Israeli Airstrikes Expose Iran’s Air Defense Weaknesses Amid Rising Tensions

Ibrahim Al-Assil

The recent Israeli airstrikes on Iran mark another significant development in the ongoing conflict, specifically targeting Iran’s air defense systems. These strikes aimed to demonstrate Israel’s airpower superiority while limiting Iran’s ability to intercept incoming attacks. While Iran produces multiple air defense systems domestically, sanctions have hampered its capacity to upgrade them, making it vulnerable to conventional warfare tactics. Notably, the Russian S-300, one of Iran’s top air defense systems, was targeted both in the Israeli strikes in April and during this recent campaign.

Historically, Iran has excelled in asymmetric warfare, leveraging support for non-state actors rather than engaging in conventional conflicts since the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988. However, Israel seeks to underscore its military superiority through these strikes, highlighting the limitations of Iran’s defense strategies in the face of direct attacks.

While U.S. pressure led Israel to avoid targeting nuclear facilities, it struck defense systems protecting these sites. This tactic not only lays the groundwork for potential future strikes on nuclear installations but also increases pressure on the Iranian regime. Confronted with these attacks, Iran may feel compelled to accelerate its nuclear capabilities as a means of ensuring regime survival against perceived existential threats.

As tensions rise, the potential for further escalation looms large, complicating U.S. efforts to contain the cycle of strikes and counter-strikes while maintaining regional stability. The next few days may bring calm ahead of the American elections, but ongoing conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza heighten the likelihood of a renewed cycle of violence.

Retaliatory Strikes: Iran and Israel’s New Normal in an Escalating Middle East

Hamidreza Aziz

Direct tit-for-tat attacks between Iran and Israel are increasingly becoming a “new normal” in the protracted conflict between these two regional adversaries. The gradual intensification and rising frequency of military actions by Tehran and Tel Aviv, amid the ongoing wars in Gaza and Lebanon that threaten to spill over into Syria, suggest that the Middle East may be entering a prolonged and perilous phase of chronic instability and sporadic escalations that could engulf the entire region.

For years, the Iran-Israel conflict operated within the “gray zone,” characterized by indirect actions below the threshold of war, aimed at undermining each other’s capabilities and influencing strategic calculations. Within this framework, Israel, leveraging its superior intelligence, conducted targeted attacks on Iranian interests in Syria, Lebanon, and occasionally inside Iran. Iran, in response, relied on its network of allied non-state actors and proxies to engage with Israel indirectly.

However, since April, a shift has become evident. The Israeli attack on Iran’s diplomatic mission in Damascus, followed by two rounds of direct confrontations, indicates a growing recognition on both sides that the previous engagement patterns no longer suffice to meet their strategic aims. For Iran, it has become clear that its “Axis of Resistance” lacks the deterrent capability to prevent direct Israeli attacks, even though it can still impose significant costs. For Israel, since the onset of the Gaza war in October 2023, an emerging perspective holds that confronting Iran’s influence in the region requires not only increasing operational costs for Tehran but also directly holding Iran accountable.

This evolving engagement pattern reflects a mutual shift in threat perceptions. Under these conditions, a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon could temporarily ease tensions and create a window for testing diplomatic solutions, though it is unlikely to resolve the Iran-Israel conflict outright. Arab states, positioned between these two rival actors, face an increasingly difficult balancing act. Yet, given their ties to both parties and Tehran’s skepticism toward extra-regional initiatives, Arab states may be uniquely positioned to mediate and nudge Iran and Israel toward a modus vivendi.

Iran and Israel’s Shadow War Comes Into the Open

Shukriya Bradost

Although Iran has tried to downplay Israel’s recent strike on its territory—the first direct attack on Iran since the Iran-Iraq war—it marks a significant shift in the longstanding shadow war between Tehran and Tel Aviv. For over three decades, Israel avoided publicly claiming responsibility for alleged attacks or assassinations within Iran, often leaving incidents shrouded in speculation. This time, however, Israel has officially acknowledged its strike, denying Iran the chance to downplay the damage, as it did following Israel’s air defense attack on Isfahan in April, which retaliated against Iran’s first missile strike on Israel.

This conflict has escalated beyond a shadow war, shifting toward direct confrontation resembling a classical war based on air power capabilities. The pressing question now is whether Iran will retaliate against this significant strike, especially given that Israel’s raid exposed vulnerabilities in Iranian air defenses, potentially leaving the country open to future attacks.

A Gaza ceasefire, which Iran is linking to its potential retaliation against Israel, suggests Iran is exercising caution, aiming to prevent further strikes from Israel—an outcome Netanyahu may be seeking. The U.S. election outcome could further shape this conflict; a Trump victory might give Netanyahu greater leeway for action, while even a Democratic win might not prevent it. Having respected the U.S. request to avoid targeting Iran’s oil and nuclear facilities, Netanyahu may find it easier to secure support from a Biden administration for action against Iran.

