As the war in Gaza entered its second year, the fate of the residents of the strip hangs in the balance. Despite numerous failures over the past year to achieve a ceasefire, Arab countries primarily Jordan, Egypt, and Qatar continue to actively seek an end to the war. Nonetheless, participation in post-war Gaza governance and reconstruction has become a major sticking point between Arab countries, the United States, and Israel. Although the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and in particular the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, agree on the need for a Palestinian state, they hold conflicting opinions on how to manage international engagement in Gaza, or even what a post-conflict governance model in the Palestinian territories looks like.
Varied Interests
Saudi Arabia’s position on the Gaza peace process and post-war reconstruction derives from Riyadh’s unique political, economic, and security considerations. As the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites and a prominent power in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia feels obligated to support the rights of Palestinians in order to maintain its religious legitimacy and leading role in the Arab world. It is no coincidence that Riyadh spearheaded the 2002 “Arab Peace Initiative,” which, with the support of the Arab League, advocated for diplomatic normalization with Israel in exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the post-1967 occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Arab Peace Initiative marked a clean break with the Arab League’s previous unwillingness to deal with Israel—exemplified by the “Three Nos” policy formulated in 1967—and thereafter gave other Arab state political cover for further negotiations with Israel.
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 also influences Riyadh’s involvement in post-war Gaza. To successfully execute Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia requires regional peace—and thus a calm environment for attracting foreign capital. Saudi leaders also see security benefits in closer ties to Israel because Tel Aviv is the key to secure a mutual defense treaty with the United States, a major goal of Saudi policymakers for many years. Indeed, it has been widely speculated that one of the driving motivations behind the October 7 attack was a desire by Hamas to throw a wrench into Israel-Saudi normalization plans. And although the human cost of the war has led Saudi leaders, including the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the Foreign Minster Faisal bin Farhan and recently the Saudi ambassador to the United Kingdom, to insist on a two-state solution as a prerequisite for normalization, Riyadh has not given up on its desire to partner with Israel in the long term.
Moreover, Vision 2030 enables Saudi Arabia to play a more active and constructive role as a regional peacemaker and an honest mediator, somewhat independent of the West. From Riyadh’s perspective, participation in post-war Gaza would diminish the popularity of Hamas, the Houthis, and other revolutionary Islamist forces in favor of the stability provided by the wealthy and pragmatic Saudi government.
Political Dominance
Like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates shares overarching goals such as the implementation of a two-state solution, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and the weakening of Hamas. What separates the UAE from Saudi Arabia, however, is the altogether different way Abu Dhabi seeks to assert itself in post-conflict Gaza.
The UAE’s participation in the peace process goes beyond its parochial economic interests: indeed, it actively seeks to gain political influence in Gaza’s post-war future. At the end of July, the UAE proposed the formation of a “temporary international mission” in Gaza. This mission, which Abu Dhabi briefed to the United States, would aim to reunify Gaza with the West Bank under the rule of a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) backed by the United States and the United Nations.
Through this proposal, the UAE has prioritized the unification of Gaza and the West Bank under the Palestinian Government rule and weakening Iran’s influence in Gaza. Perhaps most importantly, the Emirati plan maximizes Abu Dhabi’s influence over the Palestinian Authority, giving it greater leverage over the postwar future of Palestine than any of its neighbors. This open bid for influence could explain why none of the other GCC states have accepted the proposal.
As things stand, the UAE has a relatively cold relationship with the PA under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas. Abu Dhabi does not support newly appointed Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa either, arguing that he lacks the independence and political skill to implement the UAE’s desired reforms.
Ultimately, the UAE’s aim is to hand over the affairs of Gaza to a new Palestinian Authority that more closely resembles a national committee of Palestinian leaders and business figures to govern Gaza after the war ends. This group of political and business elites would, in the UAE’s telling, represent the various Palestinian factions. However, all of its members would be loyal to exiled former Fatah leader and Palestinian strongman Mohammed Dahlan, who could eventually be installed as successor to Mahmoud Abbas. Dahlan, who currently lives in the UAE, is a multi-millionaire with extensive business interests in the region who was forced into exile in 2011 after being accused of embezzlement and plotting an internal coup—allegations he has vehemently denied.
Major Mediator
In contrast to the designs of its larger Gulf neighbors, Qatar’s jostling for influence in post-conflict Gaza is focused on reinforcing Doha’s image as a diplomatic power player capable of mediating and de-escalating the most intractable international disputes. The aid and mediation in Gaza have happened in close coordination with Israel and the United States. Between 2012 and 2018, it provided more than $1.1 billion in aid to Gaza, and has reportedly spent about $15 million a month since 2018 to pay the salaries of tens of thousands of teachers, doctors, and other workers in the Gaza Strip.
