Energy, Iran, and Diplomacy: What Trump and Harris Mean for the GCC

As the 2024 presidential election is underway in the United States, there is no doubt that the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are watching and weighing the impact of the result on their own interests and foreign policy. The GCC countries as always will continue productive relations with the United States under either a second Donald Trump administration or the leadership of Vice President Kamala Harris. The notions circulating that a Trump victory is universally preferred by the Gulf states is a simplistic view—these six sovereign nations each have distinct interests, diverse polities, and their own unique relations with both parties in the U.S.

While both candidates align on issues like avoiding regional war, expanding Israel-Gulf ties, containing Iran, and boosting domestic fossil fuel production, each offers the Gulf a starkly different approach. Harris’s energy agenda and rhetorical commitment to Palestinian statehood resonate with GCC priorities, though there remains the ever-present concern in the Gulf that regional instability ensued when the Democrats held office. Trump’s swift, deal-focused style has its appeal for some in the Gulf, but his aggressive push for domestic fossil fuel production and plans to end the Ukraine war—could ultimately undermine key Gulf interests.

A Different Region Awaits America’s Next President

When the New York businessman unexpectedly won the presidency in 2016, he was regarded as a wild card for the region—eight years on, the GCC states know to expect a short-term, deal-driven approach to foreign relations rooted in a mercantilist economic outlook. However, the Gulf states are in a markedly different position now than in 2017, at the outset of Trump’s first term.  

At the time, the Middle East had recently weathered the Arab Uprisings, and enmity from that period led to intensified intra-GCC rivalries—eclipsed only by many of the Gulf states’ heightening hostility toward Iran. Today, the GCC states have shifted their focus inward, prioritizing their national visions. Having moved on from the Arab Spring era—cutting losses and capitalizing on gains—they now see maximalist policies as counterproductive, opting instead for a strategic approach centered on de-escalation, reconciliation, and mediation.

The Gulf states currently have little appetite for the maximalist policies Trump championed as president. While the GCC has mostly refrained from recognizing Israel, all its members have improved their relations with Iran and are unwilling to jeopardize this by taking sides in an all-out regional conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran. GCC leaders will predictably want the next American president to constrain Iran, but to do so in a way that avoids escalation—a point that Vice President Harris and former president Trump agree on, at least in theory. 

Under President Joe Biden, they have also witnessed their global geo-economic leverage expand in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—yet have been unable to use this newfound strategic autonomy to stem the horrific violence in Gaza that was enabled by President Biden. Although Harris has been clear about her support for Ukraine and Israel, it remains to be seen how Harris will deal with the Gaza war, yet much of the same is expected. Given these dynamics, a second Trump or a Harris administration would return to a Gulf region vastly different from 2021.  

Contain, Not Escalate: GCC’s Goal with Iran

From the GCC’s perspective, their current pragmatic ties with Iran have effectively shielded them from being pulled into a potential Israel-Iran conflict—or worse, a U.S.-Iran showdown. With a new U.S. administration on the horizon, the GCC’s priority remains clear: contain Iran, but avoid sparking a regional war at all costs. Something that is in line with the stated goals of both Harris and Trump. Although the risk of being drawn into war persists if U.S. policy stays on its current course. 

Both candidates would likely maintain sanctions enforcement on Iran and threaten to impose new ones. In principle, both candidates support diplomatic engagement with Iran; both have expressed support for a renewed nuclear agreement, while Trump promises a “better deal” with further Iranian concessions. While both candidates have expressed willingness to entertain the idea of a nuclear deal, the escalating Iran-Israel tensions and the rising bipartisan anti-Iran consensus may constrain either one of them. 

Vice President Harris has made it unequivocally clear that she regards Iran as America’s number one adversary. She has pledged to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, prioritizing diplomatic avenues to achieve this goal but ultimately leaving all options on the table. Amid historically high Israel-Iran tensions and the looming threat of escalation, she remains resolute in her support for Israel and U.S. interests against Iran. However, it appears she has left the door open for a renewed diplomatic agreement, contingent upon a de-escalation of the current situation. In the past, Harris has criticized Trump for withdrawing from the JCPOA, arguing that his decision enabled Iran to advance its nuclear weapons program to a dangerously high level. Her stance reveals a firm belief in a deal with Iran as an effective solution to curb Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Former President Trump did much to escalate U.S. hostilities with Iran while in office—famously withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018 and ordering the killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020—an action that allegedly led Iran to plot its own assassination against him during the 2024 campaign. Today, Trump argues that the consequences are too high not to make a deal with Iran. He sees himself as a master dealmaker and vows that if given the chance, he would eagerly pursue a “better deal” than the one negotiated by the Obama administration in 2015. Yet in the aftermath of the Iranian assassination attempt against him, he also claimed he would retaliate by “blowing the country to smithereens”—raising questions about the prospects for future diplomacy, to say the least.

