Oman’s Calculus Amid the STC’s Southern Gains

The rapid territorial advances made by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) following its “Promising Future” operation have effectively sidelined Yemen’s internationally recognized government (IRG), fundamentally altering the country’s political and security landscape. Yemen is now de facto divided along North–South lines, with the vast majority of territory controlled by either the Houthis or the STC. As 2025 wraps up, there are valid concerns about Yemen’s conflicts unfreezing and the fragmented country falling back into a full-scale civil war.

For the first time since the STC’s emergence in 2017, the Sultanate of Oman, which shares a 187-mile border with Yemen, finds itself directly adjacent to the secessionist group. From Muscat’s perspective, these developments in southern Yemen are deeply unsettling and pose a major security threat. Omani policymakers are particularly concerned that the STC’s near-total control of the south could usher in a new phase of instability, both through its own actions and those of its backers. Within this context, eastern Yemen—rather than the south as a whole—commands the greatest attention in Muscat. The prospect of unrest in eastern Yemen spilling across the border into Oman is taken seriously, especially amid ongoing uncertainty over the future of al-Mahra, the governorate bordering the Sultanate.

Strategic Caution Along a Shifting Border

Backed by the United Arab Emirates, the STC’s near-total territorial dominance across southern Yemen has dramatically transformed the strategic landscape in al-Mahra. For the present and, potentially, for the foreseeable future, the governorate can no longer function as a buffer between Oman and the rest of Yemen. Given past frictions between Muscat and the STC, these developments present a direct security and policy challenge for the Sultanate.

An Omani analyst who asked to remain anonymous noted that the STC’s presence along the border is more than an internal Yemeni power struggle. The analyst claimed it was a “de facto political–military entity lacking international legitimacy, rejecting Yemeni unity, and openly contesting Oman’s long-standing policy preferences.” The analyst added that the situation raises concerns about the risks of instability along the shared border, smuggling, intelligence penetration, the spread of Salafist ideology, and the potential for al-Mahra to become a “fragmented arena dominated by externally backed non-state actors.”

Salem al-Ismaily, a former Omani Foreign Ministry advisor who shared his personal views and not those of the Omani government, described the Sultanate’s relationship with the STC as “cautious and transactional,” noting that Muscat views the separatist group’s advance in southern Yemen with “concern rather than enthusiasm.”

Oman currently maintains no substantive political engagement with the STC. Any contact remains indirect and security-focused, with an emphasis on border de-escalation rather than political normalization. The anonymous Omani analyst explained that “Muscat sees the STC less as a partner and more as a risk variable whose behavior is shaped by external patrons and regional rivalries rather than Yemeni national consensus.”

Abdullah Baabood, an Omani scholar and Visiting Professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, described the Oman-STC relationship as more “pragmatic than ideological.” He emphasized that Muscat does not, in principle, stand against any particular actor in Yemen, but remains “wary of moves that disrupt local balances in eastern Yemen.” Baabood added that the Sultanate’s relationship with the UAE-backed group in southern Yemen is “shaped by geography, the STC’s expanding footprint, and Muscat’s consistent preference for de-escalation and local mediation.”

Balancing Gulf Interests

The STC’s consolidation of southern Yemen has put intra–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rivalries—most notably between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—front and center. Following recent clashes and airstrikes in southern Yemen, including the Saudi bombing of Mukalla and the UAE’s agreement to withdraw forces, Oman is now contending with intensified Emirati–Saudi competition for influence in eastern Yemen. Against the backdrop of tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Sudan, the situation in Yemen has prompted Riyadh to put out statements with especially strong language condemning Abu Dhabi—a sign that 2026 could be a year in which bilateral relations between the two Gulf powers suffer.

Keen to preserve stability in al-Mahra, Omani policymakers worry that the governorate could be destabilized by foreign actors pursuing their respective regional interests at the expense of Yemen’s stability. Such an outcome would mark a troubling departure for eastern Yemen, which has remained largely insulated from the country’s widespread violence since 2014. In general, Oman’s approach to Yemen has largely rested on the belief that the country’s political future must be shaped by Yemenis themselves, as opposed to external actors advancing their own interests. This conviction has guided Muscat’s diplomacy and its caution toward foreign-backed initiatives that could upset Yemen’s internal balance. From the Sultanate’s perspective, lasting stability cannot be imposed through proxies, surrogate actors, or externally driven territorial designs, but must arise from an inclusive process led by Yemenis. In this context, Omani policymakers tend to view the STC less as an independent actor than as a vehicle for Emirati influence, raising concerns that developments on the ground reflect external agendas rather than genuine Yemeni agency.

Baabood emphasized that eastern Yemen is no longer peripheral, describing al-Mahra as a “focal point of regional competition” and adding that “maintaining it under local consensus rather than external agendas is now a strategic priority for Oman, not just a diplomatic preference.”

