Russian Support for Yemen’s Houthi Movement

In light of the Syrian regime’s fall earlier this month and the weakening of Hezbollah at the hands of Israel’s military between September and November, the Houthi rebels (a.k.a. Ansar Allah) have established themselves as an indispensable member of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”. Tehran will likely come to view the Houthis as an increasingly valuable ally in the face of an expected US-led ‘maximum pressure 2.0’ campaign and Israeli aggression against Iran and its interests in the region. Yet, there are also important questions to raise about Ansar Allah’s evolving relationship with Russia—the permanent member of the UN Security Council that is most open to working with the Houthis in pursuit of shared interests in standing against the West.

Since the Saudi-led military coalition began its campaign against the Houthi movement in March 2015, Russia has cautiously approached Yemen with a policy of strategic non-alignment. This has involved engaging with all major Yemeni actors—Ansar Allah, Yemen’s UN-recognized government, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—and coordinating closely with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Iran on the situation in Yemen. President Vladimir Putin’s government sought to maintain positive relations with all the key players in Yemen and the surrounding region. “Playing all sides” is a standard Russian approach to intra-Arab conflicts, highlighted by Moscow’s similar approach in Libya, Palestine, and Sudan. 

Although Russia has not abandoned its overall balanced foreign policy vis-à-vis Yemen, Moscow has notably increased its cooperation with the Houthi rebels, raising some concerns among the group’s domestic enemies—chiefly the STC. Russia has already provided the Houthis with limited assistance throughout the conflict, including small arms. Viktor Bout, an infamous Russian arms dealer who was arrested in 2008 and imprisoned in the United States from 2012 until his release in the controversial Brittney Griner prisoner swap in 2022, is now back in business. According to the Wall Street Journal, he has been negotiating a $10 million arms sale with the Houthi regime in Sana’a, presumably with some degree of support from Putin’s government.

Throughout the second half of 2024, Western media outlets have reported that Moscow is considering sending advanced weapons, including Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missiles, to Ansar Allah. If the Houthis began to use such weapons in their ongoing maritime attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, it would mark a major shift in the conflict—and could have consequences for the U.S.- and UK-led military operations aimed at deterring the Houthis from further violence. Although it remains unclear if Russia has actually transferred such missiles to Ansar Allah yet, Western and Middle Eastern intelligence officials claim that Tehran is attempting to broker such deliveries. 

Via Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Moscow has also reportedly used its satellites to provide Ansar Allah with targeting data for maritime attacks on Western commercial vessels. On the diplomatic front, Russia has engaged Houthi representatives in talks about Moscow possibly recognizing Ansar Allah as the “legitimate” Yemeni government—a move that would significantly bolster the Houthis’ standing on the international stage. In March, officials from Moscow and Beijing met their Houthi counterparts in Oman to address various issues, including diplomatic recognition. Over the course of 2024, at least two Ansar Allah delegations traveled to the Russian capital to meet with Mikhail Bogdanov, Putin’s Middle East envoy, and other high-ranking officials in Moscow.

Alignment with Iran and Hostility with the West

On one level, strengthened Russia-Houthi relations must be at least partly understood within the context of Russia and Iran’s growing solidarity and military cooperation—as shown by Tehran’s active role in the Ukraine conflict. However, Moscow’s increasing support for Ansar Allah is more closely tied to Russia’s overall state of hostilities with the United States and other Western governments than the Moscow-Tehran entente. 

Almost one year into the joint American-British anti-Houthi campaign in Yemen, Moscow views Ansar Allah as a valuable bargaining chip with the West. Following the outgoing Biden administration’s authorization for Ukraine to use U.S. weapons to strike deep into Russian territory, the Kremlin will likely see the ‘Houthi card’ as increasingly useful in terms of challenging the West’s interests in/near the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Moreover, according to the Financial Times, the Russian military has recruited Yemeni foreign fighters to join its forces in Ukraine, promising them Russian citizenship and high-paying jobs. These mercenaries from Yemen, along with others from countries such as India and Nepal, have been in battles on the frontlines in Ukraine—providing an additional incentive for Russia to forge closer ties with Yemen’s dominant faction.

For the Kremlin, crises that harm Western interests in any part of the world can serve to distract the United States and the rest of NATO from the Ukraine conflict, with obvious benefits for its war effort there. With Houthi maritime attacks becoming a major concern for Washington and other Western capitals, there is a realization in Moscow that the security crisis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has the potential to divert American and British resources from Ukraine. If the second Trump administration can successfully negotiate with Russia a freezing of the Ukrainian conflict, Washington would probably demand that Moscow cut off its support to the Houthis. Yet until there is such an understanding between the United States and Russia on Ukraine, the Kremlin can be expected to continue exploiting Western vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Houthi maritime attacks to Moscow’s advantage. While America and its allies are otherwise occupied the Russians, with North Korean support, attempt to gain more of an upper hand over the Kyiv government before the start of expected negotiations in 2025.

Prior to October 7, the Houthis were mostly dependent on external support from Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah for aid. The group will always welcome new sources of foreign assistance beyond the Tehran-led “Axis of Resistance,” and given Russia’s status as a global power with nuclear weapons and a seat on the UN Security Council, it is difficult to exaggerate how much Ansar Allah values opportunities for deeper cooperation with Moscow.

Avoiding Problems with the Gulf Monarchies

Of course, Russian support for the de facto Sana‘a regime will come with conditions. The most important string attached to this assistance pertains to the security interests of Russia’s partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Moscow works closely with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh on Red Sea security. At the same time, the UAE has played an important role in helping Russia circumvent the West’s sanctions since Moscow waged its overt invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. With Putin’s government having invested significant energy into improving Russia’s relationships with both nations, preserving these partnerships is a high priority for the Kremlin. 

Ultimately, Moscow has no interest in playing any role in facilitating resumed Houthi hostilities toward Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Instead, Russia’s increasingly Houthi-aligned foreign policy agenda in Yemen relates to Moscow’s quest to challenge the West and its vital interests in and near the Arabian Peninsula’s southwestern corner.  

In the final analysis, Russia is attempting to maintain a delicate balancing act in Yemen. Hoping to avoid making moves that close the door to Moscow’s positive relationships with the STC and the rest of the Presidential Leadership Council while seeking to prevent GCC states from viewing Russia-Houthi ties as a security threat, Putin’s government is determined to leverage Ansar Allah’s power in Yemen and ability to threaten western states’ economic and geopolitical interests. 

With relations between Moscow and the West at their lowest levels of the post-Cold War era, the Kremlin seeks to challenge Washington and London’s interests in multiple corners of the world through such tactics. As long as the warfare in Ukraine rages on, Yemen, the Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden will probably continue to grow in importance as a flashpoint in Russia-NATO hostilities.