Evolving Iran-Israel Conflict: Shifts in Strategy and Regional Stance

Arman Mahmoudian

The recent confrontations between Iranians and Israelis carry significant implications for the Iran-Israel rivalry. These exchanges suggest a shift in Iran’s traditional deterrence strategy, which has historically depended on proxy groups as a frontline against Israel. Originally, Iran aimed to keep Israel at bay indirectly; however, its recent direct involvement—marked by attempts to avenge leaders like Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh, sparking renewed hostilities in October—suggests that this approach may no longer be sufficient.

In turn, Israel appears to recognize that limiting these clashes to proxy battles may no longer be viable. This escalation implies an increased likelihood of direct confrontation between Israel and Iran.

As this conflict intensifies, the Middle East edges closer to a major crisis, breaking the longstanding taboo against direct exchanges of fire between the two countries—a concerning development for regional stability. Yet, a positive outcome has emerged: Arab nations in the Persian Gulf have largely maintained their distance. Unlike past conflicts, this confrontation has not drawn in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or other Gulf states, indicating a possible trend toward restraint. This restraint may signal a move toward détente or de-escalation between Iran and the Arab states.

Additionally, Iran’s direct engagement has significant impacts on its proxies. By engaging Israel directly, Iran reinforces its commitment to the “Axis of Resistance,” boosting morale among its allies. However, Iran’s limited capacity to counter Israeli retaliatory strikes effectively exposes its military vulnerabilities, which may prompt some allied groups or regional actors to reassess their alliances with Iran in its confrontation with Israel.

Only Reinstating U.S. Deterrence Can Restrain the Gambling Ayatollah

Khosro Isfahani

In his first public response to October 26 Israeli strikes against military targets in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei laid out Tehran’s strategy: (1) acquire “tools of power… including weaponry”, presumably more advanced missile and possibly weapons of mass destruction, (2) intensify psychological warfare and crackdown on dissenting voices questioning the official narrative of security and normalcy, and (3) rattle the adversaries and “make them understand Iran’s power” and how they have “miscalculated” it. 

Ayatollah Khamenei is a gambler; human lives are his poker chips; he will play until the lights go out. He has already set the table for the next round and as always when facing a high-risk bet he has hedged by shifting responsibility to “officials” that “should calibrate” Tehran’s response.

However, there is one way to halt the game: increase the bet sky-high. The Ayatollah must be convinced that another round can cost him his regime. After all, he sees preserving the state as his sole calling and the “highest religious duty”.

That can only be achieved by reinstating U.S. deterrence in the Middle East since the leadership in Tehran only understands the language of the sword as two-term President Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021) said while hammering the Iran-Contra arms deal in Paris with U.S. and Israeli officials in 1986. Rouhani even took it a step further and recommended the US designating military targets in Iran, communicating demands and the targets to Tehran, and hitting them if redlines are crossed. As Ronen Bergman quoted Rouhani in The Secret War With Iran,“Show that you are strong, and you will see results.”

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.  

Iran’s deterrence strategy—once the terror of the region, propped up by powerful proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis as well as smaller and less capable militias—is now hobbling, visibly depleted from its engagements in the post-October 7 period. Iran’s army of foreign agents was created to influence events across the Middle East, and if necessary to keep Israel and Tehran’s other adversaries focused on their near abroad, allowing Iran to remain out of direct conflict. 

But the facts on the ground have changed substantially over the past year—and particularly since Iran’s unsuccessful missile attack against Israel on April 13. Iran’s strategy of low-cost, low-risk proxy war was meant to keep its adversaries at the mercy of perpetual surprise. But as any military planner knows, a static strategy is a doomed strategy. Indeed, Israel’s technological advantage has made it evident that Iran’s strategy, once effective, can barely keep up. Tel Aviv’s ability to conduct pinpoint airstrikes and cyber attacks, as well as its possession of cutting-edge missile defense systems, has exposed the shortcomings of Iran’s playbook when tested in real-world conditions. Tehran now faces an no-win choice: adjust to the game’s new rules, or accept defeat.

Unraveling Iran’s Traditional Deterrence Model

Iran’s strategy of uniting, arming, and directing militias across the Middle East from Lebanon to Yemen was once regarded as a stroke of genius: it allowed Iran to wreak havoc on its enemies without risking Iranian lives and provoking the anger of its own population. But today, the picture looks very different. Precision airstrikes, improved missile defenses, and cyberattacks have drained these militias of their operational effectiveness. In Lebanon, Hezbollah spent years amassing an arsenal of hundreds of thousands of missiles, effectively establishing mutually-assured destruction with Israel—but was powerless to stop the wave of Israeli missiles and airstrikes  that have decimated its command and control. In less than two weeks, Israel killed longtime Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, then his successor—along with nearly everyone else in the group’s high command, leaving it flailing and unresponsive to Israel’s incursion into Lebanon. 

