Iran Wants a Veto Over Lebanon’s Sovereignty

Lebanon is fighting for its sovereignty, but that struggle is not confined to Lebanon itself. The problems within the country are now shaping the contours of Iran’s negotiations with Washington and, indirectly, Israel’s calculations over the future of its military presence in the south. Tehran’s relationship with Lebanon, exercised primarily through its allied Hezbollah militant group, has become one of the central obstacles to a diplomatic settlement that could stabilize the country.

While Israel’s interests in Lebanon can eventually be addressed through a mutually acceptable arrangement between the Lebanese and Israeli states, Iran’s interests in Lebanon are not likely to be resolved through a comparable bilateral framework. For Iran, Lebanon is not merely a foreign policy file; through Hezbollah, it is a pillar of Iranian regional power and of the Islamic Republic’s ideological identity, making a peaceful diplomatic accommodation nearly impossible in the near future.

Israel Is Not Planning to Annex Lebanon

There is a widely shared narrative among critics of Israel that its ambition is to establish a “Greater Israel” beyond the areas it already considers its national territory. Lebanon is seen as part of Israeli leaders’ expansionist plans. According to this reading of the current situation, Israel’s expanding occupation of Lebanese land is a step towards a permanent land grab—starting in the south, and perhaps expanding upwards. Israel has rejected this interpretation as it applies to Lebanon; it has publicly affirmed that the occupation of Lebanese towns is a temporary political and military tactic aimed at countering the threat Hezbollah poses to its northern border and pressuring the group’s patron, Iran.

Whatever the merits of this narrative, it does not reflect political realities in Lebanon. Israeli occupation is fiercely contested across the country. Leaders in Beirut, even those opposed to Hezbollah influence, have condemned the Israeli occupation and sought the withdrawal of Israeli troops. This rejection has been clearly communicated by Lebanon’s delegation negotiating with Israel in Washington. It is not a rhetorical rejection: even if Hezbollah is dissolved, Lebanon would not accept permanent Israeli occupation, and any attempt to maintain it would entrench lasting hostility regardless of who governs Beirut. It is therefore not in Israel’s own security interests for its forces to occupy Lebanon indefinitely.

Fortunately, Lebanon’s diplomats in Washington have remained pragmatic and have continued negotiations despite the violation of Lebanese sovereignty, on the understanding that it will end once an agreement is reached. Despite the frustration expressed by the Lebanese delegation over Israel’s position in the negotiations, it remains realistic to expect them to eventually produce a deal under which Israel agrees to withdraw from Lebanon. The main Israeli interest in Beirut is security.

Iran Wants to Dominate Lebanon for Iran’s Own Survival

The same cannot be said about Iran, whose interest in keeping Lebanon as an Iranian satrapy is a matter of regime survival. Exporting the Islamic revolution is a key pillar of the Iranian regime’s ideology, and Hezbollah sits at its core. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian have said multiple times that Iran will not leave Lebanon. Left unsaid is that the Iranian regime cannot leave Lebanon.

Such an intrinsic interest is not something the Lebanese state can solve through negotiations. For Israel, a non-aggression agreement with Lebanon, combined with the elimination of the threat posed by Hezbollah or other non-state armed actors, fits within Israel’s national security requirements. For Iran, losing Hezbollah would threaten the regional architecture that the Islamic Republic has spent decades building and that it regards as central to its own survival.

This is why Iran–Lebanon relations are now directly affecting the U.S.–Iran negotiating track. Tehran is seeking to ensure that Lebanon is not treated as a sovereign file, separate from Iran’s regional bargaining position. It wants Hezbollah, and by extension Lebanon, to remain part of any wider understanding with Washington. Hezbollah has echoed this position by seeking to delegitimize Lebanon’s direct negotiations with Israel, openly rejecting the ceasefire agreed between Beirut and Tel Aviv and attempting to continue its own private war.

Facing Hezbollah intransigence, Israel has nominally accepted the Lebanon–Israel ceasefire, but it has continued its military activity in Lebanon, bombing towns and occupying more Lebanese land as it pursues Hezbollah personnel and assets. Israel regards the Lebanese state as separate from Hezbollah and justifies its attacks as being directed against Hezbollah, not against Lebanon. But this distinction, crucial though it is, does not change the reality that Lebanese sovereignty is being violated from both directions: by Israel’s military presence and by Iran’s insistence on retaining an armed proxy inside the country.

Beirut Between Two Forms of Maximalism

The problem for Lebanon is that Israel and Iran are both pursuing maximalist aims, albeit in different ways. Israel is maximalist in its approach to Hezbollah: as long as Hezbollah exists as a non-state armed group, Israel will continue to give itself the right to attack it inside Lebanon, violating Lebanese sovereignty. Iran’s maximalism is far more insidious: it wants to keep the country as a card in its hands, and will do anything it can to prevent Hezbollah from being separated from the broader U.S.–Iran file.

The Lebanon–Israel negotiations are therefore important not only because they may eventually produce arrangements on withdrawal, borders, and security guarantees, but also because they assert that only the Lebanese state speaks on Lebanon’s behalf in international diplomacy. But the reality on the ground is that these negotiations will not translate into compliance by Hezbollah unless parallel negotiations between Washington and Tehran produce a significant shift in Iran’s position.

This is where Lebanon–Iran relations become central to the future of U.S.–Iran diplomacy. If Washington allows Tehran to fold Lebanon into negotiations as an Iranian card, any understanding with Iran would risk legitimizing Iran’s claim to exercise a veto over Lebanon’s future. That outcome would not stabilize Lebanon. It would merely repackage Iranian influence in diplomatic form while leaving Hezbollah’s armed status intact.

For Israel, such an outcome would underline the notion that the Lebanon file cannot be separated from Iran. It would therefore give Israel further justification to continue treating Lebanon as an extension of the Iranian front, regardless of the Lebanese state’s own position. The long-term consequences of such a position are ominous. A Lebanon–Israel deal cannot by itself resolve the deeper problem if Iran retains Hezbollah as an armed instrument inside the country.

For Washington, the choice is therefore between a diplomatic framework that treats Lebanon as a sovereign state and one that treats it as a bargaining chip in U.S.–Iran negotiations. The former could help stabilize Lebanon and reduce the risk of renewed war. The latter would leave Lebanon trapped exactly where it is today: occupied by Israel, constrained by Iran, and still fighting desperately to be governed only by itself.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.