SMART Engagement: The Case for GCC–NGO Cooperation

As the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members expand their diplomatic role and pursue mediation, security, and peacebuilding initiatives in the Middle East and beyond, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) are emerging as critical partners for success. In a rapidly changing region with funding constraints, the Gulf states, NGOs, and CSOs bring complementary resources, capabilities, and shared interests. Together, they could form mutually beneficial partnerships guided by SMART investment goals: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound.

Gulf states are leveraging their wealth and growing agency to pursue ambitious modernization and development objectives—but these ambitions are often threatened by regional conflict and instability. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Houthi drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), disruptions to Red Sea trade stemming from the war in Gaza, and attacks on Qatari soil by Iran and Israel illustrate how conflict continues to spill across borders.

While high-level diplomacy remains essential, experiences in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen demonstrate that meaningful impact is often most effective when conducted at local and national levels. In these contexts, NGOs and CSOs play critical roles in preventing, mitigating, and resolving conflict. Indeed, stabilization and peacebuilding efforts would be incomplete without their involvement.

Despite their proven success, many NGOs in the Middle East are facing significant challenges from funding cuts, particularly a sharp reduction in U.S. foreign aid, which has forced them to scale back operations. These organizations often serve as vital early-warning systems, help limit the intensity of conflicts, and support post-conflict stabilization and recovery. They function as bridges between communities and local and national authorities, particularly in areas where mistrust risks escalating tensions. Additionally, NGOs act as advocates and collaborative problem-solvers, working with state and international institutions on concrete community, structural, economic, and governance challenges. However, decades of investment in human capital, institutional infrastructure, and expertise are now being underutilized at a time when the Middle East faces unprecedented levels of fragility and conflict.

Track Record: NGOs In Action

Countries across the Middle East have demonstrated the practical value of NGOs in conflict prevention, crisis response, and post-conflict stabilization. In Iraq, NGO leaders warned as early as 2013–2014 that communal tensions and political grievances were heading toward violence and extremism. Within months, ISIS seized a third of the country. As the fighting intensified and millions were displaced, sometimes multiple times, NGOs served as first responders, providing emergency humanitarian assistance and shelter. At the same time, NGO and CSO interlocutors—including tribal and religious leaders, journalists, and academics—helped prevent the fight against ISIS from devolving into a Sunni-Shia civil war, similar to what occurred during 2004–2008. Once areas were liberated, these organizations supported the return of displaced populations, early recovery, and stabilization, including complex cases such as reintegrating more than 20,000 people from Al-Hol camp.

During the Syrian revolution and the fight against ISIS, Syrian NGOs worked under dangerous conditions to provide life-saving support to displaced populations and those living in dire circumstances. These organizations repeatedly warned that poverty and governance vacuums would leave communities vulnerable to extremist groups.

In Yemen, NGOs and civic leaders played critical roles following the ouster of Ali Abdullah Saleh, particularly during the National Dialogue Process, when civil leaders and NGOs voiced the aspirations of the Yemenis and partnered to build a new Yemen. During the subsequent conflict with the Houthis, they issued early warnings of governance violations and urged international support for conflict resolution. Local NGOs, including women organizations, worked to promote accountability for armed actors, facilitated prisoner exchanges, and collaborated with UN and Western diplomatic missions to support efforts to end the conflict.

Constraints, Perceptions, and Common Ground

Many Middle Eastern NGOs were established or sustained through American and European funding, often grounded in principles such as democratic governance, inclusion, human rights, and advocacy. “Naming and shaming” has frequently been a part of this work, placing regional governments on the defensive.

Gulf states approach these dimensions differently. As a result, relationships between governments and NGOs in the Gulf have often been uneasy, if not adversarial. Middle Eastern States, including Gulf authorities, tend to view NGOs as encroaching on state authority or serving as vehicles for Western interference. Conversely, NGOs have often perceived state institutions as elite-driven, corrupt, and restrictive. This mutual distrust fostered a zero-sum dynamic that constrained constructive engagement and long-term cooperation.

In recent years, however, this dynamic has begun to evolve. Governments and communities, particularly in conflict-affected areas, have increasingly realized the value NGOs can offer: experience, knowledge, funding, and collaborative problem-solving. A younger generation of Gulf leaders and diplomats, many of whom studied in Western institutions or worked with international bodies such as the United Nations, have shown greater openness to engaging with civil society actors. Humanitarian assistance and social service delivery, in particular, have emerged as key entry points for cooperation.

Practical Pathways for Engagement

It is in GCC’s strategic interest to supplement its diplomatic, security, humanitarian, and economic toolkit with the capabilities NGOs have to offer, particularly early warning and response systems and peacebuilding initiatives. At the same time, amid constrained funding and the Gulf’s expanding regional role, NGOs should be equally incentivized to engage with Gulf partners to inform policy, align efforts, and, where appropriate, diversify their funding base.

There are several practical avenues for engagement. At the regional level, the GCC should establish a joint funding mechanism supported by member-state contributions to finance targeted programs. At the national level, existing institutions—such as Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre, the Qatar Fund for Development, and UAE AID—should expand partnerships with local NGOs and CSOs focused on conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict recovery. Gulf states should also partner with UN agencies or international organizations with proven grant-management expertise to ensure transparency and accountability.

Confidence-building measures would be equally important. The GCC should convene conferences with Middle East NGOs to assess obstacles, identify priorities, and pilot new areas of collaboration. Existing platforms such as the Doha Forum or the newly launched Beyond Profit International Non-Profit—which convene diplomats, researchers, businesses, and policymakers—could serve as practical entry points for sustained engagement.

The steps align with the GCC members’ broader trajectory. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have ambitious national development visions and are increasingly asserting agency in regional and global affairs. As regional stability underpins economic diversification and long-term growth, GCC investment in conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding is a strategic necessity. Supporting NGOs and CSOs across the Middle East offer a smart and timely opportunity—especially as western funding, the primary lifeline for many organizations, continues to decline. At the same time, the GCC member states can leverage the expertise and capacity of Western conflict resolution and peacebuilding institutions while strengthening their own systems.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.