Redeployment or Withdrawal: Evaluating U.S. Troop Drawdown in Iraq

In mid-August, the United States began withdrawing some of its roughly 2,500 troops from Iraq—redeploying the majority to neighboring Syria, while moving others to Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in the north. This move followed a September 2024 security agreement with Baghdad, which called for most U.S.-led international coalition forces to leave Iraq and for the two countries to transition to a bilateral security relationship. Under the terms of that agreement, U.S. forces in Iraq proper must be relocated to Kurdistan by the end of September 2025. By September 2026, most of the remaining U.S. troops are scheduled to leave Iraq altogether. However, a unit of roughly 300 advisors and security personnel will remain at the base to support intelligence and surveillance efforts with U.S. forces in Syria conducting counter-ISIL operations.

The start of this phased withdrawal has raised questions over whether Washington intends to exit Iraq for good. President Donald Trump has long opposed extended U.S. military engagements abroad and repeatedly pledged to end what he called “forever” wars. No single conflict looms larger in the recent American collective memory of such wars than Iraq, sparking fierce debate and lingering doubts over the costs and wisdom of foreign military interventions in the post–Cold War and post-9/11 eras. Yet most observers agree that the United States is unlikely to fully terminate its presence in Iraq—not in the near term, and even beyond 2026—viewing the move as the beginning of a long-term redeployment rather than a complete withdrawal.

Cooperation Against Jihadist Threats and Regional Turmoil

U.S. forces were redeployed to Iraq in 2014 following the rise of the Islamic State (ISIL), which seized large swaths of Iraq and Syria and declared a caliphate. The scale of the ISIL threat to regional and global security pushed the U.S. military to re-enter Iraq less than four years after its withdrawal. Some measure of continued cooperation with the United States therefore remains critical for Iraq to prevent an ISIL resurgence and avoid a repeat of the 2014–2019 period.

While ISIL has been significantly degraded over the past decade and no longer poses an existential threat to Iraq, its steadily increasing tempo of operations in Syria raises significant concerns. Given Iraq’s dependence on U.S. reconnaissance, intelligence, and air assistance, a complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could, over time, undermine Baghdad’s ability to counter a renewed ISIL threat. Iraqi security forces continue to conduct regular operations against ISIL cells in a broad triangle stretching from Anbar in the west, to Kirkuk in the east, and to Nineveh in the north.

Inside Iraq, ISIL has demonstrated that it retains lethal capabilities, as shown by several high-profile attacks on military targets over the past 18 months. Given the transnational threat that ISIL poses, the United States plays a central role in facilitating cross-border operations against it—often in coordination with Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and more recently with the new government in Syria.

The Specter of Post-October 7 over U.S.–Iraqi Relations

The September 2024 Iraq-U.S. security agreement was signed at a time when Baghdad and the wider region faced a different set of dynamics. Following the 2021 elections in Iraq, pro-Iranian factions tightened their grip on Iraqi institutions, gaining control of the government and large portions of its security and intelligence apparatus. Escalating attacks by Iran-backed militias against U.S. forces in Iraq, Syria, and even Jordan—framed as support for the Palestinian cause in the ongoing Gaza conflict—prompted negotiations over the status of U.S. troops. American retaliatory strikes, which killed several senior militia leaders, further escalated tensions. At the time, Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” sought to capitalize on a surge in anti-American sentiment over Gaza, intending to force the United States out of Iraq—a move that would have also jeopardized U.S. operations in Northeast Syria and its posture in the Levant.

