Eroding Trust: Public Opinion and the Waning Credibility of U.S. Defense Guarantees

Israel’s unprecedented September 9 strike on Doha, which followed Iran’s early summer strike against Al Udeid Air Base—just 25 miles from the Qatari capital—spread fear and unease throughout the country and the wider Gulf region. Residents living near the area that housed Hamas’s political office were treated to deafening explosions that reverberated across the city. Israel failed to achieve its aim of eliminating senior Hamas members, killing instead a Qatari security officer who had been guarding the compound and lower-level Hamas members. The strikes have also deepened an already widening perception among Gulf publics that American security commitments no longer carry the credibility they once did. Across the region, frustration with perceived U.S. double standards—from Gaza to Gulf defense—has eroded trust in Washington’s role as a dependable protector, fueling debates about sovereignty, autonomy, and alternative alliances.

A Tacit Understanding

For decades, GCC governments have justified the presence of American military bases in the region by adhering to a fundamental, if unwritten, agreement: that U.S. forces would provide the countries that host them ironclad protection from regional foes. By failing to deter Israel’s strike and dismissing claims it had prior knowledge of the attack, Washington has fueled doubts about the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor. The Qatari government’s public stance has been calculated, with Qatari leaders describing Israel’s strike as an attempt to sever historically strong U.S.-Qatari ties. Though Qatar has doubled down on its partnership with the United States, the Trump administration will be all too wary of GCC states’ efforts to expand their security partnerships with U.S. adversaries. Absent greater security guarantees, the coming decade will likely see GCC countries hedge with other regional powers or even superpowers to protect their sovereignty and reinforce their security, especially given perceptions that America’s priority is the Indo-Pacific region and Europe’s Security.

The GCC’s longing for U.S. security protection traces back to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which saw an American-led coalition destroying the Iraqi military in Kuwait. With its regional rival hobbled and eventually overthrown, Iran emerged as an ideological and geopolitical adversary of most Gulf states. GCC leaders felt that establishing a security pact with Washington was necessary to deter would-be aggressors from infringing on their territories and meddling with their affairs. The invasion of Kuwait and Saddam’s firing missiles on Saudi Arabia pushed GCC states to seek defense aid and partnership with Washington. However, establishing American bases on “holy land,” as many Muslims considered it, was far from a straightforward process. To avoid public opposition to U.S. presence, Gulf leaders sought help from religious figures to issue fatwas to back the government’s necessary defense policies.

For its part, Doha has never been fazed by public frustration when it came to the United States’ presence in the country. Qatar was determined to anchor American regional power on its territory and began a long, fruitful history of security cooperation with Washington in 1992. A few years later, in 1996, Doha spent over $1 billion to build Al Udeid Air Base, the biggest American military base in the region. “Qatari base construction strategy has been deliberately intended to attract the United States to its facilities,” according to a report by the American Security Project. Moreover, the significance of both Al Udeid and Doha skyrocketed after American troops were relocated from the Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia in 2003, turning Qatar into a central hub for U.S. power in the Gulf. Considering the growth of anti-American sentiment at the time, this marked a bold decision. In addition to Qatar’s strong military partnership with Washington, Doha has made billions of dollars in investments in the United States and proved itself an adept partner in advancing international mediation.

Given the supposed strength of the bilateral partnership and Doha’s status as a Major Non-NATO Ally, it was no shock that the Qatari public was outraged towards Washington following Israel’s September 9 strikes against Hamas officials living in the capital city. On social media, the hashtag #QatarUnderAttack went viral, with Qatari citizens and residents venting their frustration with the strike that shook their very sense of safety. In the eyes of Qatari public, for all of Qatar’s efforts to build a deep security partnership with the United States, Washington has offered no protection from Israeli missiles.

A New Reality

Immediately after the attack, the GCC leaders reaffirmed the GCC’s unity and the bloc’s support for Qatari sovereignty, and they pledged to “take the necessary executive measures to activate joint defense mechanisms and Gulf deterrence capabilities.” The Gulf monarchies might have now learned the hard way that they are not immune to Israel’s aggression—nor are they exempt from Tel Aviv’s new doctrine of preemptive action. This new reality will likely force regional governments to recalibrate and strengthen their partnerships with other actors. Some have already taken drastic steps—look no further than Saudi Arabia’s recent mutual defense agreement with nuclear-armed Pakistan.

Traditionally, Qatar has invested heavily in supporting America’s regional security footing and buttressing its unique role as a mediator to secure itself. So far, it has not pursued solid hedging compared to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, considering its small size and the unpredictable regional security landscape, expanding its security umbrella beyond the United States could become a necessity. A scenario Washington had anticipated: the erosion of Doha’s confidence in the United States’ commitment to safeguarding its interests and sovereignty was perceived as a possible significant setback for American influence in the Middle East. Consequently, President Trump took decisive action, compelling the Israeli Prime Minister to issue a formal apology to Doha for the attack, while also signing an executive order pledging that the United States would employ all necessary measures—including military force if required—to defend Qatar against any future aggression.

During the 2017-2021 blockade, Qatar suffered a similar vulnerability and strove to address it, expanding its security ties with regional powers like Türkiye and deepening its cooperation with the United States. In light of the Israeli strike, this approach may be less effective, given Washington’s unwavering support for Tel Aviv. Consequently, Doha may feel more compelled to seek out new military partnerships, potentially reshaping the face of its hedging blueprint slightly. Such a shift would not necessarily sacrifice Qatar’s emphasis on mediation and diplomacy. Qatar is likely to maintain, if not redouble, its mediation efforts on the international stage—but with clearer risk-assessment and security-guarantees from disputants, perhaps. For Qatar and the GCC, the million-dollar question is whether they will limit themselves to diplomatic pressure on the United States to rein in Israel, or take practical steps to reshape the regional security paradigm to protect their interests if Washington is not willing to.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.