A Palestinian State: Harris Hints Support, Trump Holds Back

Israel’s brutal and relentless military campaign in Gaza since the October 7 attack has unleashed a surge of public fury across the Gulf, bringing the Palestinian cause back to the forefront of Arab political discourse with renewed urgency and placing immense pressure to act on the GCC states. Despite their varying relationships with Israel, the GCC states share an exasperation with Israeli conduct in Gaza and rising worries that Tel Aviv is attempting to ignite a wider Israel-Iran confrontation. The GCC now views the establishment of a Palestinian state as an urgent national security priority—and the only way to secure long-term peace between Israel and the Palestinians. 

On the broader question of constraining Israel’s behavior, however, neither Trump nor Harris appears to be willing to diverge significantly from President Biden’s full-bore support. Both Trump and Harris have expressed general support for Israel in the Gaza war and have vowed to expand the Abraham Accords to the four remaining GCC states. However, Harris has also voiced support for negotiations on a pathway to a Palestinian state—a step that the GCC states have demanded, and one that Trump has ignored. From the Saudi perspective, Palestinian statehood is a fixed condition for normalization with Israel—something Trump is likely to try to bypass, though likely without success. As for the discussion prior to October 7th for U.S. concessions in exchange for Saudi-Israeli normalization included nuclear cooperation and a NATO-style defense pact with Saudi Arabia. However, given Trump’s disdain for NATO, it is plausible to assume it is unlikely he would support any form of NATO-like agreement with Saudi Arabia, regardless of the context. Unlike during Trump’s first term, the GCC states—even those who have already normalized relations with Israel—are fully unified behind and actively pushing for a Palestinian state. Therefore, any other concession that does not include a Palestinian state in exchange for normalization is a nonstarter for the GCC at this point. 

Harris and Trump’s Energy Agendas: Independence at a Gulf Cost? 

Trump and Harris share a common goal of boosting domestic energy production to keep prices low. However, when their foreign policies intersect with their energy strategies, Trump’s approach has the potential to strain and weaken Gulf economies.

The key difference on hydrocarbon policies of Harris and Trump lies in their approach to gaining “energy independence” for the United States. Harris advocates for expanding energy production through clean technologies essential for combating climate change, as well as investing in green energy to reduce demand for oil and gas. Conversely, Trump seeks to achieve energy independence by dismantling environmental regulations that restrict the oil, gas, and coal industries. Trump’s bolder push to expand hydrocarbon production without limits could drive down prices by reducing global fossil fuel demand at a higher degree than Harris.

Candidate’s actions would reverberate in the Gulf. However, a significant increase in oil supply from U.S. producers—a more likely outcome under Trump’s plan than Harris’—could strain OPEC+, potentially prompting Saudi Arabia to engage in an oil price war to reclaim market share. This strategy, used in 2014 and 2020, would aim to undercut American producers with higher production costs, and could even cause collateral damage to the U.S.-Saudi relationship in other areas. 

Ukraine and the GCC’s Geo-economic Leverage

One area of clear difference between Trump and Harris is their respective stances on resolving the conflict in Ukraine. Trump has often complained about the cost of Ukraine aid to U.S. taxpayers and has vowed to end the war immediately, whereas Harris promises to continue Washington’s unwavering support for the Ukrainians.

The Ukraine war has increased leverage for petro-diplomacy, shoring up the GCC states’ geo-economic position on a global scale. After the United States and the European Union halted imports of Russian oil and gas, the GCC states largely stepped up to meet the new demand and benefited from the high prices leading to a windfall in hydrocarbon profits—and, perversely, creating a market incentive for the GCC states to benefit from the continuation of the conflict. 

As the war goes on, Harris may face tougher challenges in managing energy diplomacy with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which were notably more receptive to Trump than to President Joe Biden. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi resisted Biden’s calls to increase oil production in response to the Russian invasion, signaling a potential hurdle for Harris in securing similar cooperation. 

GCC Interests Find Greater Support in Harris’s Agenda – but Still Wary 

Although Harris aligns with many of the GCC’s strategic priorities for both petro-diplomacy and traditional diplomacy, Gulf states remain cautious about the Democrats, associating the current administration with increased regional instability—a factor that could make a Trump presidency seem more appealing. Yet Saudi Arabia still bitterly remembers the lack of U.S. action after the 2019 Abqaiq attack  from Iran that temporarily halved Saudi oil production under the Trump presidency. Many smaller Gulf states, which rely on stable international norms, may be wary of the unpredictable approach that a Trump resurgence could bring. They recall how, during President Trump’s term, he initially blamed Qatar in the Gulf crisis before shifting to a neutral stance and working to mediate intra-GCC disputes. 

Ultimately, the GCC states are pragmatic in their relations with the United States. They understand the constraints of America’s political system and will work within it to the best of their ability. As we look forward to election results, there are opportunities to push for a ceasefire, prevent a regional war, use all diplomatic measures with Iran, and—though unlikely—revive the possibility of a Palestinian state. If the next administration comes to terms with the fact that a military solution is not an option and a political solution is the only way forward, then there is reason to be hopeful.  

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.