Qatar’s role as a mediator and host of Hamas’ political leadership has also reinforced the country’s importance in the eyes of Western and Israeli policymakers: while few officials in Washington and Tel Aviv may gripe about Hamas officials’ presence in Doha, they understand that if Hamas separates from Qatar, the group will then move to Iran, where communication will be near-impossible, and their presence in Qatar gives them some sort of independence in the decision making from the Islamic Republic regional agenda. Considering that the conflict has gone on for longer than a year and Hamas remains intact, it seems likely that Qatar will be able to maintain its position as a critical interlocutor until the parties agree to a ceasefire.
It is clear that post-war Gaza presents opportunities for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to expand their influence. The burgeoning competition between the GCC’s most outward-looking actors demonstrates that their interests, outside of the most high-level demands for a Palestinian state, do not consistently align. The coming months, sure to be full of diplomatic engagement and jockeying for leadership in Gaza, will be crucial to determining the future of Gaza and the Gulf states’ interests there.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.
Extreme weather events, exacerbated by climate change, are profoundly impacting societies and economies worldwide. Floods, primarily triggered by intense rainfall, are among the most devastating natural disasters, accounting for tens of thousands of deaths and hundreds of billions of dollars of damage each year. A recent World Meteorological Organization (WMO) report also highlights the increasing frequency and intensity of heat waves; in July, the global average surface air temperature registered its highest-ever level, surpassing the record set just a year earlier.
In the past six months, the Gulf Arab nations have faced two major episodes of extreme weather—violent rainstorms leading to flash floods and blistering heat waves—a pattern that is growing alarmingly common. In fact, extreme weather has become the “new normal” in the Gulf and across the wider Middle East.
In response to this challenge, the Gulf States have taken substantial steps toward implementing disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures to safeguard the lives and property of their citizens. Nonetheless, recent periods of torrential rain, flooding, and suffocating heat across the Gulf Arab countries have highlighted the urgent need to redouble these efforts.
After Rain, the Deluge
Powerful rainstorms triggered flash flooding in the Gulf in mid-April, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman the worst hit. The Emirates’ state-run WAM news agency called the rainfall “a historic weather event” that surpassed “anything documented since the start of data collection in 1949.” In Oman, although the nation’s Multi-Hazard Early Warning Center (MWEC) issued alerts prior to the deluge, the floods caused widespread disruption to infrastructure and public life and caught many residents off-guard.
Despite prompt action by emergency response teams, at least 21 people lost their lives. In addition to the fatalities, this event adversely affected human health, hitting vulnerable communities the hardest. In July, NGO FairSquare reported that migrant workers in the UAE are at heightened risk of dengue fever due to April’s devastating floods. According to World Weather Attribution (WWA), 80% of Oman’s and 85% of the UAE’s populations in low-lying areas face high flood risk, with vulnerable groups such as older adults, people with disabilities, caregivers, minorities, and low-income individuals particularly exposed.
The rain in Dubai brought the Gulf’s business hub to a standstill and caused flight cancellations at Dubai International Airport. In Saudi Arabia, prolonged heavy rainfall led to flooding in Medina and submerged roads in Riyadh. The Eastern Province also experienced widespread flooding, prompting the closure of the King Fahd Road tunnel in Dammam as a precaution.
While flash floods are not a common occurrence in most of the Gulf region, they are becoming more frequent. Major floods have struck Saudi Arabia with increased intensity since 2009. Despite its arid climate and limited rainfall, Jeddah experienced several unexpected floods in three successive years (2009-2011), causing substantial human and material damage. Fierce rains and flash foods struck Mecca in 2015 and again in 2023. Floods also hit much of the Kingdom’s Red Sea coast in 2022, forcing school closures and turning streets into rivers. Torrential storms experienced over northeastern UAE in July 2022 occurred at the height of the summer, when rainfall is normally negligible. Flash floods brought on by tropical Cyclone Gonu in July 2007 caused 54 fatalities and $3.9 billion in property damage in Oman. Intense rainfall in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman caused severe destruction and killed over 50 people in 2018.
Rapid urban development in cities such as Riyadh and Dubai has increased the risk of flash floods. Impermeable surfaces, such as asphalt-paved roads and concrete building foundations, prevent water from being absorbed into the ground, leading to increased runoff. A recent study of Sharjah, UAE, found that the city’s rapid growth over the past half-century had made it vulnerable to flooding at far lower levels of rain than before. As climate change progresses, extreme precipitation events are expected to occur more frequently and with greater severity, since a warmer atmosphere can hold more moisture. Moreover, climate change may raise the probability of intense thunderstorms, with extreme rainfall resulting from increased atmospheric instability.
Searing Heat
Given the region’s notoriously hot summers, it comes as no surprise that heat waves are a common and significant feature of the Gulf’s climate. Moreover, the rapid urbanization of Gulf societies makes matters worse; urban areas, densely packed with buildings and infrastructure, often experience higher temperatures than rural areas. In coastal zones, high humidity levels exacerbate the heat, leading to even more extreme heat indices. The effects of climate change are amplifying the intensity and frequency of heatwaves globally, and the Gulf region is no exception.
