
Hooked on Fossil Fuels? Analyzing the Gulf States’ Dependency on Hydrocarbons
There is a surprising amount of variance among the Gulf states when it comes to relying on oil and gas revenues.
This is the final article of a three-part series on hydrocarbons and wealth in the Gulf states. Part one can be found here. Part two can be found here.
The long-established importance of fossil fuels to economies of the Gulf has led some observers to claim that these states have grown reliant on hydrocarbons to maintain solvency and social stability. While all Gulf countries rely on hydrocarbon revenues to fund public expenditures to some extent, some depend on oil and gas production more than others. For instance, while Saudi Arabia has seen hydrocarbon revenues decline significantly as a percentage of GDP since 2000, Bahrain’s fossil fuel rents have nearly doubled as a portion of its GDP. Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Kuwait have experienced more moderate declines than Saudi Arabia, and Iraq’s share of GDP from hydrocarbons has remained relatively stable. Iran’s reliance on oil and gas has grown due to international sanctions, which have crippled the Islamic Republic’s non-oil sectors.
Most of the hydrocarbon-producing economies rely on revenues to remain afloat, but a few countries, like the Netherlands, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, have decoupled their growth from hydrocarbons. Former Soviet states have also seen relative decoupling, while countries like the United States and Australia have seen hydrocarbons contribute more to GDP growth. Indeed, in the United States, where the vast majority of global hydrocarbon production growth has occurred over the past two decades, fossil fuel value as a percentage of GDP doubled from 1.5 percent in 2000 to 3 percent in 2023.
Calculating Reliance on Hydrocarbon Production
As demonstrated in the preceding article in this series, the economic value of a country’s hydrocarbon production can be approximated by multiplying production quantities by the spot-market price. Comparing the approximate market value of oil and gas to GDP across the Gulf states can serve as a helpful tool for policymakers, as both production volumes and market prices impact national economies and the governments that seek to influence them.

Chart 1: Book value of hydrocarbon production as a share of GDP. Gulf countries are highlighted.
The United States, Canada, and China have economies that vastly outstrip the book value of their hydrocarbon production, meaning that the book value of this production only constitutes a small fraction to GDP. At the other extreme is war-torn Libya, where the book value of oil and gas production makes up almost all of the country’s GDP. Guyana (69 percent) and Turkmenistan (65 percent) round out the three states most dependent on hydrocarbons. The next three countries are all from the Gulf region: Qatar (64 percent), Iran (62 percent), Kuwait (57 percent). Iraq (54 percent) comes in eighth place, with a hydrocarbon book value more than half its national economic output. Oman (47 percent) and Saudi Arabia (37 percent) still derive a significant portion of their GDP from oil and gas, while the UAE and Bahrain, both at 28 percent, have the lowest hydrocarbon share in the region.
Most of the top 20 most hydrocarbon-reliant states have seen the portion of GDP derived from hydrocarbon production decline since 2000. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s book value of oil and gas production as a factor of its GDP decreased 17 percentage points, as did, more moderately, that of Qatar (12 percentage points), Kuwait (eight percentage points), the UAE and Oman (each three percentage points). Three countries in the region saw hydrocarbons become more important to their economy, Iraq (one percentage point), Bahrain (11 percentage points), and Iran (22 percentage points).
Long-term Decoupling Trends: 2000-2023
While hydrocarbon production’s share of GDP in the Gulf states could indicate the extent to which leaders have achieved their economic diversification goals, non-hydrocarbon sectors often still depend on oil and gas production. For example, “downstream” industries like petrochemicals and metallurgy directly rely on hydrocarbon inputs to thrive. More generally, industries in the Gulf are attracted by the low- or no-tax environment afforded by hydrocarbon rents. Therefore, we may posit that the economies of the Gulf states depend even more on hydrocarbons than the GDP figures in Chart 1 suggest.

