Donald Trump’s Gaza Ceasefire Might Just Stick—With GCC Help

The Gaza ceasefire agreement provides a rare opportunity for optimism in a two-year conflict where optimism has been non-existent. Given the devastation, war-weariness, and anxiety felt not only in the Gulf but across the Middle East, it’s no surprise that celebrations quickly broke out in both Gaza and Israel.

Yet amid the excitement, it is vital to remember that this is the third ceasefire in the Israel-Gaza conflict. Both of the preceding initiatives were intended to move all parties towards a better outcome. Both failed. However, this time feels different.

Why Trump’s Gaza Plan is Different

President Donald Trump’s “20-point peace plan” differs from its predecessors in the level of detail that was released to the public—even before Israel or Hamas had signed on. Trump’s plan does not merely achieve a ceasefire; it outlines a vision for the “day after” in Gaza, along with a roadmap to get there.

Under the terms of the agreement—if it proceeds as planned—Israel will withdraw entirely from the Gaza Strip. Hamas will cede power to a technocratic transitional authority that is supervised by Palestinian and international notables on a “Board of Peace” and supported by Palestinian and foreign Arab troops tasked with keeping order.

The emerging deal also front-loads several key issues that its predecessors chose to defer. Most notably, Hamas agreed to release all the remaining captives—dead or alive—within 72 hours. For Hamas, this is a major gamble; releasing all captives deprives them of their only tangible source of leverage over Israel.

That Hamas agreed to this concession exemplifies another key difference between this and previous failed initiatives. More than under any prior deal, Trump has succeeded in rallying key regional actors behind the plan. The full-throated endorsements from Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and other regional heavyweights have undoubtedly increased the pressure on Hamas to agree to the deal.

Indeed, this reads as much like a Gulf Cooperation Council initiative as an American one. Gone is Trump’s “Gaza Riviera” plan, which at best amounted to pie-in-the-sky thinking—and at worst, gave Israel a blank check for ethnic cleansing. No Gazans will be forced or “encouraged” to leave Gaza, and it mandates that aid delivery resume and at increased levels. This illustrates the increased degree of Arab involvement in the plan: ending the war and stabilizing the region has long been a core priority of the GCC states.

Major Opportunities for the GCC

The war that has plagued the region is a crisis that the GCC did not want. But in every crisis, there is also scope for opportunity.

It will almost certainly be the Gulf states, rather than the West or the broader international community, that bankroll Gaza’s reconstruction. The GCC may even provide peacekeeping forces to keep order in the territory. As in Syria and Lebanon, this will give the bloc an unprecedented role in designing the “day after.” It will therefore affirm the GCC states’ role not merely as mediators but as pivotal stakeholders with a direct role on the ground. This position will be rife with challenges, yet it also presents a unique opening for the Gulf states to lead the region, with Iran in retreat and Israel having turned itself into a global pariah.

Coming on the heels of Israel’s September 2025 strike in Doha, the success of the plan will go far to assuage Gulf anxiety and will consolidate the Gulf states’ growing reputation as “Trump whisperers.” It demonstrates the seismic shift in the regional balance of power towards the Arab Gulf states, which Trump seems more than happy to encourage.

Alongside GCC, Turkish, and broader Arab involvement, the plan in many ways reflects Trump’s unconventional personality. It secured the buy-in of the president’s favorite regional “strongmen.” It is more ambitious than the previous ceasefires, even sensationalist. That it envisions former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as one of Gaza’s postwar leaders is indicative of the unconventional thinking that often characterizes Trump’s initiatives at home and abroad.

Major Questions on Gaza’s Future Remain Unanswered

But the classically Trumpian aspects of the ceasefire plan could also prove its undoing. The plan is ambitious in scope, but it fails to answer the key questions that stymied earlier peace efforts. Under what conditions will Israel leave Gaza? How can the Palestinian Authority—whose rule has been accused of corruption for decades and who remains deeply unpopular amongst Palestinians—be reformed to effectively govern Gaza? When will it take over from the hypothetical transitional administration? Even the more short-term details are currently unclear, including which Palestinian prisoners will be released. Any misunderstandings and misperceptions on any of these questions could easily doom the plan, as they have done in the past.

These, as well as other open questions, are why both Israel and Hamas have responded with a cautious “yes, but” to the ceasefire. Hamas has not given a clear sign that it will disarm, a key Israeli demand. It has agreed to cede control of Gaza to a civilian administration but has so far refused to rule out links with any future government. This has fed Israeli fears that Hamas might use the plan as a smokescreen to transform into a Hezbollah-style organization: nominally ceding power to a civilian administration but retaining its weapons and wielding outsized political influence behind the scenes.

Netanyahu, too, has claimed that Israel will not have to leave the entire Gaza Strip, violating the terms of the agreement. This equivocation, and other opacities within the plan, may help Netanyahu by giving him just enough wiggle room to keep his far-right cabinet intact. Indeed, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich—who has openly called for the Gaza Strip to be emptied of Palestinians and annexed into Israel—voted against the plan but has not suggested that he would leave the government over it.

Most importantly, both sides only gave their consent to a ceasefire—not the plan’s three subsequent and more ambitious phases. Optimists may hope that the momentum away from an endless war may be enough to overcome the serious differences between both parties and opposition from their internal constituencies. But the fact that two earlier ceasefires have already collapsed, despite the resumption of aid to Gaza and the mutual releases of hostages and prisoners, suggests that momentum alone will not suffice. Instead, upholding the deal will require sustained pressure and oversight from all the plan’s stakeholders.

The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: GCC Mediation

This is why the GCC’s continued involvement is crucial. Trump is dealing with multiple international conflicts at once; as such, the Gulf states will need to repeatedly nudge the United States in the right direction. The UAE’s relative closeness to Israel will be indispensable, too—not only for maintaining a channel with the country’s government, but also for reaching out to the Israeli public, which opinion polls show is far more supportive of a ceasefire than Netanyahu’s far-right cabinet. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s positive relations with the Palestinian Authority will be essential for rehabilitating the organization, while Qatari mediation will continue to be crucial when disagreements inevitably occur.

This is a tall order, but given the dire situation in Gaza and the broader Middle East’s two-year spiral into chaos and war, there is still room for optimism. A ceasefire pulls Gaza and the region back from the brink. Trump’s roadmap may be vague and overly ambitious, but it is still a roadmap that no side has yet walked away from. A flawed plan is better than no plan at all.

In the weeks ahead, the devil will be not only in the details, but in the implementation. For all those seeking peace and stability—not least the GCC—the hard work begins now.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.