Russia’s Steady Return: Energy, Infrastructure, and Security in Iraq

On October 10, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with his Iraqi counterpart Muhammad Shia al-Sudani. Though much anticipated, the conversation proved anti-climactic. Amid the impending implementation of President Donald Trump’s Gaza ceasefire plan, Putin and al-Sudani agreed to postpone the first Russian-Arab Summit, originally scheduled to take place in Moscow on October 15.

While the delay underscores Moscow’s diminished clout in the Middle East, it was only a brief interruption in a broader pattern of deepening Russia-Iraq cooperation. This trend has been reinforced by Baghdad’s non-aligned stance on Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Moscow’s strong criticisms of Israel’s war on Gaza.

Since the wars in Ukraine and Gaza began, Moscow and Baghdad have translated expressions of solidarity into tangible cooperation. Russian energy companies are extending their footprint in Iraqi oil fields and moving into the country’s nuclear energy sector. At the same time, more than a decade of arms transfers and coordination over Syria have propelled Russia-Iraq military cooperation to new levels.

Russia’s Oil Giants Tighten Their Grip

Over the past year, Iraq has taken concrete steps to modernize its energy sector and expand its oil production. Baghdad aims to reach a production target of 6 million barrels per day by 2029 and is working to resolve long-standing disputes over energy resources with the Kurdistan Regional Governorate (KRG). As some Western oil majors, notably ExxonMobil and Shell, leave the Iraqi market, and others such as BP renegotiate their stakes, Iraq increasingly views Russian energy companies as valuable long-term development partners.

Russia has strong foundations to build on. During his September 2024 speech commemorating the 80th anniversary of Russia-Iraq diplomatic relations, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that Moscow’s investments in Baghdad’s energy sector had reached $19 billion, led by Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, and Rosneft. While pressure from secondary sanctions led Iraq’s state-owned oil company SOMO to suspend transactions with India’s Russia-linked Nayara oil refinery in September, this did not reflect a broader slowdown in energy cooperation. By May 2025, Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev confirmed that Moscow’s energy investments in Baghdad had surpassed $20 billion.

Having been exempt from US and EU sanctions for much of the Ukraine War, Lukoil has been the most active Russian oil giant in Iraq. In April 2025, Lukoil’s former CEO and largest individual shareholder, Vagit Alekperov, met with al-Sudani in Baghdad to discuss expanding Lukoil’s presence in the Eridu and West Qurna fields. During the visit, Alekperov also explored Lukoil’s potential role in supplying oil and gas to Iraqi power plants, as Baghdad works to double electrical generation at West Qurna-2 by 2027.

Despite Lukoil’s ongoing UK arbitration case against South Korea’s KEB Hana Bank and demonstrations around the West Qurna-2 site in northern Basra, the company’s strategic commitment to Iraq remains intact. On October 9, Lukoil’s Vice President for the Middle East Ivan Romanovsky held talks with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Hayyan Abdul Ghani al-Sawad, discussing the development of Baghdad’s largest oil field, the Eridu (Block 10). These discussions countered speculation that Lukoil had withdrawn from its $300–450 million tender.

Lukoil’s ambitious agenda in Iraq is likely to be echoed by its competitors. With the de-escalation of Iraq’s energy dispute with the KRG and easing tensions along the Syrian border, Rosneft is expected to resume investments. The partial repayment of KRG debt to Russian companies, brokered by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov during his February 2025 visit to Erbil, will further streamline this process. However, October 2025 sanctions by the United States and United Kingdom on Lukoil and Rosneft, along with Lukoil’s November force majeure declaration, have created new uncertainties over their future operations. On the other hand, Gazprom is positioning itself for a major role in developing the Nasiriyah field, which holds an estimated 4 billion barrels of oil. These investments would complement Gazprom Neft’s 30 percent stake in the Badra project in Wassit province and align with growing Chinese investment in Nasiriyah’s refinery infrastructure.

