The Gulf States’ Approach to Taliban Rule: Navigating Opportunities and Tensions

Taliban rule in Afghanistan is nearing its three-year anniversary. The group reclaimed power in Afghanistan in the days following the United States’ withdrawal in August 2021—a process facilitated by Qatar-led negotiations between the Taliban and the American government. In the years following the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has become an arena for Middle East rivalries to play out. Because of its political linkages with Taliban leaders, Doha was expected to hold the most influence of the Gulf States in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states were expected to fund infrastructure projects while also guaranteeing a line of communication between the West and the Taliban to implement these projects. However, quickly after their takeover, the Taliban made clear that in order to strike a balance among various regional stakeholders, it had no intention of relying on any one international partner to achieve its interests. Indeed, the Taliban-led government has indicated its commitment to protecting the sovereignty of their new government, which will inevitably inform Kabul’s future discussions with international powers regarding agreements that impact the country’s economy or security relationships.

Vying for Influence

One of these regional stakeholders, Türkiye, engaged in talks with the Taliban-led government regarding operational control of the country’s five international airports. Türkiye insisted that Kabul establish special security zones around these sites, to be supervised by Turkish military contractors who had provided security control in the period before the Taliban takeover. This arrangement, which overcame the Taliban’s opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, likely influenced the Taliban’s decision to forge ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). For the Taliban, the UAE’s established prowess in aviation services offered an economically beneficial agreement regarding the administration and operational control of their airports, bolstering the group’s domestic legitimacy. The Afghan government similarly expressed concern that the Doha-brokered airport deal  with Türkiye, would allow the International Chamber of Commerce—A Paris-based organization represents private business—to arbitrate in the dispute, viewed by the Taliban regime as an imposition of Western legal norms.

Despite its opposition to the intervention of some foreign governments in Afghanistan, the Taliban has expressed an interest in working with regional powers that accommodate the regime’s ultraconservative cultural values or present viable alternatives to the Western “rules-based” global order. Qatar has positioned itself as a mediator to end the Taliban’s isolation. In May 2023, the Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani held secret talks with the supreme leader of the Taliban, Haibatullah Akhunzada, to underscore the need to end Taliban bans on girls’ education and women’s employment. Though these same demands had previously been made by the United States, Qatar was able to leverage its long-standing ties with the Islamist movement to push for deeper international engagement with Kabul. Qatar remains a key interlocutor for the Taliban government, as Doha would be capable of hosting UN-backed talks on re-integrating Afghanistan into the international community.

Testing Diplomatic Waters

Another prominent GCC member, Saudi Arabia, has expressed intentions to continue monitoring Afghanistan’s relationship with Iran, as well as the distribution of charity and humanitarian assistance. In an attempt to strengthen Saudi soft power, Saudi relief efforts via entities such as the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center and the Saudi Fund have bolstered access to food, water, health care, and education in Afghanistan. Compared to Qatar and the UAE, Saudi Arabia has limited its diplomatic contact with the Taliban, as Saudi meddling in Afghanistan affairs over the past decades eroded the Saudis’ credibility in the eyes of the Afghan public. Therefore, Riyadh turned to cultivating the relationship with Afghanistan through its neighbor, Pakistan, instead. As security conditions deteriorated, Riyadh closed its Kabul embassy and relocated its Afghan consular office to Islamabad. However, Saudi Arabia’s Pakistani channel to Kabul became dysfunctional once tensions between the Taliban and Islamabad surfaced due to continued border and cross-border violence. These tensions drove the Saudis to deliver humanitarian relief to the Afghan people through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation reopened in November 2022. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan has also been complicated by the governments’ differing interpretations of the role of Islam in state and society. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has encouraged a less interlink between religion and governance,  and encouraged clergy that preaches tolerance and expanded personal freedoms, whereas the Taliban continues to advocate for a far more fundamental teachings that envisions a much diminished role for religious minorities and women. Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of more “moderate Islam” butted heads over these different approaches. For example, Saudi Arabia hosted a two-day international conference of the OIC in July 2017, where more than one hundred religious scholars from nearly forty countries participated. The conference concluded with a declaration condemning the religious illegitimacy of Taliban violence.

To date, no country, including the Gulf states, has officially recognized the legitimacy of the Taliban’s rule of what the group calls the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.  Nevertheless, in February 2024 the third meeting of dozens of international envoys to Afghanistan took place in Doha, with the goal of better coordinating international engagement with Kabul. Additionally, in the past year, the UAE has joined its Gulf partners by seeking influence in Afghanistan. On June 4 2024, Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani visited Abu Dhabi and met with UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). The occasion marked Haqqani’s first trip outside Afghanistan since the Taliban retook control of the country. The Taliban’s spy chief, Abdul Haq Wasiq, also joined the delegation. The two sides discussed, as sources reported, “strengthening the bonds of cooperation between the two countries and ways to enhance ties to serve mutual interests and contribute to regional stability.” The agenda also included “economic and development matters, as well as support for Afghan reconstruction and development.” Haqqani’s trip to Abu Dhabi sent shockwaves through Washington, because the United States had previously charged Haqqani for his involvement in a terror attack in Kabul that killed an American civilian. MbZ’s decision to meet with the Afghan delegation granted the Taliban significant international legitimacy, as the UAE treated the pair as accredited representatives of a foreign government. This undoubtedly caused consternation in Washington, which has largely discouraged its partners from reestablishing diplomatic ties with the Taliban.

Though their diplomatic overtures to Taliban-led Afghanistan grant the regime international legitimacy, several GCC states have proven—time and time again—their utility to the West as interlocutors with Kabul. These Gulf states have conveyed the West’s policy preferences to the Taliban, arguing that the government should lift  repressive restrictions on women’s rights and the ban on music as a condition for further international recognition.  For the time being, the Taliban appear content to negotiate, especially with billions of dollars in infrastructure investment on the table. However, forging strong and enduring relations with international and regional partners while preventing foreign interference in the day-to-day operations of the government in Kabul and Afghan society marks a steeper challenge.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.