Chart 2: Change in book value of hydrocarbon production versus change of GDP, from 2000 to 2023. Countries above the diagonal line exhibited a higher growth rate of GDP than hydrocarbon book value, countries below the line saw hydrocarbon book value grow at a faster rate than GDP. GDP and book value are measured in current USD. Gulf countries are highlighted.
To assess how much of an impact the fossil sector has on the non-fossil sectors, we might look at how tightly a country’s GDP growth corresponds to the book value of its hydrocarbon production. “Decoupling” is a metric that compares the percentage change of fossil fuel use or production with GDP growth. Some countries, found on the far left of the chart, have achieved “absolute” decoupling, whereby their hydrocarbon production value has decreased while their economy has grown. In other words, in these countries, hydrocarbon industries do not have much of an impact on growth in other sectors. These are mainly European countries that used to be minor fossil fuel producers, but which depleted their reserves or transitioned away from hydrocarbon production as a major source of economic activity. For example, the economy of the Netherlands grew by 176 percent between 2000 and 2023, but its hydrocarbon book value decreased by 40 percent over the same period.
Most countries, however, have seen both their GDP and their hydrocarbon production rise. When GDP grows at a much faster rate than hydrocarbon book value growth, countries experience “relative” decoupling. These countries can be found on the top left part of the chart. Many post-Soviet economies, where fossil industries were the last industries standing after economic “shock therapy” had decimated their economies in the 1990s, have experienced relative decoupling since 2000 as their non-oil sectors started to recover. For example, Azerbaijan’s GDP grew by 1272 percent from 2000 to 2023, while its hydrocarbon book value rose by “only” 873 percent. Similar cases are Kazakhstan (1336 percent/715 percent), Russia (678 percent/349 percent), and Uzbekistan (638 percent/170 percent. Saudi Arabia (463 percent/283 percent) is the only Gulf state that demonstrates “weak decoupling.” China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam also technically belong to this category, with the caveat that hydrocarbon production figures exclude coal, which has seen significant growth in these countries and may otherwise skew how they appear on Chart 2.
Some countries experience “negative” decoupling, that is, their hydrocarbon book value grows at a significantly faster pace than their GDP. These are in the lower right part of the chart, well below the diagonal line. One such country is the United States, where GDP grew by only 170 percent between 2000 and 2023, but hydrocarbon book value increased by 395 percent. Other countries in this category include Canada (188 percent/272 percent), Australia (315 percent/482 percent), as well as South American countries like Peru (417 percent/875 percent) and Brazil (232 percent/718 percent). In the Gulf region, two countries experienced negative decoupling: Bahrain (408 percent/765 percent) and Iran (269 percent/475 percent), whose non-fossil fuel economy is weighed down by sanctions.
Many countries, however, are strongly “coupled”—when GDP and hydrocarbon book value grow at roughly the same rate—meaning that these countries hew closely to the diagonal line. Coupled countries include most Gulf states: the UAE (393 percent/327 percent), Qatar (1099 percent/915 percent), Kuwait (334 percent/284 percent), Oman (389 percent/354 percent), and Iraq (419 percent/431 percent).

Chart 3: Change in book value of hydrocarbon production versus change of GDP, from 2012 to 2023. Countries above the diagonal line exhibited a higher growth rate of GDP than hydrocarbon book value, countries below the line had hydrocarbon book value grow at a faster rate than GDP. GDP and book value are measured in current USD. Gulf Countries are highlighted.
Zooming in on the Recent Past: Decoupling from 2012 to 2023
The Great Recession of 2008 heralded more modest global economic growth and an end to the hydrocarbon price rally. As a result, if we look at the more recent past, from 2012 to 2023, the picture looks different (see Chart 3). The Gulf’s near-constant hydrocarbon production, combined with a drop in prices for oil and gas, have meant that Gulf countries’ book value of hydrocarbon production is actually lower today than it was in 2012. Three countries have still been able to grow their economies, resulting in absolute decoupling. For example, Qatar’s economy grew by 14 percent from 2012 to 2023, while the book value of its oil and gas production fell by 24 percent. Saudi Arabia (44 percent/-26 percent) and the UAE (34 percent/-16 percent) also decoupled absolutely during this period. Four other countries decoupled relatively, that is, both their GDP and hydrocarbon book value rose but GDP rose much faster. These are Bahrain (44 percent/three percent), Oman (24 percent/three percent), and Iraq (15 percent/eight percent), while Kuwait experienced “recessive” decoupling: both GDP and hydrocarbon book value decreased, but GDP fell at a much lower rate than hydrocarbon book value (negative six percent/-30 percent). Finally, sanction-stricken Iran (-37 percent/15 percent) is still decoupling negatively, with hydrocarbon book value rising as GDP has fallen precipitously.
Conclusion: What Does the Future Hold?
Contrary to popular belief, the Gulf states’ relationship with fossil fuels is not monolithic. Hydrocarbon production remains the most significant part of Gulf GDP, though oil and gas have become less important to the economies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, which were able to grow their economies even as falling prices reduced the book value of their oil and gas output. Hydrocarbons’ share of GDP has remained constant in Iraq and actually increased in Bahrain and Iran.
One may ask the question: will Gulf countries be able to wean themselves off hydrocarbons, or will production remain constant? While the Gulf states have grown their non-oil sectors and kept their hydrocarbon production constant, fossil fuels remain a vital pillar of the region’s economy. Current efforts to slash production are motivated by a shared desire to stabilize prices. But investments into new production infrastructure indicate that output is projected to expand—or at least unlikely to decline—because even where the share of hydrocarbon rents in GDP has fallen, they are still the primary source of government income. What’s more, the no- or low-tax, subsidized-energy environment enabled by hydrocarbon revenues is, in turn, critical for attracting non-hydrocarbon industries. While many of the Gulf states have established Sovereign Wealth Funds and are in the tentative process of introducing taxes in their countries, the region seems unprepared to move from a rent-based to a tax-based or “portfolio-based” fiscal system. Therefore, government income from hydrocarbons remains indispensable and further reductions in hydrocarbon production seem unlikely in the near future.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.

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