Just weeks after Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors experienced torrential rains and flooding in April 2024, the Kingdom sweltered through searing summer heat. The threat of extreme heat became clear during the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca just two months later, when soaring temperatures claimed the lives of more than 1,300 people and hospitalized several thousand others.
Kuwait recorded the third-highest temperatures of any place in the world in June 2024, reaching 120.74°F (49.3°C) at the International Airport in Kuwait. In early July, the Arab Weather Center issued a severe warning of a severe heatwave. The forecast proved accurate; throughout the month, Gulf nations faced dangerously high heat indexes often rising above 140°F. Temperatures in Kuwait hit a blistering 123.8°F (51°C).
The Gulf nations are no strangers to unbearable summers—the region’s temperatures are already well above the global average. However, the Gulf states appear more susceptible to climate change than those of other regions. A recent study showed that over the past four decades, Saudi Arabia has warmed at a rate 50 percent higher than the rest of the landmass in the Northern Hemisphere. The Gulf region as a whole will warm twice as fast as the global average.
Last summer, temperatures exceeded 50°C in the UAE for the first time. Dubai was recently ranked as the world’s city with the most dangerous summer heat, facing perilous temperatures on 89 percent of summer days, with Doha following closely in second place and Riyadh, eighth. By 2050, Mecca could have an estimated 182 days of dangerous heat for Saudis who are exposed to the sun, according to an analysis conducted last year. This would also expose millions of pilgrims visiting the city throughout the year to the extreme heat, putting their health and safety at risk. Another study published in Nature Sustainability suggests the Gulf countries may have nearly their entire populations exposed to extreme temperatures due to climate change. Researchers have identified the Gulf as a region likely to frequently surpass life-threatening heat thresholds over the next 30 to 50 years.
The combination of intense heat and high humidity in the Gulf is pushing the boundaries of human tolerance and sustainability. Scorching temperatures place growing demands on electricity grids, strain infrastructure and water resources, endanger laborers, and render outdoor activities life-threatening. This summer’s heatwave has triggered extensive and rolling power outages across the Gulf. Due to the pressure on power plants from soaring demand caused by extreme heat, Kuwait’s Ministry of Electricity, Water and Renewable Energy temporarily cut power in some areas of the country.
Before Disaster Strikes
Over the last decade, states around the world have shifted away from emphasizing disaster response and instead focusing on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), which advocates for proactive prevention, preparedness, and resilience-building before catastrophic events occur. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SF) guides United Nations member states in protecting development gains from disaster.
Spurred by devastating weather events, the Gulf Cooperation Council states have increasingly embraced DRR measures. The 2022 Midterm Review (MTR) for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework in the Arab Region and the December 2023 outcome document of the 9th Arab partnership meeting for DRR highlight promising progress toward the goals of the DRR framework. Notably, all six GCC countries have started implementing National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies (NDRRs). Among various improvements, advancements in meteorological technology and modeling have enhanced governments’ ability to forecast extreme weather events.
In particular, the UAE has made significant strides in building a system for dealing with disasters, led by the country’s National Crisis and Emergency Management Authority (NCEMA). Some of these advances were on display in recent months. In late April, to mitigate the impact of a second round of storms set to sweep across the Emirates, NCEMA issued directives for road and park closures, recommended distance learning and remote work, and implemented other precautions. To reduce the risk of future severe flooding, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum approved an extensive $8 billion stormwater management project for Dubai. In addition to these recent measures, the UAE Ministry of Health and Prevention also launched an initiative aimed at preventing heat exhaustion, heat stroke, and other heat-related illnesses. This approach, which incorporates the efforts of government and private actors, proved effective to avoid the worst effects of potentially devastating climate events.
Saudi Arabia has also made progress in three critical dimensions of DRR. The Kingdom has implemented advanced early warning systems, raised public awareness about the dangers of climate change and fostered education initiatives to ensure that all segments of society are equipped with actionable information that can be used in emergencies, and enhanced emergency response capabilities. Saudi Arabia has implemented a Heat Health Warning System (HHWS).
The extreme weather events of this year in the Gulf highlight the urgent need for proactive climate resilience strategies, particularly in fast-growing urban centers. The experiences of the past several months have revealed that despite ongoing efforts to mitigate economic and human losses, the Gulf countries continue to face increasingly complex climate-related risks. To mitigate the effects of climate change, the Gulf states must not only invest significant sums into infrastructure and new technologies, but also make a dedicated effort to boost adaptive capacity through public engagement and grassroots initiatives. The climate fight of the future will require the attention of all Gulf citizens; without actively engaged societies, state-led efforts to address natural disasters will never be truly effective.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.
