh has not given up on its desire to partner with Israel in the long term.

Moreover, Vision 2030 enables Saudi Arabia to play a more active and constructive role as a regional peacemaker and an honest mediator, somewhat independent of the West. From Riyadh’s perspective, participation in post-war Gaza would diminish the popularity of Hamas, the Houthis, and other revolutionary Islamist forces in favor of the stability provided by the wealthy and pragmatic Saudi government.

Political Dominance

Like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates shares overarching goals such as the implementation of a two-state solution, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and the weakening of Hamas. What separates the UAE from Saudi Arabia, however, is the altogether different way Abu Dhabi seeks to assert itself in post-conflict Gaza.

The UAE’s participation in the peace process goes beyond its parochial economic interests: indeed, it actively seeks to gain political influence in Gaza’s post-war future. At the end of July, the UAE proposed the formation of a “temporary international mission” in Gaza. This mission, which Abu Dhabi briefed to the United States, would aim to reunify Gaza with the West Bank under the rule of a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) backed by the United States and the United Nations.

Through this proposal, the UAE has prioritized the unification of Gaza and the West Bank under the Palestinian Government rule and weakening Iran’s influence in Gaza. Perhaps most importantly, the Emirati plan maximizes Abu Dhabi’s influence over the Palestinian Authority, giving it greater leverage over the postwar future of Palestine than any of its neighbors. This open bid for influence could explain why none of the other GCC states have accepted the proposal.

As things stand, the UAE has a relatively cold relationship with the PA under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas. Abu Dhabi does not support newly appointed Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa either, arguing that he lacks the independence and political skill to implement the UAE’s desired reforms. 

Ultimately, the UAE’s aim is to hand over the affairs of Gaza to a new Palestinian Authority that more closely resembles a national committee of Palestinian leaders and business figures to govern Gaza after the war ends. This group of political and business elites would, in the UAE’s telling, represent the various Palestinian factions. However, all of its members would be loyal to exiled former Fatah leader and Palestinian strongman Mohammed Dahlan, who could eventually be installed as successor to Mahmoud Abbas. Dahlan, who currently lives in the UAE, is a multi-millionaire with extensive business interests in the region who was forced into exile in 2011 after being accused of embezzlement and plotting an internal coup—allegations he has vehemently denied. 

Major Mediator

In contrast to the designs of its larger Gulf neighbors, Qatar’s jostling for influence in post-conflict Gaza is focused on reinforcing Doha’s image as a diplomatic power player capable of mediating and de-escalating the most intractable international disputes. The aid and mediation in Gaza have happened in close coordination with Israel and the United States. Between 2012 and 2018, it provided more than $1.1 billion in aid to Gaza, and has reportedly spent about $15 million a month since 2018 to pay the salaries of tens of thousands of teachers, doctors, and other workers in the Gaza Strip. 

Qatar’s role as a mediator and host of Hamas’ political leadership has also reinforced the country’s importance in the eyes of Western and Israeli policymakers: while few officials in Washington and Tel Aviv may gripe about Hamas officials’ presence in Doha, they understand that if Hamas separates from Qatar, the group will then move to Iran, where communication will be near-impossible, and their presence in Qatar gives them some sort of independence in the decision making from the Islamic Republic regional agenda. Considering that the conflict has gone on for longer than a year and Hamas remains intact, it seems likely that Qatar will be able to maintain its position as a critical interlocutor until the parties agree to a ceasefire.

 It is clear that post-war Gaza presents opportunities for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to expand their influence. The burgeoning competition between the GCC’s most outward-looking actors demonstrates that their interests, outside of the most high-level demands for a Palestinian state, do not consistently align. The coming months, sure to be full of diplomatic engagement and jockeying for leadership in Gaza, will be crucial to determining the future of Gaza and the Gulf states’ interests there.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.