The EU and GCC Cautiously Engage Syria’s New Regime

On December 8, 2024, the 11-day military offensive led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group culminated in the downfall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, marking the end of the 54-year Baathist rule. The Assad regime’s collapse caught most regional and international observers unprepared, including the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Since 2011, the EU’s foreign policy approach to Syria has been firmly grounded on the “three noes:” no normalization with the Assad regime, no European contributions to reconstruction efforts, and no relaxation of sanctions until the warring parties agree to a political solution to the Syrian conflict based on UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254. With the Assad regime’s demise, the EU’s Syria policy was overtaken by on-the-ground political realities, forcing Brussels to come up with a new strategy.

After the Syrian civil war’s outbreak, the GCC countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar in particular—staunchly supported regime change in Syria, campaigning for the Assad regime’s diplomatic isolation and, especially in the conflict’s early stages, providing financial backing to a galaxy of competing armed opposition factions. However, Russian and Iranian military interventions in the Syrian civil war on the government’s side tilted the balance in favor of the regime, inducing the GCC nations to abandon their hopes of dethroning Assad and pursue the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations with Damascus. Spearheaded by the UAE and later embraced by Saudi Arabia, the GCC-Assad rapprochement process peaked with Syria’s re-admission to the Arab League in May 2023. However, perspectives on Assad’s political rehabilitation were far from unified within the GCC bloc. Qatar refused to resume bilateral ties with the Assad regime, but to avoid diplomatic isolation in the Arab camp, it did not oppose the League’s decision to welcome Syria back into the fold.

As Syria’s caretaker authorities face the daunting challenge of realizing a peaceful political transition after a devastating 13-year civil conflict, the EU and the GCC look at Syria’s new political reality with a combination of hope and alarm. Undoubtedly, the Assad regime’s collapse opens the door to groundbreaking political reforms in Syria. However, the chief concern for both Europe and the Gulf monarchies remains that competing priorities among Syrian factions and foreign interference could derail the transition process, plummeting the country into a new cycle of violence and providing fertile ground for radical Islamist groups to take root. For now, the EU and the GCC have answered to Syria’s new political realities with paced, cautious diplomatic engagement.

Ending Syria’s Diplomatic Isolation

The EU welcomed the Assad regime’s fall, stressing the importance of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and state institutions while denouncing all forms of extremism. 

European diplomacy is in full swing. On January 3, 2024, a European high-level delegation comprising German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot, and EU Chargé d’Affaires Michael Ohnmacht, traveled to Damascus, marking the first official visit to Syria by high-ranking Western diplomats since the fall of the regime. The two FMs visited the notorious Sednaya prison before meeting with top figures of the emergent Syrian government, including HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa and the acting Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani.

During the talks with al-Sharaa, the German and French FMs outlined three key goals at the heart of future European engagements with Syria’s new authorities. First, the EU will endorse a peaceful and inclusive political transition that meaningfully integrates ethnic and religious minorities, as well as women, into the government. In particular, FM Barrot pointed out the imperative of ensuring that “France’s allies, the Kurds,” the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), are genuinely included in the political transition’s process and that a “permanent and lasting ceasefire” is achieved in northern Syria. FM Baerbock, while reaffirming Europe’s willingness to back Syria’s political transition, stressed that Europe “will not finance new Islamist structures.” Second, the EU will continue to support the fight against the Islamic State, whose ranks have been bolstered following the release of the group’s fighters from regime prisons. And third, Brussels will monitor the disposal of the Assad regime’s stockpiles of chemical weapons. Germany and France also offered to provide the new Syrian administration with specialized teams to support the National Dialogue Conference’s constitutional work and its ongoing efforts to ensure legal accountability for crimes committed by the Assad regime.

A week later, on January 9, 2025, the Quint group—an initiative including senior officials of Italy, France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S., plus the EU—met in Rome to coordinate diplomatic action in Syria. More concretely, the group discussed  HTS’ current designation as a terrorist group and the removal of Western sanctions against the organization. In this regard, the EU diplomacy chief Kaja Kallas hinted at possible changes in EU policy, suggesting that Brussels “could gradually ease sanctions provided there is tangible progress” toward a more democratic and less oppressive Syria. Several reports have suggested the EU could adopt a sectoral and phased approach to sanction lifting, issuing temporary waivers for transactions in the energy, transport, and banking sectors. This approach would serve the EU’s goals of keeping in place individual sanctions against cadres in the al-Assad regime, addressing the Syrian population’s immediate needs, and building trust with Syria’s interim authorities.

