Gulf Mediation in the Middle East: Drivers, Convergence and Prospects

Workshop Concept

This workshop will explore Gulf mediation, primarily in the Middle East, from a range of state based, thematic and policy-orientated perspectives. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in 1981, is itself the product of attempts to create collective security and a framework for dialogue during the Iran-Iraq War. Kuwait played a mediation role during the conflict and in critical phases since, such as helping to end the GCC crisis (2017-21) and advance Saudi-Iranian dialogue. Since the 2023 Saudi-Iranian normalization deal brokered by Iraq, Oman and China, the de-escalation phase in the Gulf has spread out across the region like concentric circles, including greater interaction between the UAE, Egypt and Turkey. Oman has imbedded quiet diplomacy within the fabric of its approach to foreign affairs, including acting as host for US-Iran nuclear talks.

Qatar has a long record of mediation in the wider region: in Lebanon, Darfur (Sudan), between Chad and Sudan, and more recently between the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group and the Congolese army in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. However, Qatar’s willingness to act as host to Islamist groups, whilst useful in generating influence with the Taliban and Hamas, has been a form of contention up to and including the GCC crisis. The Iranian strike on the Al Udeid base in Qatar and Israeli strike on the Hamas leadership in Doha in September 2025 has demonstrated that mediators can become targets themselves, albeit after Qatar has been encouraged by successive US administrations to play such an intermediary role. The Israeli attack has also shattered the view that the GCC states are immune to the effects of geopolitical contestation in the neighborhood.

Some of the key drivers of regional escalation have included uncertain US security guarantees and escalation in the Gulf since the end of the first Trump administration, including ‘maximum pressure’ against Iran, attacks on Saudi oil installations at Abqaiq and Khurais, and the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps major general, Qassem Soleimani. Following a number of wars in the region, generally linked to uprisings associated with the Arab Spring more than a decade ago, there is a growing awareness that de-escalation could be more effective at achieving state objectives. Deadlocks in conflict and the importance of stability to implement economic diversification or ‘Visions’ strategies over the next few years, have influenced GCC state calculations.

The 2023 Saudi-Iranian deal shows the importance of regional and international buy-in into mediation as a relatively low-risk form of engagement. Indeed, China, with strong trade and investment relations with many Gulf states, has sought to build on its 2023 success by hosting Hamas and Fatah unity talks in Beijing in 2024. Beijing also established the International Organization for Mediation (IOMED), the world’s first intergovernmental mediation body, in Hong Kong in May 2025.

Mediation is now being spurred on due to the unwelcome re-emergence of conflict in the Middle East and the potential for it to spill over or affect the security of neighbouring states. Following Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites there were fears of radiation leaks and the contamination of water supplies. Since the war in Gaza in 2023, the security situation in the region has been deteriorating on multiple fronts. The war has highlighted the need for humanitarian intervention, including hostage negotiation and negotiation with Hamas and Israel over a ceasefire deal. Israel’s militarized policies towards Gaza have also elevated tensions with neighboring Egypt.

It was GCC state mediation efforts, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, that led to the Eritrea – Ethiopia peace deal in 2018 and kudos for all the countries involved. This draws attention to the further potential for the GCC states to develop a collective and collaborative approach, building on their individual state records, and their wealth of experience, resources and specialisms. Further advancement will probably require a formalized infrastructure beyond personal politics, based on an agreement that includes reference to synergies such as good offices, venues, and burden sharing, as well as ways to build capacity, manage leverage over conflicting parties, and hedge against risks. Given the plethora of track II events in the region, mediation could better utilize and extend these to develop insights and incorporate more dialogue and negotiation with proscribed and/or marginal actors.

The objective of this workshop is to build on the relatively sparse literature of mediation in the Middle East. It will look broadly at GCC state mediation within the region and emerging synergies within the GCC as well as collaboration with external states that can inform our broader conceptualization and understanding of the subject.

We welcome submissions from a diverse range of academic perspectives and aim to publish 10-15 papers as chapters in an edited volume with a leading academic press, or possibly fewer in a special issue of a journal with other standalone articles. Papers are invited in areas which speak directly to the theme, and may include reference to the following research areas or questions:

• At the state level, how is a mediation tactic developed into a higher-level strategic approach, including with reference to (changes in) national role conceptions?
• Forensic analyses of GCC state mediation efforts and assessments, including the importance of neutrality, personal connections, aid and leverage
• Studies on the reasons why GCC state approaches to mediation generally compatible and complementary (possibly through a division of labor) or discordant and divergent, and the key elements of an integrated GCC approach towards mediation
• To what extent can the GCC states withstand mediation setbacks in the bloc within what has been a more positive environment for negotiation over the past 2-3 years?
• How can the GCC states better leverage or ensure their mediation translates into more tangible results on the ground, specifically in Gaza and the West Bank or the two-state solution more broadly?
• Relatedly, what are the trends and developments in regional and extra-regional state cooperation on mediation?
• Lessons learnt from the Oslo peace process vis-à-vis the question of Palestinian statehood.
• Is there a ‘best practice’ as to how regional states engage and on what basis?
• What are the structural or case specific limitations to mediation? E.g. regression due to (past) episodes of conflict.
• How can trust, lost over many years, be re-established through confidence building measures?
• How do mediation efforts vary by conflict and what are the core components?
• Comparative studies between mediation efforts in the Middle East and mediation in other regions and contexts