Iran’s Reach in Latin America: Strategic Networks and U.S. Pressure in Venezuela

Washington’s efforts to remove President Nicolas Maduro from office turned Venezuela into a new arena of confrontation between the United States and Iran. The Trump administration’s deployment of troops and a dozen warships near Venezuela’s borders—ostensibly aiming to curb illegal migration and drug trafficking that U.S. officials have linked to Hezbollah networks—initially strained Iran’s ability to retain its strong bonds with Maduro’s government. These U.S. actions drove Caracas briefly closer to Tehran, prompting mutual warnings of potential U.S. military action.

The situation, however, shifted dramatically in early January when the United States launched a military mission in Venezuela, capturing Maduro and his wife and transferring them back to the United States to face federal charges. While Tehran and Caracas still maintain embassies and diplomatic contacts, these developments have placed their strategic ties on the back burner.

Military Ties and Regional Engagement

The Caracas-Tehran alignment has taken shape through a 20-year cooperation agreement signed in 2022. Under this framework, Tehran has also provided Venezuela with military expertise and equipment, including Iranian-designed drones and missiles that remain in the possession of Venezuelan forces. These assets strengthened the Venezuelan government’s ability to deter U.S. military pressure and underscored Caracas’ importance in Iran’s asymmetric strategy.

Iran’s engagement in Latin America is not only limited to Venezuela, but rather fits into a broader pattern of strategic outreach in the region aimed to challenge U.S. influence. Tehran has cultivated diplomatic and military ties throughout the region through both soft-power initiatives, such as embassies and cultural programs, and hard-power support, including military training and equipment. However, recent U.S. pressure and increasing American leverage in Caracas—which is reflected in high-level meetings between U.S. officials and Venezuelan leaders—suggest that Venezuela may no longer serve as a safe haven for Iran’s regional operations.

This pattern of Iran seeking a safe haven in Latin America is also evident in Bolivia, where Tehran struck a deal in 2021 to supply military equipment in exchange for wider access to uranium and lithium. Prior to his removal in 2019, former Bolivian President Evo Morales was even encouraged by Iran’s law enforcement to adopt Iranian models of policing, partly to combat drug trafficking but also to increase Iran’s hard-power influence. In 2023, Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi traveled to South America on a tour of Tehran’s various regional allies—including Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—and signed dozens of agreements with each nation, focusing largely on the oil and petrochemicals sector.

Iran’s Soft Power Projection

Despite U.S. efforts to challenge “Pink Tide” leaders like Maduro and Morales, both governments have maintained at least partial alignment with Iran. For instance, Venezuelan and Bolivian leaders have historically declined to support collective Latin American efforts to constrain the operations of groups like Hamas and the Iranian-funded Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Now, the United States is directly reshaping this trend by positioning leadership aligned with Washington and using its leverage to realign Caracas with American interests.

In contrast, Tehran has leveraged its own regional alignment to promote a model of militia mobilization and paramilitary operations in South America, challenging Washington’s influence by drawing on narratives of resisting foreign intervention. Iran’s growing soft power is exercised through ideational and cultural initiatives across Latin America. Iranian embassies and affiliated institutions have increased their presence on the continent, building networks of cultural, religious, and educational outreach that reinforce ideological affinity with anti‑U.S. political narratives.

For example, Iranian embassies across Latin America celebrated “Quds Day” on March 28, 2025, the last Friday of Ramadan, particularly drawing large crowds in areas with significant Arab migrant populations. In Caracas alone, more than 2,000 Venezuelans gathered to denounce Israeli policies. Other cultural programs, such as Farsi language courses at various universities across the region, allow Iranian embassies to overcome language barriers and promote Iran’s revolutionary and anti-Western worldview.

Tehran’s Strategic Depth

Venezuela’s Iranian-backed hybrid warfare strategy under Maduro aimed to combine hard military power with soft ideological influence, utilizing embedded operatives in South America to preempt U.S. action. Several reports indicate that Iran and Hezbollah are operating jihadi cells and training guerrilla groups in neighboring Bolivia as well. Allegations and charges against Maduro that drug money supports these operations, alongside prior Iranian profit-generating mining activities in the region, suggest cooperation with local cartels to circumvent U.S.-backed counter-terrorist financing efforts carried out through the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America.

Iran expected to increase its influence in Venezuela by exploring opportunities for joint ventures in their oil industries, a move that would have helped ensure continued financial flows to Iran despite sanctions. Not surprisingly, President Maduro urged restraint from U.S. intervention, citing the need to spare Venezuela from patterns of other ongoing and unresolved conflicts such as Gaza or Afghanistan where Iranian-backed militias have also operated. Venezuela’s ambassador to Iran, Jose Rafael Silva Aponte, similarly stressed that U.S. imperialism would not break Caracas’ ties with Tehran, suggesting that these bonds were intended to endure beyond Maduro’s rule.

Tehran strengthened its influence in Venezuela under Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chávez through a network of organizations, some of which may retain ties to the Iranian government. These included Iran’s Red Crescent Society, the Jihad-e-Sazandeghi, al-Mustafa University, and Ahl-ul-Bayt. This network expanded Iran’s so-called “strategic depth,” challenging U.S. dominance in the region. Iranian media, including Press TV, Al-Alam, and the Spanish-language Hispan TV, amplified this message with programs such as Baghdad 01:20, which portrays the “martyrdom” of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani as a symbol of Bolivarian resistance.

Cultural and religious outreach has further consolidated Iranian influence in the region. Book donations, support for mosques and Islamic centers linked to Hezbollah, and engagement with Arab migrant communities have contributed to Shia conversions across the continent—even among indigenous communities. In Venezuela, this judicious use of soft power allowed Iran to build political capital, supporting Maduro and other political actors against U.S.-backed opposition leaders, including Juan Guaidó and Maria Corina Machado.

Despite these efforts, Iran lacks the capacity to supplant U.S. influence in Latin America. Tehran increasingly recognizes that energy security will shape the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy under Trump, potentially restricting Iran’s access to emerging global energy sources and partners that control them. With Maduro captured and Washington seeking to consolidate control over Venezuela’s political and economic system, Iran’s leverage in the country and region has been sharply reduced. As a result, Tehran’s blended strategy of ideological and military influence will need to adapt to survive on the continent.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.