As increasingly devastating climate events underline the need to transition away from fossil fuels, the rapid and sustainable development of renewable energy resources has emerged as a focal point in the global discourse on sustainable development. The United Arab Emirates—particularly the largest and most powerful emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi—has advanced significantly in the field of renewable energy to meet the demands of a post-oil era. The UAE has expended significant sums to develop its nuclear and renewable capacity, with the overall goal of achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century. Prominent projects such as the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park and the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant exemplify the country’s dedication to diversification. However, major issues must be resolved. To fully embrace sustainable development, the UAE must mitigate the drawbacks of less reliable renewable green energy sources, improve energy storage capacity, and facilitate renewable energy’s smooth integration with the country’s existing energy grid.
A Defining Challenge
Embracing a green future represents a massive undertaking for the hydrocarbon-rich UAE. In 2022, the country exported roughly 2.7 million barrels of crude oil per day—a significant increase over the previous year. In 2022, the government’s budget surplus, anticipated to be about 5 percent of GDP due to oil earnings and strong economic activity, was aided by this spike in oil exports, as well as the rising global price of oil following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of that year. Historically, the UAE’s economy has been supported by the oil industry. However, to lessen its reliance on fossil fuels, the nation has aggressively pursued an energy transition that will diversify its energy mix.
To satisfy its economic needs and environmental goals, the UAE’s Energy Strategy 2050 guidance document seeks to embrace nuclear, clean, and renewable energy sources. By 2050, the country’s leadership hopes to achieve a domestic energy mix of that consists of 44 percent renewable energy, 38 percent gas, 12 percent coal, and 6 percent nuclear power, according to the strategy. The country is making noteworthy progress in broadening its energy mix and promoting a sustainable and low-carbon future, despite its impressive success in the oil industry.
As part of its plan to attain net-zero emissions by 2050, the UAE has pledged to invest $54 billion in renewable energy by 2030, with the goal of tripling its capacity to 14 GW and generating 50,000 new green employment. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates is prioritizing carbon capture technologies and augmenting its production of blue and green hydrogen. The National Hydrogen Strategy 2050 aims to establish the nation as one of the foremost hydrogen producers by the year 2050.
The UAE has positioned itself as a significant participant and influencer on the global stage by crafting innovative and sustainable energy policies and becoming a pioneer in the development and incorporation of clean energy technologies. Through its dedication to technological advancement and energy diversification, the UAE has set an example for others. The UAE’s global leadership in sustainable energy policy is evident through its deepening involvement in renewable energy projects outside of the Emirates’ territory.
Energy Strategy 2050
The UAE’s Energy Strategy 2050 lays out the country’s precise goals to eliminate carbon emissions. For instance, it calls for doubling renewable energy usage as a percentage of the economy’s total energy requirements, from 25 percent to 50 percent, by 2050, reducing the nation’s overall carbon footprint by 70 percent in the process. Energy Strategy 2050 also hopes to boost the economy and save over $190 billion by enhancing energy efficiency for both homes and businesses by 40 percent. To support these programs and help the economy flourish, the UAE has committed to investing approximately $160 billion domestically. More generally, the Energy Strategy 2050 also aims to encourage the use of renewable energy sources, nuclear power, and hydrogen, stimulate R&D, and invite capital to the renewable and clean energy industries—initiatives described below.
The UAE has committed to modernizing its energy environment through renewable energy sources, including solar and wind power. By 2030, Emirati renewable energy capacity is expected to triple to 14 GW. By 2031, the Emirati leadership hopes that 30 percent of the UAE’s energy mix will come from clean sources—a swift and significant uptick that would lay the groundwork for the country’s goal of reaching 50 percent by 2050. The UAE has spent substantial sums to develop its solar energy infrastructure. Indeed, the small Gulf state is already home to three of the biggest solar power facilities in the world, suggesting a dedication to the goals outlined in the country’s Energy Strategy 2050.
