Lebanon Is Where Iran’s Proxy Empire Unravels

The U.S.-Israeli war launched against Iran in February 2026 is accelerating the end of Tehran’s proxy-based model of influence in the Middle East. At the heart of this model is Hezbollah, Iran’s oldest and most influential proxy. Built up since the 1980s into the most powerful Shia militia, Hezbollah is now experiencing an unprecedented degradation of its capabilities. Against this backdrop, growing discussion around negotiations between Lebanon and Israel underlines a broader shift: the era of Iranian influence through proxies is coming to an end and Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanon is slowly evaporating.

Nevertheless, Iran is attempting to preserve its last remaining channel of influence in the Levant. On April 9, a day after Israel’s most intense bombing of Lebanon yet, Iranian president Masoud Pezekshian posted on X that Iran would “never abandon its Lebanese brothers and sisters.” This was not an expression of solidarity. Iran has increasingly demonstrated its role as a destabilizing actor in the Middle East, one that prioritizes the survival of its theocratic regime above all other considerations. Iran cannot be realistically expected to change its behavior, whether toward the United States, U.S. allies, or Lebanon, in ways that lessen the burden of the war on Lebanese citizens. If anything, Tehran is doubling down on its “claim” over Lebanon. Iran has even threatened Lebanon’s Prime Minister Nawaf Salam over his planned visit to the United States for peace talks with Israel. The negotiations between Israel and Lebanon can fundamentally shift this dynamic, helping to constrain Iranian influence, restore Beirut’s sovereignty over its regional policy, and create space for broader regional stabilization.

Lebanon as a Sacrificial Lamb

Iran’s strategy has long relied on proxy networks to extend its influence across the Middle East and advance its regime interests. This model served Iran for decades, bolstering its position in the Arab world, but at the expense of the stability, security, and prosperity of Arab states. According to announced U.S. objectives, Operation Epic Fury aims to end this status quo.

Iran’s reaction to the U.S.-Israeli strikes has primarily involved targeting its Arab neighbors, reinforcing long-standing beliefs about its threat to regional stability. The activation of its proxy networks, mainly Hezbollah, to supplement its own military actions is part of its model of self-protection. This activation has vividly illustrated that Iran’s pursuit of regime-preservation comes at the expense not only of neighboring states but also of countries harbouring its proxies.

Hezbollah entered the war on March 2 on Tehran’s orders, aiming to divert Israeli focus toward its northern front. The cascading consequences Lebanon has suffered since—including, on April 8, the most violent Israeli attack on the country since the 1982 invasion—have not changed Iran’s sacrificial mentality. In theory, Iran could have asked Hezbollah to refrain from intervening. In reality, Hezbollah’s intervention into the war highlights its prioritization of Iran’s security over Lebanon’s, even as it frames intervention as necessary Lebanese “resistance” against Israel. Both Iran and Hezbollah knew that Israel’s reaction would come at a significant cost to Lebanon, which was an acceptable outcome to both actors given their view of Lebanon as a mere staging ground to attack Israel.

Domestic Coercion in Lebanon

Hezbollah has managed to put up a fight in the face of Israeli attacks but has incurred significant losses in both military capability and personnel, along with a decline in political and defense legitimacy it once enjoyed in Lebanon. Since the U.S.-brokered ceasefire agreement it signed with Israel in November 2024, Hezbollah has had plenty of opportunity to disarm and transition into a political party, similar to other former militias that pursued this path after the end of the Lebanese Civil War. However, Iran did not create Hezbollah for it to become another Amal Movement. Coercive power derived through its armed status has been central to Hezbollah’s rise as Lebanon’s most powerful political party up until 2024.

Despite its subsequent military losses, Hezbollah continues to intimidate political opponents in Lebanon and suppress dissent within the country’s Shia community. This helps explain why there has not been a popular uprising against the group, despite widespread anger over its intervention in the war, which went against the Lebanese government’s position.

Yet Israel continues to operate under the unrealistic assumption that sustained attacks on Lebanon will generate internal backlash against Hezbollah and lead the Shia population to view it as the culprit in the country’s destruction. In reality, the Shia who oppose Hezbollah are too scared to stand up to the group due to its continued domestic coercive capacity. A similar hurdle applies to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Not only is the Lebanese army militarily weaker than Hezbollah, but it also risks internal fragmentation given the significant number of Shia personnel within its ranks, many of whom are reluctant to confront a group from their own sect. The productive way forward is for Israel to prioritize serious negotiations with Lebanon.

War Negotiations Corner Iran

The Lebanese government has long expressed willingness to enter direct negotiations with Israel, though until recently Israel had rejected their offer. Following the renewed ceasefire discussion between the United States and Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu indicated that Israel now accepts direct negotiations with Lebanon, as long as the end goal is a peace agreement and full disarmament of Hezbollah. This shift comes amid broader diplomatic recalibrations in which Iran has also requested that the situation in Lebanon be included in the negotiations. Netanyahu’s acceptance of direct negotiations with Lebanon further undermines Iran’s influence over the country.

At the same time, the Lebanese state has rejected Iran’s proposed negotiations path, with Lebanese leaders affirming that only Lebanese officials should be speaking on the country’s behalf. By rejecting Iran’s attempt to place Beirut under Tehran’s umbrella, Lebanon is attempting to assert its sovereignty.

Iran is therefore cornered. If it accepts a long-term ceasefire decoupled from Lebanon, it risks losing its influence in the country because it will be seen as having abandoned Hezbollah, its most critical remaining proxy. If it rejects the ceasefire because it does not include Lebanon, Iran risks further escalation with Israel and the United States. Meanwhile, if the Lebanese government enters direct negotiations with Israel, Hezbollah’s domestic standing will erode further. A weakened Hezbollah would, in turn, translate into reduced Iranian influence across the region. This is why both Iran and Hezbollah have recently floated the risk of civil strife within Lebanon as a consequence of the peace negotiations with Israel. Such a thinly disguised threat is driven by Iran’s concern that the Lebanon card is slipping from its hands.

The broader implications extend beyond Lebanon. Hezbollah has received billions of dollars in Iranian funding, resources the regime could have instead used to improve domestic conditions inside Iran. For the Iranian people, the weakening of Hezbollah would underscore that their leaders’ investment has been wasted. This would destroy the model of “exporting the revolution,” a central pillar of the Iranian regime’s political ideology. It would also signal to Iran’s newer proxy networks that the jewel in Iran’s crown can crumble. Over time, Hezbollah’s collapse as a military force in the Levant could contribute to a broader recalibration of regional dynamics, paving the way for the Gulf states and their allies to pursue a more stable, regional order.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.