Risks and Rewards for Russia in the Israel-Iran Conflict

Moscow has so far taken a cautious approach to the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel. While the Russian government has put out a series of statements criticizing Israel’s attack, Moscow has done very little in concrete terms to support its longstanding partner in Tehran. It is clear that Moscow hopes the flare-up of the conflict may benefit Russian interests in some ways; at the very least, it will be a painful distraction for America at a time when its support for Ukraine is already wavering but it may also harm Russia’s interests.

Tangible—but Uncertain—Benefits for Russia

At the outset of the conflict, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement critical of Israel’s attack on Iran, but called for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, the exercise of restraint on both sides, and the avoidance of escalation. In his phone call to Donald Trump wishing him a happy birthday, Vladimir Putin offered Russian mediation to end the conflict—an offer that Trump responded to positively. So far, however, Russia has largely remained on the sidelines of the conflict, and does not seem to have taken concrete efforts to help defend Iran against Israel.

However, Russia is far more than a passive observer. Russian interests are very much affected by the conflict. Some Russian observers have speculated that Russia will benefit from a prolonged Israel-Iran war in several ways. Most obviously, the war will sap the energy, resources, and diplomatic capital of the United States. To the extent that America and perhaps other states will send weapons to Israel, those weapons will almost certainly come at the expense of Ukraine. Indeed, even before the recent Israeli strike on Iran, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth had already redirected anti-drone weapons from Ukraine to U.S. bases in the Middle East in response to a general escalation in tensions.

In addition, to the extent that the Israel-Iran conflict has served to raise petroleum prices worldwide, Russia benefits from the additional revenue that it receives from petroleum exports—an important source for funding Putin’s war against Ukraine. And Trump’s welcoming of Putin’s mediation efforts in this conflict could help to reduce Russian diplomatic isolation from the West since February 2022.

These benefits, though, might prove short-lived. If Trump does not intend to send more weapons to Ukraine anyway—a possibility the forty-seventh president has repeatedly floated in recent months—his decision to send weapons to Israel does not help Russian interests. By contrast, since European governments regard Russia’s war against Ukraine as far more threatening to them than the Israeli-Iranian conflict, they are extremely unlikely to divert European arms supplies intended for Ukraine to Israel—particularly since European public support for Israel is at its lowest on record.

Russia certainly benefits from rising petroleum prices. Petroleum prices may rise further if the Israeli-Iranian conflict continues or intensifies, but this, too, may be limited if the Gulf Cooperation Council nations increase their own production. In other words, Moscow cannot count on the Israeli-Iranian conflict leading to higher petroleum prices for long. And once the conflict ends, whatever benefit Moscow does receive from higher wartime prices may cease.

Finally, whatever diplomatic gain from Trump’s willingness to allow Russian mediation between Iran and Israel may prove short-lived if Putin cannot deliver. Israel has made clear it will not accept Russian mediation. Meanwhile, according to Israeli media, Iran has reached out to Oman and Qatar to help relaunch talks, but has conditioned any negotiations on a halt to Israeli attacks. Moscow has offered to accept Iran’s highly enriched uranium and convert it to civilian use as a way of defusing the conflict, but Tehran has not accepted this offer. Despite Trump’s enthusiasm for Russian-led peace negotiations, Putin’s willingness to oversee them cannot amount to much if neither Israel nor Iran is interested in them.

The War Could Hurt Russia, Too

There may be limits, then, to how much Russia can benefit from Israeli-Iranian conflict. On the other hand, there are real harms that Moscow could suffer from its continuation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear in the opening hours of the conflict that his war aim was nothing less than the downfall of the Islamic Republic. It is not at all clear if this outcome is likely to occur. If it does, however, the consequences would be catastrophic for Russia.

Just as the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria—Russia’s long standing ally in the Middle East since the 1970s—has meant that Moscow must now compete with other powers for influence with the new government in Damascus, the downfall of the Islamic Republic would mean the loss of a longstanding Russian partner and the possibility that Moscow will have to compete with America and the West for influence in Tehran. If a new Iranian government—or even the present one under new management—decided to abandon the Islamic Republic’s hostility toward Israel and ambitions in the Middle East but focus instead on Iran’s own economic development, its relations with the West and the Arab Gulf states would quickly improve. As has already occurred with the new government in Syria, the lifting of Western sanctions against Iran may result in Russia becoming far less important to Tehran.

Even if the present Israeli-Iranian conflict ends with the Islamic Republic intact, Tehran will likely become more determined than ever to pursue nuclear weapons as essential for its defense in a future conflict. This could result in further rounds of Israeli-Iranian conflict. If Iran succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons, it would almost certainly motivate other Middle Eastern states to follow suit. The Middle East as a whole would become a region far less amenable to influence by Russia (or any outside power). Trump now seems to value Putin for his presumed ability to influence Iran. If Putin lost that ability, the predictable result would be his loss of esteem in Trump’s eyes as well.

Thus, while the present Israel-Iran conflict may result in some benefits for Russia, Moscow’s interests could also be decisively harmed by it. And while Russia clearly hopes that the ongoing war will distract from Ukraine, the reverse is also true: so long as Moscow’s war against Kyiv continues, its ability to operate in the Middle East will be constrained. Just as Russia was unable to prevent the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria, Putin’s inability to protect the Kremlin’s longstanding Iranian partners from Israeli military attacks makes Russia appear less useful as an ally to other prospective Middle Eastern partners. Conversely, Russia’s taking more active measures to protect Iran could sour Putin’s relations with Trump, Israel, and Arab governments fearful of Iran.

Putin, then, may well be sincere in his calls for a peaceful resolution to the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict. Unfortunately for him, this does not appear likely.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.