The following day, Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani visited Damascus, where he met with key figures in the Syrian provisional government, including al-Sharaa and al-Shaibani. Tajani recognized that economic sanctions “do not have to affect the Syrian people” but were imposed because of the Assad regime. Tajani reinforced the importance of opening a healthy political dialogue in Syria and adopting measures that better reflect the country’s new political reality. Tajani also called for joint action to combat criminal networks involved in drug and human trafficking.

On January 27, the EU FMs met in the European Council to discuss the lifting of sanctions on Syria. The EU bloc reached a political consensus on a roadmap to begin rolling back sanctions on Syria, starting with easing economic restrictions “that are most hindering the early build-up of the country.” The EU chief diplomat Kallas spoke of a “step-for-step approach,” which reflects the EU’s will to “move fast” on stabilizing Syria’s dire humanitarian situation while keeping open options to reverse course “if wrong steps are taken” by the Syrian interim government.

Extending Humanitarian Assistance

In the wake of Assad’s ouster, the European Commission launched a humanitarian air bridge operation to Syria, flying 50 tons of health supplies and 46 tons of health, education, and shelter items to the Turkish-Syrian border. Brussels also backed these aid shipments with €4 million in humanitarian funding, bringing the EU’s total humanitarian aid to Syria to €163 million in 2024. 

Recent events suggest that more money is on the way. This month, the EU Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness, and Crisis Management, Hadja Lahbib, met with al-Sharaa to discuss Syria’s humanitarian needs. During the visit, Commissioner Lahbib announced a €235 million aid support package to support Syrians inside the countries and in neighboring nations for 2025, including providing food supplies, essential health services, shelter solutions, educational support, and clean water and sanitation facilities.

Individual European states are also offering aid. On January 16, 2025, Spain’s Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares Bueno made an official trip to Damascus, where he announced a humanitarian package of €11 million to support reconstruction and the return of Syrian refugees.

With several EU nations governed by right-wing political parties, the Syrian power transition is primarily seen through security lenses. Some European countries fear that the Syrian political vacuum could lead to the outbreak of domestic infighting among opposing factions, resulting in a new migratory crisis and the possible return of militant Jihadist groups. For them, stopping migration flows and facilitating the return of refugees top the foreign policy agenda. Tellingly, in June 2024, seven EU countries (Austria, Czechia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, and Poland) called Brussels to change the EU’s Syria policy by re-evaluating the criteria for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees. As the HTS-led military offensive ousted the al-Assad regime, some European countries rushed to halt Syrian asylum applications, reinforcing the idea that with Bashar al-Assad gone, Syria is a safe country. However, although European right-leaning governments will likely try to hasten the refugee returns, the high volatility surrounding Syria’s political transition complicates return dynamics.

Overcoming the GCC’s Syria Skepticism

Whereas the European Union has seemingly welcomed the new regime with open arms, the GCC has proven less unified and more tentative toward Damascus. On December 14, 2024, the GCC countries, except for Oman, participated in the Arab Ministerial Contact Committee on Syria held in Jordan, marking the first regional effort to support joint diplomatic action. Twelve days later, the GCC held the Ministerial Council’s 46th extraordinary meeting in Kuwait to coordinate a common position on Syria. Recognizing the UNSC Resolution 2254 as the bedrock of a post-Assad Syria, the GCC positively welcomed the measures undertaken by the de-facto Syrian authorities to ensure civilian safety, preserve state institutions, and promote national reconciliation.

On December 30, resolved to have a first official engagement with the interim Syrian authorities and convey a unified front, GCC Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi and Kuwaiti FM Abdullah Al Yahya led a GCC delegation to Damascus. During talks with al-Sharaa, the diplomats emphasized the need for a transitional process that limits the influence of foreign powers in Syria, dissolves the patchwork of armed groups operating in the country, restricts the force’s use to the state’s control, fights terrorism, and respects the rights of cultural and religious minorities. The GCC Secretary General also stressed the importance of lifting economic sanctions, delivering humanitarian aid, and providing safe mechanisms for the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced people.

