The Evolving Nature of Pakistan’s Defence Cooperation with the Arab Gulf States

Since its independence from the British Empire in 1947, generations of Pakistani leaders have developed a special relationship with the broader Muslim world—and the Muslim nations in the Middle East in particular. Owing to Islamabad’s alignment with the U.S.-led camp during the Cold War, Pakistan forged ties with like-minded states like Turkey, Iran (then under the Pahlavi regime), and the Arab Gulf States. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 dampened the country’s ties with Iran, but these events strengthened its relationship with the Arab Gulf States. Today, these relationships with the Arab Gulf States are at their zenith and involve a much greater level of defence cooperation.

Pakistan’s Preeminent Gulf Partnership

In the initial years after the country’s independence, Pakistan was not particularly welcomed within parts of the Arab world, owing to its military partnership with the United States and other Western states. With Saudi Arabia, bilateral defence ties gradually developed in the 1960s, largely as a response to the Egyptian military’s intervention in Yemen, which concerned leaders in Riyadh. The countries entered a formal security cooperation arrangement in 1967 during then-Saudi Minister of Defence Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz’s visit to Pakistan. Pakistani military and Air Force officers were dispatched to the Kingdom that same year.

The Iranian Revolution further strengthened bilateral ties and led to the signing of a new defence protocol by the two sides in 1982. Under the auspices of this agreement, Pakistan deployed a division of troops inside Saudi Arabia, which remained there until 1987. Though the number of soldiers has waxed and waned, they make Pakistan the only country to have a continuous military presence in the Kingdom since before the First Gulf War in 1990. And the relationship is not one way; thousands of Saudi cadets have undergone training in Pakistan following the signing of a renewed military cooperation agreement in 2005.

A second plank of Saudi-Pakistani defence cooperation is the prevalence of joint exercises. In the maritime domain, the two partners have held exercises under the banner of Naseem Al-Bahr biannually since 1993. Additionally, the navalspecial forces, navy marines, and air forces of both countries have hosted separate joint exercises. In particular, Saudi and Pakistani pilots have participated in Joint Exercise “Al Saqoor,” and also participate in multinational air exercises on each other’s turf.

At a broader level, joint military exercises began in 2004 and continue under the auspices of “Al Samsaam,” the eighth round of which was held in 2022. The special forces of the two militaries have conducted their own separate Al-Shehaband Al-Battar exercises, which have also seen the involvement of combat aviation. A third and a rather recent addition tothis cooperation has been the Al-Kassah exercise, which focused on the handling and defusal of improvised explosive devices. These short exercises are further complemented by the two-month-long Joint-Mechanized Training that includedthe mechanized columns of both countries. This multi-domain military cooperation is coordinated during the annual meetings of Pakistan-KSA Defence Collaboration forum, as well as the Pakistan-KSA Bilateral Defence Industrial Forum.

Engagements with Other Gulf States

Pakistan maintains close defence ties with other Arab Gulf States, as well. After the independence of the Trucial States and the foundation of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, the Pakistani Armed Forces supported these states by training their security forces and stationing troops there during their first decades free of colonial rule. It was only after the turn of the 21st century that these countries phased out the practice of employing Pakistanis in their armed forces. In Bahrain, however, Pakistanis continue to play a critical role in the security sector, particularly the national guard and police.

Pakistan has also maintained close defence ties with the Sultanate of Oman. During the Dhofar Rebellion in the 1960s and 1970s, Pakistan helped Omani government forces to crush the revolt. In the case of Kuwait, the bilateral relationship has largely been cordial, though Pakistan conspicuously decided against joining the military coalition to liberate Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion in 1990. Even so, Pakistani troops took part in demining operations after the war.

These defence partnerships are complemented by joint exercises. Pakistan’s Navy holds regular joint exercises with the navies of the UAE, Oman and Qatar. Maritime cooperation also takes place under the auspices of the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and its various task forces. Pakistan’s Army also recently held a new joint exercise, “Washq Al Jabal 1,” or Mountain Lynx 1, with Oman in the latter’s Jabal Al Akhdar Mountain Range. Pakistan Army’s National Counter Terrorism Center holds bilateral and multinational exercises involving troops from Kuwait and Bahrain. Finally, Pakistan’s Air Force (PAF) has held the joint aerial exercise “Zilzal” with the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF). Accordingly, it can be argued that Pakistan’s military ties remain strong with Bahrain and Qatar, but over the years the defence cooperation with UAE, Oman and Kuwait has declined.

What Pakistan Gains from Exposure to the Gulf

Pakistan’s defence cooperation with the Gulf monarchies may appear to be one where a larger middle power with a well-developed and professional army chooses to support its partners and help build their military capacity. However, the joint exercises held between the Gulf States and Pakistan are beneficial to Pakistan, as well. Indeed, they provide Pakistan’s Armed Forces with exposure to cutting-edge Western-produced weapons systems and platforms that Islamabad may have lost access to since its ties to the United States have cooled in recent years. Thus, interactions with Gulf service members during joint exercises enables Pakistani soldiers to understand the workings of these platforms, to test them against their own capabilities, and potentially to acquire them. Similarly, Pakistan’s arch-rival India has some of these platforms in its arsenal; in this context, joint exercises with the Arab Gulf states provide Pakistan with a rare opportunity to map out their vulnerabilities and exploit their limitations.

This has been the case particularly in the air domain, where the PAF, through its joint exercises with the QEAF, has been able to hone its skills against fighter jets like the French Rafale. This was critical in the Pakistani case, as the Indian Air Force (IAF) fields a fleet of these fighters. In response, the Pakistan Air Force acquired Chinese J-10C fighter jets, which the PAF’s commanders believed would perform well against the Rafales. The PAF brought its newly acquired Chinese jets into the Zilzal-II exercise with the QEAF, testing its capabilities against the Rafales. This strategy later helped Pakistan to hold its own against India in the two countries’ brief conflict in May, in which the PAF managed to down at least one IAF Rafale.

This battlefield lesson exemplifies the multifaceted nature of Pakistan’s defence cooperation with the Arab Gulf States. These defence partnerships demonstrate a unique level of trust and strategic partnership between the two sides. However, in recent years, Pakistan’s reluctance to actively participate in the conflicts within the Gulf region—particularly the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen—has threatened to diminish goodwill toward Islamabad in Gulf capitals. Furthermore, the rising power of India as a political and economic great power within South Asia is starting to overshadow Pakistan’s long-held defence relationships with the Gulf states. Still, expect Pakistan to remain integrated in the security infrastructure of the Arabian Gulf as long as both sides gain strategic dividends from this association.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.