The Gulf in 2025: Expert Outlook

GCC Leadership in Syria’s 2025 Transition: Stability and Revival

Anas Alqaed

2025 is expected to see increased engagement by the GCC nations within Syria, where the political transition will continue. The wealthy and influential GCC states have a unique opportunity to champion the restoration of Syria’s state institutions and its journey toward lasting peace. In the three weeks since Bashar al-Assad’s sudden fall from power, the new rulers in Damascus have established communication or met officials from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Yemen, and Iraq. While the level of engagement, discussion topics, and meeting priorities varied across these interactions, the outreach underscores the Gulf states’ strategic interest in shaping Syria’s future and playing an active role in its transition.

This engagement will likely persist throughout 2025, provided no significant deterrents emerge. The GCC states have a clear strategic interest in establishing an inclusive government in Syria, which would almost certainly include a wide range of Syrian opposition figures, including those historically supported by GCC players such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Such an arrangement would also help to counterbalance Turkish influence, ensuring a more equitable balance of power in the Levant.

Despite the potential opportunities, the Gulf states could face challenges engaging with post-Assad Syria in 2025 if the new authority cannot stabilize the country. The new rulers in Damascus are confronted with a myriad of issues, raising concerns about a security vacuum. As the initial euphoria of regime change subsides, economic and security challenges are expected to intensify, creating fertile ground for spoilers. Failure to consolidate power within a cohesive security apparatus under the transitional government would exacerbate these risks. This fragmentation could lead to the resurgence of ISIS, escalating violence between Damascus and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), or the empowerment of militias to dominate political affairs at the expense of institutional governance. These dynamics directly threaten the GCC states, whose own security and economic interests have long been intricately tied to Syria’s stability.

While these challenges are daunting, they are not insurmountable. Though fraught with difficulties, the transitional period in 2025 offers a unique opportunity for regional cooperation. The absence of a structured transition following Assad’s departure necessitates collective action from the GCC states, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan to stabilize Syria’s different regions. This includes consolidating the power of state institutions, rebuilding security forces, and initiating economic recovery projects that would incentivize refugees to return.

An essential component of ensuring Syria’s stability is preserving its territorial unity and integrity. Riyadh and Doha, leveraging their diplomatic influence, can facilitate reconciliation between the SDF and Turkish-backed groups. Saudi Arabia, with its influence with American President-elect Donald Trump, and Qatar, with its ties to Ankara, are well-positioned to mediate such a rapprochement. Such efforts could pave the way for forming a national unity government and preserving the country’s unity on both banks of the Euphrates. 

Economic recovery is another critical area where the GCC states can make a significant impact in 2025. Working with the incoming U.S. administration, the GCC can advocate for significant sanctions relief to allow humanitarian aid and reconstruction funds to flow into Syria. Although lifting U.S. sanctions entirely—some of which date back to 1979—would require navigating a complex legislative and executive process, targeted waivers could provide immediate relief. These measures would not only accelerate Syria’s recovery but also incentivize the new rulers in Damascus to maintain an inclusive government, aligning with both GCC and U.S. priorities.

U.S. Outlook Toward Developing Gulf-Iran Relations

Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Relations between the Gulf states and Iran have changed markedly in the four years that separated the first Trump administration from the second. The geopolitical flashpoints of a divided GCC, and the tensions between the Gulf capitals and Tehran that overshadowed regional politics when Trump took office in 2017, have largely dissipated. While there are multiple reasons for the thawing of geopolitical tensions in the Gulf since 2020, several of them relate directly to the legacy of decisions taken (and, in one notable case, not taken) during Trump’s first term, which still loom large today. 

Trump’s transactional approach and unconventional style of decision-making affected GCC states—first Qatar in 2017 and then Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2019—and injected doubts about the reliability of the U.S. as a political and security partner and fed into existing perceptions of U.S. regional disengagement. In particular, the lack of any overt U.S. response to the series of attacks by Iran and its allies against maritime and energy targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2019 caused shockwaves in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, where officials immediately began to reassess baseline assumptions of security policy.

The subsequent trajectory of U.S.-Gulf (and Gulf-Iran) relations during Biden’s one-term presidency has further reinforced the sense of divergence, as officials across the GCC acted pragmatically to repair fractured ties and emerged at the forefront of regional diplomacy. Notably, the pace of high-level meetings, including at head of government as well as senior ministerial levels, between Gulf and Iranian leaders continued after the outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election was known, and in full anticipation of Donald Trump returning to the Oval Office in January 2025. 