The UAE has significantly invested in solar energy infrastructure to align with its Energy Strategy 2050, which aims to increase renewable energy’s share to 44% in the country’s energy mix by 2050. Major solar facilities supporting this goal include the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park in Dubai, which currently has a capacity of 2.6 GW and is set to expand to 5 GW, featuring a 950 MW hybrid solar energy complex. The Al Dhafra Solar Project in Abu Dhabi, with a capacity of 2 GW, became operational in November 2023, while the Noor Abu Dhabi Solar Plant (Sweihan) has been generating 935 MW since 2019. Collectively, these three plants provide over 5.5 GW of solar power capacity. Following the activation of the Al Dhafra project, the UAE’s total installed solar capacity surpassed 5 GW. Solar energy’s contribution to national electricity generation increased from 0.3% in 2014 to 4.5% in 2022, showcasing the UAE’s significant advancements in expanding its solar energy capabilities and advancing toward its renewable energy objectives.
Nuclear energy also plays an important role in the UAE’s sustainable energy strategy, and the country has made substantial progress toward making nuclear a pillar of the country’s energy transition. With four reactors in operation, the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in western Abu Dhabi is a landmark project—the first-ever nuclear power plant on the Arabian Peninsula—that is expected to supply up to 25 percent of the UAE’s power needs. By 2030, the nuclear power station is expected to add an additional 14 GW of clean power to the UAE’s energy composition, effectively increasing the amount of clean energy produced in the UAE six-fold. The UAE’s decision to develop a civilian nuclear energy sector dovetails with its overarching objective of attaining net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Incorporating nuclear power into the Emirati energy portfolio not only boosts sustainability, but also establishes the country as a regional and international leader in the adoption of cutting-edge, clean energy technologies.
Alongside more traditional clean energy resources, Abu Dhabi also seeks to cultivate the UAE as a leader in low-carbon green hydrogen production. The UAE’s National Hydrogen Strategy sets targets of 1.4 million tons per annum (MTPA) by 2031, 7.5 MTPA by 2040, and 15 MTPA by 2050. This strategy leverages the UAE’s position as a preeminent global energy hub, as well as its bountiful natural gas and solar resources. By leveraging the Hydrogen Innovation Fund to support developers, the UAE can more rapidly achieve its environmental goals.
Smart Investment Strategies
Two Emirati entities will play a key role in advancing the country’s attempts to achieve the goals of Energy Strategy 2050—the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company, or “Masdar,” and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Masdar, founded by the UAE government in 2006, promotes renewable energy development and the advancement, commercialization, and deployment of clean technologies to diversify the UAE’s economy and diminish its carbon footprint.
Masdar has become one of the world’s top investors in renewable energy, providing capital to over 40 nations to make the shift to cleaner energy. It is projected that Masdar’s initiatives will remove more than 30 million tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere annually, which is equivalent to taking 6.5 million automobiles off the road. Abu Dhabi’s sustainable urban development, Masdar City, is a prime example of Masdar’s dedication to renewable energy; this strategy includes rooftop photovoltaic (PV) installations and the first renewable energy facility in the UAE—the 10MW Masdar City Solar Power Plant.
Meanwhile, IRENA will certainly play an important role in empowering the UAE to make the switch to sustainable energy sources. While IRENA operates worldwide, it has an especially close relationship with the UAE, where its Masdar City offices are situated. IRENA and the UAE currently collaborate on several projects that advance the objectives laid out in Energy Strategy 2050. One noteworthy example is the Energy Transition Accelerator Financing (ETAF) Platform, designed to improve the livelihoods and quality of life of those most vulnerable communities through the transformation of the agri-food and health value chains. This project emphasizes the linkages between energy, climate change, and sustainable development objectives, such as access to food and healthcare.
Abroad, IRENA and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) established a $1 billion Global Finance Platform in 2021. This fund aims to contribute to 1.5 GW of additional renewable energy capacity by 2030, highlighting not only the UAE’s commitment to supporting global green energy generation, but IRENA’s position as an essential partner in the fight against climate change.
The UAE has announced intentions to invest up to $54 billion in additional funds to triple its supply of renewable energy over the next seven years, with the overarching goal of generating 70 percent of its power from renewables by 2050, despite its role as a significant exporter of gas and oil. And the country has put its money where its mouth is—allotting nearly $40 billion in recent years to sustainable energy initiatives.
Challenges
The United Arab Emirates still faces several significant hurdles to achieve a net-zero economy. One of the largest remaining obstacles is the legal barriers to entry in Emirati energy markets. To promote greater involvement in energy generation, the UAE has worked aggressively to deregulate its energy market. However, ongoing legal challenges from the country’s existing power players, such as the major oil and gas companies, pose a significant obstacle to this goal. To take flight, the energy transition needs more clarity from the nation’s legal codes and market systems. A clear framework must be established to effectively manage disputes and protect investments.
