Iran-Israel Escalation: Expert Outlook

The killng of Hassan Nasrallah marks a pivotal moment in the ongoing Iran-Israel escalation, with significant implications for Lebanon and the Gulf region. As tensions between Iran and Israel intensify, experts examine the potential fallout for regional stability, the challenges facing U.S. diplomacy, and the urgent need for effective governance in Lebanon. This collection of insights explores the complex interplay of local and international dynamics that will shape the future of Lebanon amid this crisis.

U.S. Missteps Fuel  Gulf Insecurity & Undermine U.S. Interests

Dr. Dania Thafer

Most Gulf state leaders likely harbored little sympathy for Nasrallah and may have quietly welcomed his assassination. However, their primary concern is avoiding an all-out Iran-Israeli or Iran-U.S. war, as the consequences of such conflicts far outweigh the threat posed by Hezbollah. The potential for devastating ramifications across the GCC is a much greater worry, with regional stability and security at stake. 

Iran’s leader may have believed they had no other option, but its last round of missile attacks risks provoking an unprecedented response, one not seen since the Iran-Iraq war. The GCC states are likely deeply unsettled, as this conflict has the potential to spiral into a broader regional confrontation with far-reaching consequences for their economies and security.  

Fortunately for the GCC states, their recent normalization of relations with Iran has proven to be a crucial strategic move, shielding them from the potential fallout of the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran. This diplomatic shift has positioned the Gulf states to avoid being caught in the crossfire, offering a layer of political protection amidst rising regional tensions. 

However, the proximity of vital Gulf oil and gas facilities to Iran makes them susceptible to attacks if escalation continues for the long-term. Despite the recent improvement in relations between Iran and the GCC, it remains widely acknowledged that Iran continues to perceive the GCC as an integral component of the U.S. strategic posture in the region. Already, since the Gaza war started Saudi Arabia has intercepted missiles heading toward Israel, placing the kingdom in a difficult position. As a key U.S. ally, Saudi Arabia must protect its territory while managing the risk of being seen as siding with Israel, a stance that could unnecessarily further agitate an already discontent public. 

Over the past year the U.S. has consistently undermined its own interests in the Gulf. The core U.S. interests in the Gulf region—countering Iran’s destabilizing actions, promoting de-escalation, safeguarding freedom of navigation in critical waterways, and keeping U.S. troops safe—have all been undermined. The U.S. has managed to embolden Iran, allowed regional tensions to escalate complicating the U.S.’s ability to achieve its own stated strategic goals.

With U.S. Policy in Flux, Regional Diplomacy Takes Lead

Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

In an ideal world, U.S. officials would seek to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East by using diplomatic and other tools at their disposal to alter the calculations of the warring parties. However, throughout the past year, the Biden administration has shown itself reluctant to consider measures that many of its predecessors have enacted. This has placed the U.S. in a reactive stance, limiting its ability to shape events as they unfold. The stance t is as baffling to close observers of regional politics as it is damaging to perceptions of the U.S. as a fair and consistent international actor.

With the  presidential campaign cycle entering its final month, and the outgoing incumbent seemingly bereft of any remaining political capital, there is perhaps even less reason to expect U.S. leadership at a time when political attention is focused so heavily on domestic affairs. The lame-duck presidency may choose to wait until after November 5 to flex its diplomatic muscles, which opens a window of five weeks until that point. With this in mind, the options (as well as expectations) for effective American engagement in arguably the most serious period of brinkmanship in the region since 2003 appear limited. It may instead fall on regional officials, including those across the broader region, to redouble their own efforts at diplomacy.

If there is one development over the past year that has offered grounds for optimism, it is that the Gulf States have continued to pursue pathways of rapprochement and de-escalation that preceded October 7, 2023 and have not been derailed by subsequent events. Perceptions in the Gulf of U.S. disengagement in the region have, in the past, generated policy responses that have not always been conducive to regional stability, with the post-2015 military intervention in Yemen a case in point. The very different mood in the Gulf in 2024 can be a building-block for keeping diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives open, and for mitigating the policy choices being made elsewhere.

Lebanon Must Tackle Political Stalemate 

Dr. Lina Khatib

Lebanon today is paying the price not just of Hezbollah’s decisions and Israel’s aggression, but also the political power vacuum in Lebanon.  

The Lebanese caretaker government and parliament are calling for the international community to step up diplomatic efforts towards an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon. Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati has also said that Lebanon is ready to deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. But the Lebanese state faces the dual challenge of not having formal authority over Lebanon’s most powerful fighting force, Hezbollah, and the United States standing by Israel’s campaign in Lebanon as part of Israel’s self-defense. This means that both Hezbollah and Israel are likely to carry on fighting regardless of the Lebanese authorities’ diplomatic pleas. 

The Lebanese state was not prepared for the level that the Hezbollah-Israel confrontation has reached nor its domestic consequences. Lebanon is failing to address even the basic humanitarian needs of the one million people displaced as a result of the conflict. This passivity on part of Lebanon is to a large degree the result of the political stalemate in the country and the intransigence of its ruling elite in the face of the need for political and economic reform.