In Yemen, the Houthis, beyond creating headlines with their missiles and drone attacks, have not shifted the military balance on the ground. Elsewhere in the region, Iran’s proxies are faltering under the relentless pressure of Israel and the United States, unable to deliver the punch that Tehran needs to stay afloat. And their impotence is being broadcast to a global audience, emasculating Iran in the eyes of the world.

While Israel’s military operations have resulted in a strategic setback for both Hezbollah and Iran, Tel Aviv has also come under significant criticism for the terrible human cost it has imposed upon the Palestinian people, especially in Gaza—and now in Lebanon as well. While its high-tech weapons have proven effective at eliminating Hamas and Hezbollah foot soldiers and commanders, the consequences of this Israeli success are far from strategic. “Precision” strikes often cause collateral damage, and the devastation left behind has triggered international outrage and further inflamed tensions in Gaza and beyond.

The IDF’s approach—“shock and awe”-style airstrikes backed by near-total control over the skies—diminishes the threat of retaliation against Israel’s armed forces. But the Israeli campaign will also produce more cycles of violence, undermining the long-term stability of the region. This is not a recipe for peace; instead, it is a path that leads to endless conflict and the deepening of mutual hatred.

Tehran’s New Playbook

Now that its proxy-based deterrence is near collapse, Iran has little choice but to develop a new playbook if it wants to remain a credible regional power. Below are some potential courses of action Tehran could pursue to regain the initiative and re-establish itself as a regional heavyweight. 

First, Iran is likely to devote serious consideration to the development of a nuclear weapon. Until the last month, observers regarded Hezbollah as Iran’s ‘trump card’ over Israel, with its ability to incinerate the country’s north a significant deterrent. With Hezbollah’s abrupt collapse, Tehran will need a new way to guarantee its own safety from external threats. Indeed, a nuclear-armed Iran would not just shift the regional balance of power; it would reverse the order altogether. The costs of any military action against Tehran would skyrocket, causing even the most hawkish opponents to think twice—or develop atomic weapons of their own, leading to a dangerous arms race. 

Second, with its military technology falling further behind in the arms race, Iran is likely to make significant investments in asymmetric warfare, doubling down on drones, offensive cyber capabilities, and precision-guided munitions. Through its partnership with Russia and burgeoning relationship with North Korea, Tehran could gain access to helpful technologies that would allow it to evade the Iron Dome and strike Israel, thereby re-establishing some measure of deterrence.

Third, Iran has proven creative and cunning in its approach to hybrid warfare: it utilizes electronic warfare, cyber attacks, loitering munitions, and technologies that can bypass Israel’s conventional systems of deterrence and defense, allowing Iran to inflict costs without having to commit to major war. This guerrilla mindset could allow Tehran to succeed where simple conventional warfare has clearly failed.

Finally, Iran will probably continue to invest in its foreign partnerships. As Saudi Arabia and Israel eye a ‘grand bargain’ establishing a broad anti-Iran alliance under the leadership of the United States, Tehran sees a clear strategic imperative in improving its ties to Russia, its main foreign backer. Russia’s international isolation in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine has allowed it to deepen bilateral ties to Iran without fear of further Western actions. Iran is also likely to strengthen its ties to North Korea, which faces similar constraints and has more experience weathering international isolation.

No Good Options

Whichever route Iran takes, the Islamic Republic could send shockwaves across the Middle East. Israel and the United States—not to mention others in the region—are unlikely to sit still as Tehran cultivates new military capabilities, and especially if it develops a nuclear capability. If these events occur, tensions will mount, economic sanctions will be levied, and the Western nations might even launch preemptive strikes that neuter Iran’s ability to develop its conventional or nuclear forces. Asymmetric and unconventional warfare do not add stability, but even greater unpredictability. In a region where miscalculation can easily lead to catastrophe, none of Iran’s potential courses of action are a clear recipe for success.

Yet, it is clear that Iran’s old playbook is circling the drain. As evidenced by the current conflict, the ability to conduct proxy warfare does not guarantee deterrence; an age of technological competitiveness and accelerated change has taken place. The more Tehran seeks to adapt, the more turbulent the region’s newest phase of war will become, with higher stakes and fewer off-ramps. Ultimately, deterrence in the Middle East will be determined as much by adaptability and ingenuity as by brute force, as Iran and its many adversaries try to anticipate developments on the battlefield. Such anticipation is more than an academic exercise: it is a matter of urgent strategic consequence for any country aspiring to survive and prosper in an increasingly bleak security environment.