The second obstacle is economic inertia itself, which renders the adoption of new energy sources across the country more difficult. For example, while Dubai has made great progress toward incorporating solar into its energy composition, other parts of the UAE still rely on traditional energy sources, such as hydrocarbons. As long as fossil fuels remain abundant and cheap in the UAE, there will always be some degree of popular resistance towards a transition to cleaner, and more expensive, energy sources. This mismatch between market forces and policy preferences hampers the consistent and extensive integration of renewable energy across the nation.
Resistance to the green transition is not limited to citizens concerned about the transformation’s impact on their checkbook; political and economic elites remain wary of the macroeconomic ramifications of embracing a net-zero strategy. The UAE’s economy remains heavily dependent on the export of fossil fuels, particularly gas and oil, which account for 30 percent of the country’s GDP. Diminishing the importance of fossil fuels while simultaneously switching to renewable sources presents an obvious danger to government revenues. Though Dubai and Abu Dhabi have conducted successful transitions thus far, the country as a whole continues to struggle with high carbon emissions.
These obstacles highlight how difficult it will be to steer the UAE’s hydrocarbon-dependent industries toward a green future without massive investments to soften the blow of transformational change. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi has laid the groundwork for an unlikely energy transition if its political leadership and people are willing to make the sacrifices to bring it to fruition.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.
Taliban rule in Afghanistan is nearing its three-year anniversary. The group reclaimed power in Afghanistan in the days following the United States’ withdrawal in August 2021—a process facilitated by Qatar-led negotiations between the Taliban and the American government. In the years following the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has become an arena for Middle East rivalries to play out. Because of its political linkages with Taliban leaders, Doha was expected to hold the most influence of the Gulf States in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states were expected to fund infrastructure projects while also guaranteeing a line of communication between the West and the Taliban to implement these projects. However, quickly after their takeover, the Taliban made clear that in order to strike a balance among various regional stakeholders, it had no intention of relying on any one international partner to achieve its interests. Indeed, the Taliban-led government has indicated its commitment to protecting the sovereignty of their new government, which will inevitably inform Kabul’s future discussions with international powers regarding agreements that impact the country’s economy or security relationships.
Vying for Influence
One of these regional stakeholders, Türkiye, engaged in talks with the Taliban-led government regarding operational control of the country’s five international airports. Türkiye insisted that Kabul establish special security zones around these sites, to be supervised by Turkish military contractors who had provided security control in the period before the Taliban takeover. This arrangement, which overcame the Taliban’s opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, likely influenced the Taliban’s decision to forge ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). For the Taliban, the UAE’s established prowess in aviation services offered an economically beneficial agreement regarding the administration and operational control of their airports, bolstering the group’s domestic legitimacy. The Afghan government similarly expressed concern that the Doha-brokered airport deal with Türkiye, would allow the International Chamber of Commerce—A Paris-based organization represents private business—to arbitrate in the dispute, viewed by the Taliban regime as an imposition of Western legal norms.
Despite its opposition to the intervention of some foreign governments in Afghanistan, the Taliban has expressed an interest in working with regional powers that accommodate the regime’s ultraconservative cultural values or present viable alternatives to the Western “rules-based” global order. Qatar has positioned itself as a mediator to end the Taliban’s isolation. In May 2023, the Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani held secret talks with the supreme leader of the Taliban, Haibatullah Akhunzada, to underscore the need to end Taliban bans on girls’ education and women’s employment. Though these same demands had previously been made by the United States, Qatar was able to leverage its long-standing ties with the Islamist movement to push for deeper international engagement with Kabul. Qatar remains a key interlocutor for the Taliban government, as Doha would be capable of hosting UN-backed talks on re-integrating Afghanistan into the international community.