However, circumstances shifted dramatically in late 2024 and into 2025. The killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024, the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, and Israel’s 12-Day War against Iran in June 2025 left pro-Iran groups across the region reeling and extremely weakened. In Iraq, these developments created a sense of panic and vulnerability among the dominant Shia parties and groups running the state. Ironically, many Iraqi politicians have acknowledged that the U.S. presence provided a degree of protection from regional spillover—and that withdrawal could expose the country to an emboldened ISIL or even American sanctions over disagreements concerning pro-Iran groups. As a result, pressure in Baghdad to accelerate the American withdrawal has significantly eased. Despite earlier statements asserting there was no reason for a U.S. military presence in Iraq, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani recently acknowledged that a small contingent of 250-350 U.S. troops would remain at the strategic Ayn al-Assad Airbase in Anbar, citing ISIL activity in Syria. Similarly, an Iraqi Shia official told the Associated Press in January that “most leaders” of the ruling Shia Coordination Framework were “in favor of keeping American forces in Iraq and will not want American forces to leave Iraq as a result of what happened in Syria.”

For Washington, the regional turbulence that skyrocketed in the post-October 7 period also provides an important incentive for maintaining a military presence in Iraq. U.S. troops help prevent Iraq from sliding into chaos, constrain Iranian influence, and serve as a logistical hub for the U.S. mission in Syria, where ISIL activity has been far more pronounced.

U.S. Domestic Politics

Despite regional drivers, U.S. policy toward Iraq remains strongly attached to domestic political considerations. President Trump’s anti-war rhetoric has been central to his electoral messaging throughout his time in office, and he has shown a penchant for acting unpredictably, as evidenced by his unexpected lifting of sanctions on post-Assad Syria. Although unlikely in the immediate term, a complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq cannot be entirely ruled out. Such a move could be considered around sensitive electoral moments, to highlight the administration’s commitment to ending overseas wars and redirecting resources to domestic or other more pressing foreign policy priorities.

A more realistic option for both the current and future U.S. administrations may be to keep a limited troop presence in the Iraqi Kurdistan region beyond the anticipated 2026 withdrawal date. Such a posture offers substantial returns: the Iraqi Kurdish government provides a secure and cooperative environment for U.S. forces, with support from both the government and the public. Basing troops there would also facilitate U.S. operations in Syria and sustain early warning capacities against future threats from Iran or ISIL.

The Future of U.S. Presence in Iraq

Within Iraq’s domestic political sphere, the U.S. presence remains a hot-button issue. Kurdish and Sunni political groups continue to support some form of U.S. military deployment, viewing it as a necessary counterweight to Iranian ambitions and the growing influence of pro-Iran groups in the country. The Shia political camp, however, is split. Factions led by figures such as former prime minister Haider al-Abadi, Sudani, and prominent cleric and political leader Ammar al-Hakim view the U.S. presence as a stabilizing factor, particularly amid the current regional upheavals. This sentiment has grown since the fall of Assad in Syria and the regional weakening of the Iran-led axis.

In contrast, more hardline Shia factions with armed wings, organized under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and closely tied to Iran, remain opposed to U.S. and foreign troops’ presence. Since the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and PMF deputy leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020, these groups have intensified their calls for a U.S. exit. They accuse Washington of serving Israeli interests—especially by allowing Iraq’s airspace to be used in Israeli strikes against Iran—and portray the U.S. presence as strategically harmful to Iraq.

Despite their rhetoric, however, even pro-Iran armed groups recognize the benefits of a continued U.S. troop presence—for now—amid ongoing regional instability. At moments of heightened tension with the United States, such as in 2020 and 2024, many moderate Shia elements were often pulled into alignment with the hawks. For instance, after Soleimani and Muhandis were killed, a majority of Shia MPs supported a parliamentary resolution demanding the expulsion of U.S. forces, and subsequently backed the 2024 security agreement. Although Iran-aligned Shia armed factions have recently muted their opposition to U.S. presence following unfavorable regional shifts, any renewed escalation between U.S. troops and PMF factions could again tilt Shia politics toward confrontation with the United States. This development would undermine the pragmatists’ more moderate approach of managing an uneasy relationship with Washington.

Ultimately, the recent U.S. troop movements and reductions are less about leaving Iraq and more about recalibrating Washington’s long-term role in the country. Short of a black swan event in Washington, U.S. forces will likely remain in Iraq in some capacity for the foreseeable future—particularly amid fluid regional conditions with wide-ranging repercussions for American interests across the region.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.