Oman seeks to navigate these changes through selective cooperation with fellow Gulf states. Central to Muscat’s approach is the preservation of strategic independence: avoiding entanglement in competing geopolitical camps while remaining open to collaboration with states that share Oman’s interest in fostering stability and countering violent extremism in Yemen. Following the STC’s seizure of significant territory in early December 2025, Omani and Saudi officials have engaged in close consultations, with both sides maintaining a strong and shared focus on developments in Yemen, where Muscat and Riyadh find areas of common ground.

Baabood explained that “Oman will coordinate with Saudi Arabia where interests clearly overlap, particularly on border stability and risk containment in eastern Yemen. However, Muscat is unlikely to fully align with a bloc approach; it will preserve an independent diplomatic lane focused on deconfliction rather than competition.”

Countering smuggling networks, preventing uncontrolled fragmentation, and engaging Yemeni actors to de-escalate existing tensions are among the areas in which Oman and Saudi Arabia are likely to step up coordination throughout 2026. Such cooperation will be pragmatic and issue-specific rather than evolving into full alignment with Saudi Arabia or any other GCC state. “You’ll see coordination with Riyadh on practical security and humanitarian responses. But Muscat will avoid being drawn into punitive policies that would undermine its neutral diplomacy,” said Ismaily. He also stressed that “Muscat will try to avoid alienating either the UAE or Saudi Arabia; this will require careful, sometimes quiet diplomacy.”

The Challenge of Israeli Influence

Not lost in the equation is Israel—a state that benefits heavily from the STC’s territorial gains in southern Yemen. A South Yemen governed by the UAE-backed organization will give Israel a major foothold on Oman’s border, a deeply concerning development to Omani officials.

Muscat has consistently articulated a firm position in support of Palestinian rights and has used strong language to voice opposition to Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza, rendering this issue a clear political and moral red line in Omani foreign policy. Against this backdrop, the STC’s openness to normalization with Israel, or its alignment with Tel Aviv in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, creates a significant credibility gap. For Oman, engagement with any actor viewed as normalizing relations with Israel amid an ongoing conflict in Gaza carries substantial reputational costs, constrains diplomatic maneuverability, and risks undermining Muscat’s credibility as a neutral mediator.

This dynamic limits the potential for constructive relations with the STC and reinforces Omani concerns that southern Yemen is evolving not only into a security challenge, but also a geopolitical platform fundamentally misaligned with Oman’s core regional positions. Moreover, Oman is unlikely to tolerate a strategic environment in which Israeli influence, or that of its regional partners, encroaches on its immediate neighborhood, particularly in sensitive areas such as al-Mahra and Socotra.

Oman’s Path Forward
Oman’s Yemen policy is entering a phase of strategic hardening while maintaining its long-standing diplomatic orientation. On December 26, the Foreign Ministry of Oman released a statement emphasizing its support for peaceful resolution and dialogue in Yemen, particularly in al-Mahra and Hadhramaut, while acknowledging efforts by Saudi Arabia to mediate with concerned parties. The Sultanate further highlighted the need to avoid escalation, return to the political track, and pursue comprehensive and inclusive political dialogue to consolidate security, stability, peace, and neighborly relations.

While the Sultanate will continue to advocate dialogue, humanitarian access, and inclusive political solutions, it is also expected to invest more heavily in border control, maritime surveillance, and defensive deterrence, particularly in Dhofar and along critical maritime approaches. This shift reflects a growing emphasis on risk management rather than escalation, aimed at insulating Oman from spillover instability. Economic infrastructure, ports, and border security are increasingly treated as clear red lines, signaling resolve while preserving Muscat’s preference for de-escalation.

Diplomatically, Oman will seek to position itself as a stabilizing actor that opposes both total state collapse and externally imposed partition in Yemen. Muscat is likely to intensify shuttle diplomacy with key Yemeni actors, as well as with regional and international stakeholders such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the United Nations. These efforts are designed to preserve channels for mediation and prevent further fragmentation. At the same time, Oman will favor non-military instruments—including humanitarian assistance, consular engagement, and support for local governance—as tools to stabilize neighboring areas and reinforce its diplomatic leverage.

Oman’s response should not be misread as passive or reactive. Quiet diplomacy, calibrated security measures, and strategic patience remain core elements of Muscat’s strategy and statecraft. There is every reason to expect enhanced surveillance, closer engagement with local leaders in al-Mahra and Hadhramaut, and expanded contingency planning along the Omani frontier. However, if southern and eastern Yemen continue to evolve into a platform for sustained hostility or strategic encirclement, Oman is prepared to recalibrate its approach firmly, though without theatrics nor Omani military intervention in Yemen. As stated by Ismaily, “Oman’s policy will be simple and consistent: protect the border, protect people, and preserve channels for dialogue—even when others prefer coercion.”

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.