Testing Diplomatic Waters
Another prominent GCC member, Saudi Arabia, has expressed intentions to continue monitoring Afghanistan’s relationship with Iran, as well as the distribution of charity and humanitarian assistance. In an attempt to strengthen Saudi soft power, Saudi relief efforts via entities such as the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center and the Saudi Fund have bolstered access to food, water, health care, and education in Afghanistan. Compared to Qatar and the UAE, Saudi Arabia has limited its diplomatic contact with the Taliban, as Saudi meddling in Afghanistan affairs over the past decades eroded the Saudis’ credibility in the eyes of the Afghan public. Therefore, Riyadh turned to cultivating the relationship with Afghanistan through its neighbor, Pakistan, instead. As security conditions deteriorated, Riyadh closed its Kabul embassy and relocated its Afghan consular office to Islamabad. However, Saudi Arabia’s Pakistani channel to Kabul became dysfunctional once tensions between the Taliban and Islamabad surfaced due to continued border and cross-border violence. These tensions drove the Saudis to deliver humanitarian relief to the Afghan people through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation reopened in November 2022. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan has also been complicated by the governments’ differing interpretations of the role of Islam in state and society. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has encouraged a less interlink between religion and governance, and encouraged clergy that preaches tolerance and expanded personal freedoms, whereas the Taliban continues to advocate for a far more fundamental teachings that envisions a much diminished role for religious minorities and women. Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of more “moderate Islam” butted heads over these different approaches. For example, Saudi Arabia hosted a two-day international conference of the OIC in July 2017, where more than one hundred religious scholars from nearly forty countries participated. The conference concluded with a declaration condemning the religious illegitimacy of Taliban violence.
To date, no country, including the Gulf states, has officially recognized the legitimacy of the Taliban’s rule of what the group calls the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in February 2024 the third meeting of dozens of international envoys to Afghanistan took place in Doha, with the goal of better coordinating international engagement with Kabul. Additionally, in the past year, the UAE has joined its Gulf partners by seeking influence in Afghanistan. On June 4 2024, Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani visited Abu Dhabi and met with UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). The occasion marked Haqqani’s first trip outside Afghanistan since the Taliban retook control of the country. The Taliban’s spy chief, Abdul Haq Wasiq, also joined the delegation. The two sides discussed, as sources reported, “strengthening the bonds of cooperation between the two countries and ways to enhance ties to serve mutual interests and contribute to regional stability.” The agenda also included “economic and development matters, as well as support for Afghan reconstruction and development.” Haqqani’s trip to Abu Dhabi sent shockwaves through Washington, because the United States had previously charged Haqqani for his involvement in a terror attack in Kabul that killed an American civilian. MbZ’s decision to meet with the Afghan delegation granted the Taliban significant international legitimacy, as the UAE treated the pair as accredited representatives of a foreign government. This undoubtedly caused consternation in Washington, which has largely discouraged its partners from reestablishing diplomatic ties with the Taliban.
Though their diplomatic overtures to Taliban-led Afghanistan grant the regime international legitimacy, several GCC states have proven—time and time again—their utility to the West as interlocutors with Kabul. These Gulf states have conveyed the West’s policy preferences to the Taliban, arguing that the government should lift repressive restrictions on women’s rights and the ban on music as a condition for further international recognition. For the time being, the Taliban appear content to negotiate, especially with billions of dollars in infrastructure investment on the table. However, forging strong and enduring relations with international and regional partners while preventing foreign interference in the day-to-day operations of the government in Kabul and Afghan society marks a steeper challenge.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.
From Lobe Log, September 29, 2017, by William D. Hartung.
Published on September 29th, 2017 | by Guest
Discussions about the war in Yemen in the media and on Capitol Hill generally focus on the role of the Saudi-led bombing campaign, which has killed thousands of civilians while targeting hospitals, marketplaces, and even a funeral. Just last week, Amnesty International revealed details of a Saudi air strike that killed 16 civilians—including seven children—with a U.S.-supplied bomb.
To make matters worse, the Saudi regime has doggedly opposed efforts to establish an independent United Nations investigation of potential war crimes committed by all sides in the conflict. The Saudi role in contributing to what a UN official has described as “the world’s largest humanitarian crisis” has drawn growing criticism in Congress. In June, in response to Saudi actions in Yemen, 47 senators voted to block a sale of U.S. bombs to the regime.
But another U.S.-backed regime also bears a major share of responsibility for the devastating consequences of the Yemen war—the United Arab Emirates. The UAE has been the most important participant in the ground war and has participated in the naval blockade of Yemen that has made it extremely difficult to get humanitarian aid to those who need it. More recently, there have also been allegations that the UAE and its local allies have been running a network of secret prisons in Yemen where suspects are regularly subjected to brutal acts of torture, including a technique called “the grill,” which involves rotating a human being over a fire.
