Above the Fray: How Iraq and Iran-Aligned Militias Responded to the 12-Day War

Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—a coalition of Iran-aligned paramilitary groups formally incorporated into the country’s security apparatus—have been forced to adapt to the weakening of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” Amid shifting regional dynamics, these factions have prioritized their own domestic political and security interests, embracing a highly cautious approach to avoid being embroiled in a conflict with Israel or the United States. During the recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran—culminating in U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities—both the PMF and the Iraqi state notably refrained from direct engagement on either side. Instead, they opted to safeguard Iraq’s stability, security, and economic health.

Shortly after the war began, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—Iraq’s most senior Shi’a cleric, who notably issued the 2014 fatwa that led to the PMF’s formation and called for armed resistance against the Islamic State (ISIS)—offered a measured appeal to the international community, urging global actors to intervene and bring an end to Israeli aggression against the Islamic Republic. However, al-Sistani refrained from calling upon any Iraqi factions to initiate or participate in military actions, which would have likely brought an Israeli military response down on Iraq.

In a similar vein, Kataib Hezbollah (KH), the dominant paramilitary group under the PMF’s umbrella, condemned the American and Israeli strikes on Iran, expressed solidarity with Tehran, and joined many other Iran-backed Iraqi militias in calling on Iraq’s government to expel American troops from Iraq. Yet despite KH’s longstanding ties to Tehran and history of militant activity against Israel and U.S. forces in the region, it did not retaliate during the 12-day war.

The PMF’s Calculated Discipline

The restraint demonstrated by these pro-Tehran factions speaks to their deliberate strategic calculus, which reflects their vulnerabilities vis-á-vis Israel and the broader recognition of the risks of widening the conflict.

The 2023–24 Hezbollah-Israel conflict in Lebanon was a critical factor in shaping the PMF’s response to last month’s war. Observing the consequences of Israel’s decisive campaign against the most powerful member of the “Axis of Resistance” appears to have had a sobering effect on these Iraqi groups, whose leadership would be unlikely to survive an Israeli assault. The war—during which Israel killed most of Hezbollah’s military commanders and its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, as well as thousands of its fighters and a wide swathe of its missile depots—underscored the risks of direct confrontation with a highly capable adversary. As a result, Iraqi militias have exhibited a marked degree of caution and restraint, likely calculating that any bold or overt action could expose them to similar vulnerabilities and draw Iraq deeper into a volatile conflict not of its own making.

Another factor relates to how these factions operating under the PMF umbrella have over time entrenched themselves more deeply within the fabric of Iraq’s political and economic landscape. No longer confined to the realm of paramilitary activity, many of these forces have successfully secured positions within state institutions, gaining access to public resources and integrating themselves into the formal armed forces. This institutionalization has enabled them to draw from Iraq’s state budget, while simultaneously expanding their influence through extensive patronage networks and commercial enterprises. Accordingly, the PMF are reluctant to jeopardize their newfound clout or expose their newfound assets to the volatility of war.

Baghdad Stays Above the Fray

Perhaps now more than ever, Prime Minister Mohammed Shi’a al-Sudani and the central government in Baghdad have been forced to strike a delicate balancing act between Iran and the United States to safeguard Iraq’s hard-won stability. The prospect of Iraq becoming entangled in a broader regional war—particularly one involving regional powers such as Iran and Israel—has been rightly viewed in Baghdad as a grave risk. Having only recently emerged from decades of armed conflict and foreign occupation, Iraq’s leadership is deeply invested in consolidating state institutions, attracting foreign investment, and restoring public confidence in the government’s ability to deliver basic services and ensure national sovereignty. A war in which Iraq becomes a battleground would abruptly plunge Baghdad back into crisis.

Therefore, while the Iraqi government was unequivocal in its condemnation of Israeli military actions against Iran, it opted for a measured and pragmatic approach that prioritized Iraq’s national interests. Both the Sudani government and large segments of the Iraqi public view Tel Aviv’s conduct, from its war in Gaza to its military strikes in Lebanon and Syria, as a profound source of regional destabilization. This sentiment was made clear just two days into the war, when Sudani met with the European Union’s ambassador to Iraq, Thomas Seiler. During their conversation, Sudani describedIsrael’s military aggression as “a direct threat to security and stability in Iraq and the region.”

Israeli and American strikes also undermined Iraqi diplomacy. Sudani’s government has long favored negotiation, particularly through Omani-led mediation, as the most viable path to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue and de-escalate broader tensions. In this context, the Israeli strikes on Iran were seen not only as a provocation, but as a deliberate effort to derail promising diplomatic efforts. Sudani’s condemnation of these attacks thus reflected a broader Iraqi interest in maintaining space for negotiated solutions in the future. The prime minister publicly called on influential actors on the international stage to assume a more active role in reining in Israel.

The fact that Israel violated Iraqi airspace during “Operation Rising Lion” only added to Sudani’s frustration. Yet despite these firm positions, the government was able to stay out of the conflict militarily. In doing so, Baghdad reaffirmed its intention to pursue a foreign policy grounded in strategic autonomy, national interests, and a commitment to regional de-escalation.

In a broader context, Iraq’s political leadership increasingly desires to reassert the country’s regional influence. The memory of past turmoil—particularly the brutal sectarian violence that followed Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003, as well as the dark times of the mid-2010s when the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupied and terrorized much of the country—remains vivid in Iraq’s national consciousness. These collective traumas have forged a widespread societal and political consensus around the need to keep the peace and prevent a return to chaos.

Ultimately, Iraq’s principal actors recognize that the country’s recent gains are too valuable to jeopardize through involvement in Middle Eastern wars. As such, maintaining neutrality or strategic nonalignment in regional disputes is not simply a matter of diplomacy; it is integral to Iraq’s long-term strategy for security and prosperity.

However, should the fragile Iran-Israel ceasefire collapse, Iraq may yet be drawn into renewed hostilities. For the Iraqi state and the Tehran-aligned groups, the stakes are extremely high. Baghdad will likely join other regional capitals such as Abu Dhabi, Ankara, Doha, Muscat, and Riyadh in urging all parties to de-escalate and pursue paths of diplomacy. How the PMF will respond to future conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran is less certain and could still embroil Iraq in a catastrophic war it does not want.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.