Damascus Reset: Shifting the Axis from Iran to Turkey and the GCC

Now that more than six months have passed since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the broader impact of this historic shift across the Middle East has come into focus. The fall of Assad has significantly reshaped the regional balance of power among key actors, particularly Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Gulf’s Arab states. As the dust settles, clear winners and losers have emerged, as well as those states that have seen a mixed bag of gains and risks.

Iran: The Clear Loser

Among all actors, Iran has suffered the most from Assad’s fall. Strategically, regionally, and even domestically, the consequences for Tehran have been profound. The Assad regime in Syria long served as Iran’s most reliable Arab ally, particularly during critical moments like the Iran-Iraq War. Syria was not just a political partner, but a vital logistical corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon—a land bridge that allowed for both weapons transfers and direct supply. In recent years, Syria had even become a hub for Iran’s attempts to establish weapons manufacturing capabilities outside its borders. Through its growing presence in Syria’s scientific and defense institutions, Iran’s military was laying the groundwork for a more permanent and industrial supply infrastructure.

The loss of Syria thus represents the loss of a strategic outpost that allowed the Islamic Republic to project power across the Middle East. Even more concerning for Tehran is the ripple effect the collapse could have on neighboring Iraq. Iran now fears that Sunni unrest, possibly inspired by events in Syria, could spread into Iraq, destabilizing areas where Iran has worked hard to consolidate influence.

Further afield, Iran’s position has also weakened. With Assad gone, regional perceptions of Iran’s power have diminished, emboldening its adversaries, as evidenced by the 12-day confrontation with Israel. This is reflected in the hardened stance the United States has taken by striking Iran’s nuclear sites and before that in nuclear negotiations, where Washington is now pushing for maximalist terms, such as zero uranium enrichment, that it hadn’t seriously demanded in decades.

Domestically, the Iranian government has yet to justify the enormous cost of its intervention in Syria. Reports estimate Tehran spent between $20–30 billion propping up Assad, an investment that has now visibly failed, fueling public frustration at home amid widespread economic hardship.

Turkey: The Big Winner

In contrast, Turkey has gained the most from Assad’s downfall. For years, Ankara’s regional position had been steadily weakened, first by the ousting of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, and later by the tide turning in Syria in favor of Assad after 2018. Erdogan’s government remained committed to supporting the Syrian opposition, even under significant domestic criticism. Now, Ankara’s persistence is being recast as strategic foresight.

With Assad gone, Turkey can begin facilitating the return of almost three million Syrian refugees living within its borders, relieving itself of a long-standing political and economic burden. Simultaneously, Turkish influence has expanded deeply into the Levant, and Ankara now enjoys new opportunities to project power and trade westward, toward Lebanon. Most importantly, one of Turkey’s principal rivals, Iran, has been significantly weakened, giving Erdogan a freer hand in regional affairs.

Israel and the Gulf States: More to Follow

Israel and the Gulf’s Arab states, though certainly pleased to see Assad’s ouster, face a less certain regional picture as a result.

For Israel, the fall of Assad is both a strategic victory and a potential source of concern. Assad was a long-time adversary, and his alliance with Iran and Hezbollah made Syria a key node in the anti-Israel axis. His removal disrupts this network at a critical time for Tel Aviv. Hezbollah, already reeling from Israeli military operations that decapitated its senior leadership, fighters, and arsenal, now faces severe logistical challenges in rebuilding its forces. Though Iran is reportedly attempting to transfer arms to Hezbollah through smugglers in Syria or by establishing alternate routes that transit Sudan, Egypt, and the Mediterranean, none offer the same security or reliability of the old land corridor through Syria.

Yet, these apparent advantages come with potential risks. Israel had grown accustomed to conducting military operations in Assad’s Syria, routinely targeting Iranian positions and weapons transfers. The collapse of Assad’s regime introduces significant uncertainty about Tel Aviv’s security interests in the country. A new Sunni-led government in Damascus could challenge Israel’s actions more directly, possibly even pushing for the return of the Golan Heights. Israeli strategists are also wary of a possible alignment between Turkey, Syria, and Sunni Islamist movements, one that could eventually threaten Israel’s regional position.

The Gulf’s rich Arab monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, also find themselves in an unprecedented situation. While the fall of Assad eliminates a long-time Iranian proxy and might be seen as a blow to Tehran’s regional ambitions, it also empowers Turkey, an increasingly assertive rival to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. For countries like Qatar, which has maintained relatively cordial ties with both Syria and Turkey, the transition may bring more opportunity than risk.

Paradoxically, the weakening of Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance,” of which Syria was a critical pillar could undermine efforts to normalize diplomatic relations between the Gulf states and Israel. With Iran’s regional posture diminished, the Arab Monarchies may feel less urgency to align with Israel or fully embrace U.S. regional strategies as they once did. This new reality may slow normalization efforts and complicate Israel’s ambitions to build a regional coalition to contain Iran.

That said, these states have much to gain from the current environment. For example, U.S. sanctions, which had long placed pressure on Assad and crippled Syria’s economy. The lifting of those sanctions may allow the new Syrian government to consolidate power more effectively, countering Iran in the process.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia and the UAE can use their immense financial resources to stimulate economic development in Syria—and buy influence—particularly if they grow concerned about growing Turkish or Qatari sway over the new Syrian leadership.

Finally, Israel’s own approach to Syria remains a major variable that could change the calculus entirely. Should Israel escalate its strikes inside Syrian territory, Damascus may consider renewed support from Tehran if Turkey or the Arab states do not come to its aid. Iran, eager to recover its former satellite, would likely be more than willing to re-engage. In that case, an aggressive Israeli policy toward Syria could inadvertently pave the way for Iran’s return.

The change in leadership in Damascus, coupled with the lifting of U.S. and EU sanctions and the restoration of warm ties between GCC states and Syria, marks a decisive turning point in Middle East geopolitics. While recent developments have clearly weakened Iran and bolstered Turkey’s regional standing, the implications for Israel—and, to a lesser extent, the GCC states—remain uncertain and subject to rapid change. In the months ahead, the emerging dynamics will depend not only on how regional actors recalibrate, but also on whether Syria’s new leadership consolidates power or sparks further fragmentation in an already volatile region.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.