Syria’s new authorities have also been busy soliciting the support of the Gulf states. In early January, a high-ranking Syrian delegation—including Foreign Minister al-Shaibani, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, and Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab—embarked on a diplomatic tour of the rich Arab monarchies to rally political and financial backing for the caretaker government. At stops in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, Gulf leaders affirmed their support for Syria’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity while stressing the need to ensure the country’s security and stability. Although not part of the regional tour, Bahrain and Oman also held high-level engagements with Syrian authorities, with senior diplomats meeting al-Sharaa in Damascus. Traditionally cautious about engaging with political Islam-inspired groups, Saudi Arabia appears to have partially overcome its concerns about the political empowerment of HTS. Indeed, al-Sharaa traveled to Saudi Arabia for his first international trip since the toppling of the Assad regime, where he met with the Saudi leadership and performed Umrah. Al-Sharaa’s diplomatic visit to Saudi Arabia cements Riyadh’s role as a pivotal interlocutor in the Arab camp for the Syrian caretaker government.

Like EU member-states, the national relief organizations of the GCC provided humanitarian assistance in the wake of Assad’s downfall. Saudi Arabia sent more than 50 relief planes and over 100 aid trucks. As part of the “Kuwait by Your Side” campaign launched in late December 2024, Kuwait dispatched 25 airplanes and dozens of trucks carrying relief supplies. For its part, Qatar contributed to the humanitarian airlift operations with 13 aid cargo aircraft and an electricity-generating ship to help address Syria’s severe power shortages

Although the Gulf states have projected unity since al-Assad’s fall, Syria’s political future represents a thorny subject for the GCC countries. Divergent strategic interests and diverse ideological perspectives have long prevented the bloc’s members from reaching a widespread consensus on Syria, leading to a deep-rooted mistrust. There is a risk that past animosities—particularly between Qatar and its neighbors—could resurface if the GCC states see Syria’s power vacuum as an opportunity to gain influence rather than a chance to promote regional peace.

Time for EU-GCC Cooperation in Syria

Although EU-GCC relations have grown over the last years, the EU’s “three noes” policy and intra-GCC divisions on Assad’s political rehabilitation have long prevented the two blocs from cooperating in Syria—a surprising fact, given that the EU and the GCC are the two top aid donors to Syria. Since 2013, the EU and the GCC have delivered more than $35 billion and over $8 billion in relief assistance, respectively. Perhaps the Assad regime’s fall should open the door for a new phase in EU-GCC cooperation in Syria.

The first opportunity for joint engagement between EU nations and GCC countries on Syria’s transitional process is exemplified by the expanded Arab ministerial meeting in Saudi Arabia on January 12. High-ranking officials from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the EU represented the European camp. For the GCC bloc, senior diplomats from all six Gulf Arab countries and the GCC Secretary General Albudaiwi attended the meeting. The participation of top representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, Jodan, Lebanon, Egypt, and the UN enhanced the gathering’s political legitimacy, while consolidating the Syrian caretaker government’s position as a pivotal interlocutor for the international community. The EU and the GCC should continue to lead international efforts to coordinate diplomatic actions in Syria. The EU and the GCC can provide much-needed diplomatic legitimacy to a new regime seeking recognition on the international stage. As the EU and GCC share similar foreign policy objectives and security concerns in post-Assad Syria, the two blocs should leverage political and economic incentives to ensure the new Syrian government’s commitment to an inclusive and peaceful state-building process. Building on a years-long experience as leading aid providers, the EU and the GCC can play a pivotal role in stabilizing the humanitarian emergency in Syria and restoring access to clean water, food supplies, electricity, and medical aid. As powerful economic actors, the EU and the GCC should mobilize their financial heft to rebuild the country and stimulate economic activity. 

If the EU and the GCC can maintain a unified vision for Syria, they could meaningfully contribute to stabilizing Syria and cement their positions as influential geopolitical players. The new political reality in Syria offers a unique opportunity for the two blocs to realize a shared vision for a more stable Syria.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.