For all the talk of ‘normalization’ with Israel, it is with Iran that key states in the Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia, have chosen to focus on, as ties between Tehran and Gulf capitals have not merely been restored since 2020 but have survived the stress test of regional geopolitics since 2023. If officials in Trump’s second administration view the Gulf through the prism of the Abraham Accords, they are likely to speak past their counterparts in GCC capitals, but early indications are that this is precisely what may happen, at least in their opening weeks in office. 

US Security Commitments in the Gulf 2025: The Reluctant Necessity

David Des Roches 

2025 will be a year of concern for America’s security partners in the Gulf, who will find their fear of abandonment re-kindled with every isolationist statement from any person in Donald Trump’s orbit, regardless of their office, access, or level of influence.  The relief the Gulf may feel from the end of the Biden administration, which was viewed on a spectrum ranging from ineffective to hostile, will be short lived as the “America First” agenda will be loudly and aggressively asserted.  

Look past the hype. We’ve been here before.  The region is too important, and the U.S. footprint too small relative to its impact, to leave.  Successive administrations have sought to focus U.S. military and security assets on other regions, but the level of forces in the Gulf is one which both enhances U.S. security and is necessary to project American power in other regions, most notably the Indian Ocean.  There may be bluster or a greater degree of burden-sharing, but it is unlikely that the second Trump term will see a significant reduction in U.S. forces in the Gulf, and there definitely will not be a reduction in strategic and long-range assets (the semi-mythical “over the horizon” capabilities) allocated to the Gulf in U.S. military planning. The region is simply too critical, the issues too big, and the bureaucratic inertia too strong to see a major reduction in force. 

In the short term, the Arab Gulf states will be spectators in the most important security event of the last generation:  Israel’s destruction of (some of) Iran’s force projection capabilities.  We can expect the now-weakened Iran to reach out to the Arab Gulf states in search of a new security regime. This discussion should be approached warily, and in close consultation with Washington.  However, if managed carefully, there is a distinct possibility for the settlement of many of the security concerns which have impeded long-term investment in the Gulf, as well as a closer, more productive security relationship with the United States.  There are not just grounds for optimism; there is a historic confluence of events which could favorably transform the regional security architecture.

The GCC, Syria, and Domestic Diplomacy

Dr. Hind Al-Ansari

As GCC governments recalibrate their approach to a new Syria following the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad at the hands of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, they may find themselves walking a delicate tightrope, balancing regional policies and keeping a close eye on possible cases of radicalization at home. A key challenge lies in carefully framing a narrative that supports their involvement in Syria without deepening pre-existing grievances, especially against the backdrop of the ongoing humanitarian crises in Gaza and Lebanon and the growth of anti-Western sentiment.

During the Syrian civil war, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia supported the opposition, and their respective media ecosystems portrayed the conflict as a people’s struggle for liberation from a tyrannical leader. However, their tone shifted as many young men from the region flocked to Syria to join rebel groups. More alarmingly, many Gulf youths joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a terrorist organization notorious for their heinous crimes against sectarian minorities and the local populations. In response, the GCC states introduced strenuous measures to curb radicalization and dissuade other citizens from joining the extremist group and others. 

Considering the uncertainty of Syria’s future in the hands of HTS and the presence of factions with different interests, many experts and state actors are heedful of the potential regrouping of ISIS and the emergence of other extremist militias. Therefore, the GCC governments’ rhetoric will likely focus on their support for the new government in establishing a new Syria for the Syrian people and securing a window of stability in a conflict-ridden region. Concurrently, they are likely to tighten their national security measures to mitigate radicalization among the youth especially in the digital sphere. Extremist groups are likely to exploit young men’s emotions over Gaza and further fuel anti-Western sentiment by shedding light on Western intervention in Syria to appeal to this demographic. 

Overall, balancing domestic diplomacy with regional ambitions during such a turbulent time will undoubtedly be a taxing task for GCC governments. Should the incoming Trump administration choose a hands-off approach, as the president-elect stated in a recent tweet, it could enable these governments to frame their efforts in Syria as independent of Western objectives—potentially a strategic narrative to help negotiate between these states and their societies.

The Role of the Gulf in Global Conflict Management in 2025

Daniel Serwer 

The Arab Gulf states are most directly engaged in conflicts in their own region and nearby. They have sought over the last two years to calm their own conflicts with Iran. Riyadh re-established diplomatic relations with Tehran in March 2023, and Abu Dhabi also warmed its relations with Tehran. Qatar has long prided itself on good relations with Iran, with which it shares its major gas field.