The United States has a longstanding, close relationship with the UAE military, grounded in the UAE’s participation in U.S.-led interventions in Somalia, Iraq (1991), Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Syria. The only exception to the rule was the Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and other U.S. officials have long referred to the UAE as “Little Sparta” in recognition of the effectiveness of their air and ground forces. The tight connection between the two nations is further underscored by the fact that Mattis served as an unpaid advisor to the UAE military after retiring as the head of the U.S. Central Command and before joining the Trump administration as secretary of defense. And data from the Security Assistance Monitor indicates that the U.S. has trained more than 5,000 UAE military personnel since 2009.
The United States has played an enabling role in the UAE’s war effort in Yemen, supplying the bulk of its imported weaponry, training thousands of its military personnel, and refueling its aircraft. Many of the weapons supplied are directly relevant to the war in Yemen, including offers of over 30,000 bombs since the March 2015 Saudi-led intervention there. The Pentagon refuses to divulge how many of these bombs have been delivered to the UAE thus far, but if nothing else the scale of the offers indicates an endorsement of the UAE’s conduct in Yemen. In any case, more than half of the UAE’s air force is composed of U.S. supplied F-16s—souped-up models that are more capable than those possessed by the U.S. air force.
Although the Obama administration seemed to be internally divided about ongoing U.S. support for the Saudis and their allies in the Yemen conflict—as evidenced by the suspension of a sale of guided bombs late in Obama’s term—the Trump administration has no such reservations. President Trump buys the Saudi line that the Yemen war is simply a response to Iranian expansionism expressed via its support for the Houthi rebels who are fighting the Saudi-led coalition. But most experts on the region have noted that the Iranian role is limited and that the Houthi forces have longstanding grievances that would lead them to fight for a greater share of political and economic power within Yemen regardless of whether Iran was involved in the conflict.
The one ray of hope for U.S. policy is growing bipartisan opposition to the current approach of uncritical military backing of the Saudis and their allies in the war, led by members such as Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT), Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), Sen. Todd Young (R-IN), Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA), and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA). Blundering ahead with the current approach does not serve U.S. interests, however narrowly defined, given that the arming of the Saudis and the UAE risks implicating Washington in war crimes even as it creates a chaotic situation that has made it easier for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to make gains in Yemen.
A sounder U.S. policy towards Yemen should include support for an independent investigation of human rights abuses by all sides of the conflict, a suspension of U.S. arms and training to the Saudis and the UAE until allegations of torture and intentional targeting of civilians are resolved, and pressure on U.S. allies to participate in inclusive peace talks that take into account all parties to the dispute. Anything less will only lead to more needless suffering while undermining the security of the United States and the region.
William D. Hartung is the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy and the author of the Center’s new report, “U.S. Arms Transfers to the UAE and the War in Yemen.” Photo: Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan meets with Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis (Jim Mattis via Flickr)
Qatar’s ex-Deputy Prime Minister has revealed details of a plan funded by the UAE to invade his country using mercenaries from the American security service company formerly known as Blackwater. Abdullah Bin Hamas Al-Attiyah noted that the plan still hasn’t received the green light from Washington.
Al-Attiyah told Spain’s ABC newspaper that thousands of mercenaries from Blackwater — now called Academi — are undergoing training in the UAE. “Plans for the invasion led by the Emirati authorities were underway before the announcement of the economic and diplomatic siege on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain [on 5 June, 2017],” he explained.
According to the Spanish newspaper, the White House was supposed to approve the plan, but it did not get the final “green light” from US President Donald Trump. There was no immediate comment from the UAE regarding the accusation.
Huff Post newspaper quoted unnamed official sources saying that the foreign mercenaries are being training in the Emirati military base in Liwa. The same sources also noted that Blackwater has trained 15,000 other mercenaries, mostly from Colombia and South America.
The Abu Dhabi government is believed to have used Blackwater’s services in its operations in Yemen as part of the Riyadh-led Coalition against the Houthi rebels. Over the summer, the mercenaries apparently suffered numerous military setbacks in Yemen, prompting them to abandon their positions.
Blackwater decided to change its name due to several reports in the international press about abuses committed by its “contractors”, especially during and after the US-led invasion of Iraq.
