Pakistan Offers Another Vector for U.S.-Iran Diplomacy

The fragile ceasefire between Israel and Iran following the 12-Day War earlier this year has exposed a troubling shift that Washington must consider when formulating its approach to regional affairs. The U.S.-Israel-Iran shadow conflict is no longer limited to these actors; rather, the GCC states have also been drawn into the conflict. If the ceasefire fails in the future, these states may find themselves targeted by Tehran or its proxies—or even by Israel.

Recent events underscore this risk: Israel’s strikes on Hamas leadership in Doha demonstrate how the traditional de-escalation architecture, painstakingly built by Gulf states like Oman and Qatar, has been severely weakened. In this new era of regional relations, Washington must find a more credible pathway to stabilize the region.

An Overlooked Mediator

One actor could play an important role in a new-look Middle East: Pakistan. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s recent visit to Doha following the Israeli strike was, above all, a gesture of solidarity with Qatar. But it also signaled Islamabad’s willingness to play a greater role in regional affairs. For the United States, leveraging Pakistan’s assistance could offer a valuable off-ramp in future crises—allowing Washington to manage tensions between the Gulf, Iran, and other regional actors without relying exclusively on traditional mediators.

This potential is shaped by Islamabad’s complex relationship with Tehran, a tapestry woven with threads of common interest and regional rivalry dating back to 1947, when Iran became the first state to recognize Pakistan. The two countries share a 900-kilometer-long border, deep cultural and religious ties, and a common desire for a stable region free from the blight of terrorism—a threat that menaces both nations. Economically, the potential for cooperation is immense, from energy pipelines to trade corridors and logistical networks that could link Iran’s ports to Central Asia via Pakistan.

Yet, the promise of a closer partnership has remained unfulfilled. Pakistan’s historically pro-Western orientation—its deep military and political ties with Saudi Arabia and the United States, in particular—clashes with Iran’s revolutionary ethos. This ideological divergence has given rise to a persistent rivalry, with each side accusing the other of fomenting instability.

Strategic Independence

Despite its fractious relationship with Tehran, Pakistan is well positioned to mediate between Iran and the United States. Islamabad maintains functional, high-level access in Washington—a channel underscored by Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir’s White House meeting with Donald Trump in June 2025. Furthermore, Pakistan’s stature as a nuclear-armed state with a substantial and professional conventional military, demonstrated during the recent conflict with India, grants it a level of security credibility in both Pentagon briefing rooms and Iranian security councils that purely diplomatic mediators cannot replicate.

Pakistan has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to mediate in recent years. In early 2025, Islamabad fired missiles into Iranian territory after Iran struck alleged terrorist groups across the border. Almost as quickly as the flare-up began, Pakistan moved to de-escalate and reaffirm its desire for diplomacy with Tehran. Beyond crisis management, Pakistan has managed the seemingly impossible feat of maintaining functional ties with both Washington and Beijing while avoiding outright alignment with either.

This balancing extends to the Gulf, where Pakistan refuses to be drawn into regional rivalries. For example, in September 2025, Pakistan signed a landmark mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia. Pakistani leaders have gone to great lengths to assure Iran that the agreement does not single out the Islamic Republic, as Riyadh and Tehran are themselves pursuing a path of détente. Pakistan also represents Iran’s diplomatic interests in the United States, operating the Interests Section of Iran at its embassy in Washington, D.C. Taken together, these factors make Pakistan a viable partner for both states in easing conflict and promoting regional stability.

Transforming Influence into Action

Insecurity in the Gulf has created a strategic opening to explore the potential of these ties for discreet, backchannel dialogue. However, the field of mediation is crowded with seasoned players like Qatar and Oman. For Pakistan to step onto this stage, it must offer insights, access, or breakthroughs that others cannot.

Already, Pakistani officials are laying the foundation for a more prominent role. Islamabad’s swift and clear condemnation of the Israeli attack on Iran in June was a significant gesture that resonated in Tehran. During the September 19 United Nations Security Council meeting, Pakistan, together with Russia, China, and Algeria opposed the “snapback” of Security Council sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program.

The path forward requires a clear understanding of mutual interests. For the United States, cultivating Pakistan as a potential interlocutor would expand its diplomatic toolkit—one that does not replace existing Gulf channels. For Pakistan, transitioning from a passive observer to an active facilitator would mark a consolidation of its role as a regional power. To realize success, however, Islamabad would need to dedicate significant diplomatic resources, intelligence channels, and political capital to the singular goal of reducing regional hostilities. It must make clear to Washington that a stable Iran is in everyone’s interest—not only in the Middle East, but also in Central and South Asia. At the same time, it must reassure Tehran that it can be a trusted conduit for dialogue.

Prime Minister Sharif’s trip to Doha was a gesture of solidarity. Now, Pakistan must transform that symbolic gesture into a concrete strategy. By judiciously leveraging its multi-vector relationships and military power, Islamabad could help build a bridge between the United States and Iran, complementing the Gulf’s efforts rather than competing with them.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.