Led by the UAE, the GCC states were attempting to normalize relations with Bashar al-Assad when his regime collapsed in December 2024. They will now play a key role in Syria’s reconstruction, provided the new regime is one that they see as friendly and pliable. The Saudis and Emiratis may worry about Turkish strength in northern Syria and Ankara’s support for Hayat Tahrir al Sham, which led the forces that toppled the Assad regime. The Arab Gulf states will be glad to see the Iranians and their proxies pushed out of Syria, and hope that their Houthi allies in Yemen will eventually suffer a similar fate.

Israel’s war against Iran’s “axis of resistance”—chiefly Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon—has put the Gulf states in a dilemma. They do not regret the damage to Iran’s allies, whom they saw as a regional threat. However, they do not want to be seen as abandoning the Palestinian cause. They have squared that circle by criticizing the Israeli conduct of the war but doing little else to stop it. Saudi Arabia, which hopes for a security agreement with the United States, has made it plain that it cannot normalize relations with Israel without a clear and irreversible path to a Palestinian state. Qatar, which, in coordination with Israel, had previously helped to finance services in Gaza, has played a difficult mediating role there, without yet achieving a ceasefire and exchange of prisoners and hostages.

The UAE is active in both Sudan, where it supports the Rapid Support Forces against the Sudanese Army, and in Libya, where it has reduced its support to Khalifa Haftar’s eastern forces in favor of unification with the government in Tripoli. The UAE has also long supported the Sisi regime in Egypt. Gulf oil and gas production continue to be major factors in world markets. Due in part to Gulf-Russia cooperation, they have remained stable during the Middle East and Ukraine wars. However, American increases in production and exports, as well as sanctions on Russian oil and gas have weakened the Gulf’s influence on prices, and this trend is likely to continue.

The Gulf states have opted out of the Ukraine war, which they regard as Europe’s problem. They have tried to warm relations with China, their major oil and gas customer. They will try to maintain their exports even as the world gradually moves towards non-carbon fuel sources to meet the challenges of global warming.

Iran-Gulf Relations: Fragile Stability at Risk in 2025

Dr. Arman Mahmoudian 

Despite the many crises of 2024—the continuing war in Gaza, the clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—relations between Iran and the Gulf states remained, ironically, relatively stable.This stability can be attributed to several factors, most notably the Chinese-brokered 2023 peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the general de-escalation between Iran and the Gulf states. However, the same stability cannot be guaranteed in 2025, as several factors are likely to shape the trajectory of Iran’s relations with the Gulf states.

The first and most obvious factor is the presidency of Donald Trump. Historically, Trump has demonstrated a strong inclination to confront Iran, albeit with a reluctance to commit U.S. troops to conflict and emphasizing coalition-building rather than direct force. He has also shown a clear preference for using the budding Arab-Israeli alliance to exert pressure on Iran. In 2025, Trump may balk at the Iran-GCC normalization and pressure the Gulf states to apply greater pressure on Tehran. In response, Iran may escalate its nuclear enrichment activities or increase its support for regional proxies—both of which would alarm Gulf governments  and subsequently strain their relations with Iran.

The second factor is the uncertain future of Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. While many regional actors, including Iran, are still processing the implications of this upheaval, they are beginning to adjust to the new reality. Iran’s actions in Syria could significantly impact its relations with the Gulf states, which rely on a stable Syria for their own safety. For instance, if Iran seeks to meddle in Syrian affairs, perhaps by fueling an Alawite insurgency or seeking to maintain other pro-Iranian proxies, it could provoke the Gulf states and further destabilize the region.

The final and most critical factor is the evolving conflict between Iran and Israel. In 2024, Iran and Israel exchanged direct fire for the first time in history, coming perilously close to full-scale war. This marked the end of the era of “kinetic diplomacy” between the two nations, ushering in a period of heightened risk for direct confrontation. Should Iran and Israel engage in a full-fledged war in 2025, the Gulf states  would find it nearly impossible to remain neutral. If Gulf states allow Israeli forces to use their airspace for strikes against Iran, they could face Iranian retaliation. Conversely, if they deny access, Israel would lean on the United States to use that airspace instead, leading to Iranian targeting of American assets in the GCC states and further dragging them into the fray.

These three major factors—the Trump presidency, the future of Syria, and the Iran-Israel conflict—are poised to shape Iran’s relations with the Arab states of the Gulf in 2025. While 2024 saw a fragile stability, the coming year is likely to test this equilibrium, with significant risks of escalation on multiple fronts.