While Lebanon alone may not be able to do much to influence Hezbollah and Israel-or their two respective external backers Iran and the US—it can still cooperate with Arab nations to set in motion a process to end the country’s political stalemate. This would serve to convey a sense of political maturity to the Lebanese people during a time when tensions are high and the need for national unity is critical. Lebanon needs to have its political house in order whenever a diplomatic exit out of the current conflict looms, so that it is in a strong enough position to push for the national interest. Arab nations helped steer Lebanon through rough political waters in the past. Now is the time for them, with US support, to resume such a role while avoiding repeating previous scenarios that resulted in only temporary political calm in Lebanon. 

Lebanon’s Future at the Mercy of External Forces

Ambassador Patrick Theros

Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination may be a transformational event for Lebanon or prove to be inconsequential. The outcome depends more on the actions of outsiders than on those of the Lebanese themselves, as has always been the case in Lebanon. Iran has chosen to challenge Israel directly rather than through Hezbollah, as most pundits expected. If Israel succeeds in dragging the U.S. into a war with Iran, Lebanon will become a sideshow. The implications of such a situation are uncertain. Iran has promised to destroy the Gulf’s oil and gas exporting facilities if the United States attacks, and the consequences of such a disaster would far outweigh any concerns about the plight of Lebanon.

Sideshow or not, if Israel’s bombing of Lebanon resembles its actions in Gaza, only Hezbollah stands to benefit; it is the only entity capable of organizing even a modicum of relief operations. Despite the decapitation of its leadership, the organizational apparatus, like bureaucracies everywhere, will continue to function. If Israel launches serious ground attacks into Lebanon and Hezbollah fighters inflict significant losses, as they did in 2006, Hezbollah will profit. Given the abysmal performance of Israeli ground forces in Gaza against Hamas, there is little reason to believe they will fare any better against well-armed, well-trained Hezbollah soldiers who are highly motivated to defend their homes. In either scenario, Hezbollah will not disappear quietly, especially since Shi’a are a plurality, if not a majority, in Lebanon. 

In the highly unlikely event that Israel prevails and occupies Lebanon, its conduct as an occupying force elsewhere should not give us confidence in how it would manage the situation in Lebanon. The only way to dislodge Hezbollah would be for the U.S. and Europe to demand that Israel cease its attacks on Lebanon and then launch a large-scale relief effort combined with a serious initiative to strengthen the regular Lebanese Army. This approach would undercut Hezbollah’s influence. It would be even better if the U.S. and possibly France could find a way to weaken the sectarian leaders who have crippled Lebanon. However, since this is unlikely to happen, my prediction is that Hezbollah will weather the storm.

LAF Leadership and GCC Support Amid Nasrallah’s Death

Nour Dabboussi

Turning points in history do not happen in a vacuum; they emerge from a complex web of interconnected ideas and events that, for better or worse, culminate in a significant moment capable of transforming the status quo. After a series of assassinations of Hezbollah’s high-ranking commanders, Hassan Nasrallah’s death might well be a turning point in Lebanon’s history. In the fog of war, it’s still early to tell. What is certain however, is that we are at a point in time where the Lebanese government must urgently implement firm actions to define the path forward, because if the response is weak – or worst, mismanaged – the direction the country is heading in might be a much darker one than the one it saw with Hezbollah under Nasrallah’s control. The aftermath of Nasrallah’s killing weakens Iran’s influence in Lebanese politics but also raises several concerning scenarios: an expanded Israeli invasion could lead to a prolonged occupation similar to those in 1982 and 1978, growing divisions within Lebanon could destabilize its socio-political fabric, and humanitarian uncertainties threaten over one million internally displaced people in an already impoverished country.

What’s certain, however, is that with Nasrallah’s killing comes a window of opportunity – albeit small and difficult to fully grasp – for the Lebanese caretaker government to restore stability. This starts by reaffirming the government’s full commitment to implementing UN Resolution 1701 – which caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati already declared his commitment to – and by calling for a ceasefire enforced only by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in close collaboration with UNIFIL forces. 

The Lebanese government should seize the opportunity of renewed public sentiment against Hezbollah and Hezbollah weakened political infrastructure to force the militant group’s disarmament, as called for by UNSC 1701, and the integration of its arms within the LAF. Next, the President of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, should call for an immediate emergency meeting to take several key actions and stances: elect a President for the Republic, commit to upholding the Lebanese constitution, call for the international community to use its leverage against Israel to protect Lebanon’s sovereignty, and emphasize unity among the Lebanese people. This final element is essential to interrupt the momentum toward division and prevent igniting internal sectarian hostilities that were once prevalent in Lebanon’s bloody civil war. 

Calls for Israel to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty have quickly emerged from GCC states, notably from Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with the last two also committing to emergency humanitarian assistance to Lebanon. As Israel expands its ground incursions in Lebanon, GCC states should continue their commitment towards calling for the respect of international law by denouncing Israel’s violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty. This move will also be critical in supporting the credibility the Lebanese government is trying to prove in its ability to commit to a Hezbollah-free governance – an issue that has distanced GCC states from Lebanon within the last few years. 

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.