Powering Progress and Building Routes

Beyond oil and gas cooperation, Russia is also seeking to position itself as a key player in Iraq’s emerging nuclear energy sector. On May 27, head of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission Naim al-Aboudi revealed that Iraq was collaborating with Russia on the co-development of small nuclear reactors for electricity production. This agreement, informally struck in early 2024, also included provisions for Russian training of local Iraqi personnel to manage the nuclear facilities. On September 18, Alexey Likachev, CEO of the Russian nuclear energy giant Rosatom, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with al-Aboudi on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

While Rosatom’s projects often face delays, and the 2018 collapse of Jordan’s pursuit of Russian nuclear energy sets a negative precedent for its regional activities, Baghdad remains cautiously optimistic. Nuclear energy could help Iraq reach its 15 percent carbon emissions reduction target, attract follow-on international investment, and stabilize electricity for desalination plants that underpin the country’s water security. These benefits are more likely to materialize if Iraq continues diversifying its nuclear energy partnerships, such as China’s construction of a sub-critical nuclear reactor, which offers an additional platform for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Outside of the energy sector, Iraq is also courting Russian investment in its Development Road infrastructure megaproject. In August 2024, senior Russian and Iraqi officials signed an agreement enabling Russian firms to build rail lines across major Iraqi cities. Although the Development Road is nominally an Iraq–Europe corridor that bypasses Russia, its potential as a hotspot for Russian investment is still touted in Moscow. In a January 2025 interview with Moskovskaya Gazeta, Russian transport expert Yakov Gurevich described the Development Road as the “most interesting, promising, and feasible logistics project in the world.” Fellow expert Dmitry Baranov lauded it as a valuable complement to the North–South Corridor, with the potential to expand the volume of goods transiting through Russia. Viewing Eurasian connectivity as both a hedge against Western sanctions and an alternative transit route to the Suez Canal, Moscow is likely to prioritize the Development Road in its investment calculus.

Deepening the Security Footprint

Since Iraq pursued an abortive and corrupt $4.2 billion arms deal with Russia in 2012, security cooperation between the two countries has grown intermittently. For much of the Syrian Civil War, Baghdad served as the coordination center for Russia’s military operations in support of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, providing a foundation for deeper engagement. This cooperation expanded in December 2016, when Hashd al-Shaabi leader Falih al-Fayyadh met with then-Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev to establish a dedicated dialogue channel with the Iran-aligned umbrella organization. Focused primarily on Syria–Iraq border security, the channel even survived Russia’s alleged endorsement of three Israeli airstrikes against Iran-aligned targets in Iraq in August 2019.

Russia’s broad partnerships with the Iraqi security establishment provides a robust foundation for stronger military cooperation. On September 16, former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu made his first working visit to Baghdad. Shoigu leveraged Russia and Iraq’s shared opposition to Israel’s strike against Hamas targets in Doha to reaffirm the two countries’ common vision of regional security. Shoigu offered Iraq “the most advanced Russian-made weapons and military equipment” and advertised the sophistication of Russia’s air defense and missile technologies, framing the capabilities as tools to counter ISIS’s resurgence.

Yet secondary sanctions and Russia’s wartime supply chain constraints limit the scope of bilateral arms trade. Reduced logistical and maintenance support for Iraq’s fleet of Mi-17 Hip military transport helicopters has complicated anti-ISIS operations. Although Iraqi Defense Minister Anad Sadoun initially expressed optimism that its Mi-17s could rise to an 80% combat readiness rate with Russian assistance, U.S. intelligence assessments suggest that full restoration is unlikely until the war in Ukraine ends.

Despite these travails, a post-Ukraine war scenario could allow Iraq to renew its interest in Russian military technology. Baghdad’s pledge to purchase the S-400 Triumf air defense system in May 2019, and Washington’s reluctance to provide it with its own sophisticated air defense systems, could provide Moscow with a post-war opening for the shipment of Russian Su-35 jets. The main question relating to this delicate balancing act is whether the Iraqi military can operate both U.S.-made F-16s and advanced Russian equipment without jeopardizing its relationship with either supplier.

Although Russia’s great power status in the Middle East has been set back by its costly invasion of Ukraine and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, its partnership with Iraq continues to grow. The coordinated activities of Russian energy companies, infrastructure investors, and defense suppliers in Iraq warrant close monitoring by American policymakers in the months ahead.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.