Future of Gulf-Turkey Relations in 2025     

Sinem Cengiz 

The year 2024 saw significant progress in Ankara’s relations with the Arab Gulf states since the Arab Spring of 2011. Turkish-Gulf relations have entered a new phase, underpinned by three key developments. Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have agreed to begin formal negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA); they have agreed to resume talks on strategic dialogue (Turkey was designated as a strategic dialogue partner by the GCC in 2008); and they signed a four-way preliminary agreement for a joint collaboration on a “Development Road” involving Iraq, Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE. In addition, Turkey’s political and defense cooperation with the individual GCC states was strengthened through visits by Gulf leaders, which paved the way for the signing of several key agreements.     

Looking ahead to 2025, while the aspirations of Turkish and Gulf policymakers are important, evolving regional and international dynamics will likely play a crucial role in strengthening Turkish-Gulf relations. On the bilateral level, Turkey needs to maintain its position within the Gulf sub-regional system by cultivating relations with each GCC state based on an understanding of their individual interests. While the signing of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between Turkey and the individual GCC states are important, the real success will be the implementation of these agreements effectively. Strengthening institutional frameworks and ensuring the effective implementation of these initiatives is crucial, as this can help to prevent any potential future tensions in relations.     

On the regional level, shifts in security dynamics and threat perceptions are likely to drive the GCC states and Turkey toward closer collaboration. The first key regional issue to address is Syria. For the past decade, Syria had been an arena where Turkey and the GCC states vied for influence, but with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, there are opportunities for greater partnership, particularly in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Similarly, Turkey and GCC states share concerns over Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza, which has strengthened Turkey-GCC relations as Ankara has strongly supported Gulf efforts in addressing the crisis.     

On the international level, the return of Donald Trump to power in the United States is crucial for the sustainability of the momentum that Turkey and the GCC states have built. Trump has unfinished business in the region from his first term, and both Ankara and Gulf capitals must be prepared to navigate the unpredictable and evolving regional policies of his second. Given the lessons taken from the past, Turkey and the GCC states should work to capitalize on their burgeoning political, security, and economic ties, focusing more on closing ranks against the regional challenges, rather than being dragged into potential tensions that may be triggered by Trump’s foreign policy decisions. In 2025, Turkey and the GCC states may elevate their relations to another level if they put their “Mutual Interests First” over the “America First” approach championed by Trump.

Uncertainty in 2025’s Energy Markets

Rachel Ziemba

2025 is set to bring significant changes in U.S. sanctions enforcement that will again reshape regional oil markets—notably the Trump administration’s promise to return to a policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran. Clamping down on illicit shipping and financial networks will be tough, and suggests more pressure both on Iran but also Iraq, which is implicated in smuggling operations. While GCC producers would welcome a chance to regain market share, this policy also risks an escalation in tensions. Moreover, intermediaries in the Gulf, especially the UAE and Oman, face risks of more direct U.S. sanctions enforcement, further impacting local financial systems. 

Meanwhile after one final push for Russian energy sanctions from the outgoing Biden administration, the Trump team is likely to shift policy, perhaps towards a removal or weaker implementation of the oil price cap. This policy, disliked by GCC due to their concerns about consumers setting terms for fuel trade and the discounts it grants to Russia, will likely leave an active shadow fleet in operation with associated security and environmental risks. Any major sanctions relief, however, will probably be linked to a lasting ceasefire in Ukraine, which seems overly optimistic in the short run. In any case, Russia’s energy sectors are likely to remain uninvestable for most U.S. allies for the foreseeable future. Expect export controls and trade restrictions on military trade to continue.

Throughout this, GCC fuel producers will face uncertainties around global demand growth and difficulty maintaining cohesion with their partners in OPEC. Chinese economic support is unlikely to boost its energy intensity of growth, perpetuating the new normal of sluggish demand growth. India is a bright spot, but additional gains are a challenge. Natural gas looks brighter, especially for Qatar, but others will step up investments at home and abroad as well, increasing Doha’s competition. 

The GCC countries will find more welcome interlocutors among the incoming U.S. energy team, who aim to reduce regulations and facilitate investment in the U.S. and a more transactional approach to policy making. However, the reality may be rougher sailing. Saudi and Emirati pledges that they are on America’s side for high-level tech development may face a more receptive audience.  However, the push against environmental regulations and uncertainty around renewable energy subsidies will bring some unease. It remains to be seen if the Trump administration can implement their pledge of easing investment pathways for the region’s sovereign wealth funds. Indeed, those funds’ ties to China could serve as an anchor in relations with Washington and complicate energy and non-energy investment. Despite optimism that comes from lack of direct trade, the indirect effect of U.S. tariffs will bring some costs, dampening growth around the world and raising costs.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.