For Russia, a Constrained Iran is Both a Concern and an Opportunity

The military campaign by the United States and Israel against Iran, which ended in U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites on June 22, puts Russia in an uncomfortable geopolitical position. Moscow has already endured the loss of one of its most strategically vital clients with the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Partnered with a weakened Iran, Moscow could face a far greater challenge to its ability to influence developments in the Middle East.

A Close Partner, Not an Ally

Given Russia’s split with the European Union and the United States over Ukraine, Moscow dearly needs to build new economic and strategic partnerships in the Middle East and Asia. To this end, Iran plays an important ideological and concrete role for the Kremlin. For example, the weakening of the Islamic Republic could impact the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects Russia with the Middle East. The project has seen its own share of difficulties—primarily financial—over the past years. Despite recent assurances, the specter of further military escalation could complicate the work on the 162 km-long Rasht-Astrara railway section on the border between Iran and Azerbaijan—dealing a blow to a Russian economy already straining under the weight of international sanctions.

The recent 12-day war also impacted bilateral military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, which had been growing by leaps and bounds since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. After the attacks, the Iranian side hinted that it would consider purchasing Chinese J-10C fighter jets instead of Russian Su-35s. Negotiations between Tehran and Beijing have been ongoing for many years, and Russia’s focus on Ukraine, which has limited its ability to export weaponry, has the Islamic Republic searching for a different provider.

There is also the question of Russia’s relatively cordial relations with Israel. Despite Moscow’s harsh criticism of Tel Aviv over its war in Gaza and the recent bombing of Iran, Russia and Israel have always maintained close ties. The two have long coordinated with one another in Syria—sometimes to Iran’s detriment—and both have an interest in keeping Turkey’s influence in check. Therefore, Russia has always strived to maintain a balancing act in the Middle East, meaning in practice that Moscow’s relations with Tehran will always be calibrated to avoid overtly antagonizing the Jewish state.

And then there is the reality that Russia has always been ambivalent toward Iran. Ever since the end of the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic has been perceived by Moscow as a partner with which it could usher in a multipolar world order, but the two sides have never entered into a full alliance. Their partnership has always been transactional, and it remained so after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Russo-Iranian military cooperation—particularly in the realm of drone warfare—coupled with extensive bilateral political engagement pushed the two to upgrade their relationship by signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement earlier this year. For all the fanfare surrounding the accord, however, it lacked a mutual defense clause, which would have caused Israel and the United States to think twice before deciding to strike Iran in June. In the end, Iran’s vaunted strategic partnership with Russia proved insufficient when tested by Tehran’s adversaries.

However, what may worry Tehran more than anything is Moscow’s somewhat improved relationship with Washington under the second Trump administration. More specifically, Iranian leaders have quietly expressed concerns that talks to end the war in Ukraine are not solely about Kyiv, but also about improving the broader relationship between the two superpowers. Tehran worries that Washington is hoping to drive a wedge between Moscow and Tehran to curtail its nuclear program—a seemingly credible fear, given the Kremlin’s reluctance to endorse nuclear proliferation and its past cooperation with the United States on nuclear efforts such as the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The bombing of Iran is also an uncomfortable development for Russia, given that the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program may have been set back significantly. Though Russia has generally opposed the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran—Moscow has condemned Iran’s threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—Moscow has skilfully used its major position in the United Nations and its closeness to Iran as a negotiating tool in its relations with the West. Russia has hoped that its cooperation with the West on the Iran file would come in exchange for limiting the West’s support for Ukraine. But with Iran’s nuclear program possibly in shambles, Washington will feel little incentive to negotiate with Tehran, rendering Russia’s influence with Iran irrelevant

More in Common than Not

Despite these headwinds, Iran and Russia are expected to continue their work together to reshape the geopolitical landscape in their near abroad. One such area is the South Caucasus, where Turkey’s influence threatens to diminish their clout. Ankara is keen on opening the so-called Zangezur transport corridor, which aims to link Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhchivan exclave and onto Turkey. Iran fears that a corridor stretching from Turkey to Turkmenistan along Iran’s northern border might reduce the Islamic Republic’s influence in Armenia and throughout the South Caucasus overall. Russia, for its part, is not ready to give up its paramount military and economic position on its southern flank, and Turkey’s outreach to Azerbaijan directly counters Moscow’s core objective of keeping the former Soviet republic under its sway.

Further east, Iran and Russia also look to Central Asia as an area of strategic concern. In May 2025, Tehran hostedsenior railway officials from China, Turkey, and Central Asian states to discuss the expansion of trade corridors from China to West Asia. Russia, too, wants to tap into Central Asia’s unexplored connectivity potential with the ultimate goal of expanding the INSTC into Iran and Afghanistan. Both Russia and Iran see Afghanistan as an untapped market, just as the Taliban are seeking access to global commercial routes, for which Iran’s ports and the INSTC are seen as critical linkages. Russia’s recent decision to extend formal recognition to the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan—making it the first country in the world to do so—appears to have been made with this outcome in mind.

Despite their shared interests, Iran and Russia remain distrustful of each other. The Islamic Republic still holds historical grievances and an underlying fear that it might end up a pawn in the broader competition between Moscow and Washington. Though differences in threat perception will likely continue to prevent Iran and Russia from pushing the bilateral relations into an official alliance, the two understand that an alliance would limit their room to maneuver. Nevertheless, Russia is closely tracking the situation in Iran, as a truly weakened Islamic Republic, coupled with the fall of the Assad regime and the humbling of the Axis of Resistance, could undermine its regional position. At the same time, opportunities emanating from the shifting Eurasian connectivity remain central to the two partners’ long-term alignment. Perhaps Russo-Iranian cooperation in the South Caucasus will be the most notable aspect of their partnership going forward as the two nations  work together to advance common goals in their back yard.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.