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Unmanned aerial vehicles, missile systems, and other military equipment on display at the SAHA Expo 2026 international defense and aerospace industry trade fair in Istanbul, May 6, 2026. Photo/Pavel Nemecek (CTK via AP Images)

The Iran War Is Driving the Gulf Toward Turkish Air Defense

The Iran war triggered one of the most significant reassessments of Gulf air-defense strategy in decades, exposing the structural limitations of systems primarily designed around ballistic missile threats. Over weeks of sustained attacks, Gulf states faced mounting pressure from saturation campaigns, radar attrition, and increasingly sophisticated unmanned systems, all of which highlighted the economic and operational unsustainability of relying exclusively on high-end interceptors such as the MIM-104 Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems against cheap drones and loitering munitions. As Gulf states search for more affordable and scalable ways to counter these attacks, Turkish defense firms are emerging as some of the biggest beneficiaries. From short-range air defense systems to integrated counter-drone architectures, Ankara is increasingly positioning itself as a key supplier in the Gulf’s next generation of air defense investments.

GCC states all maintained significant interception rates throughout the conflict using layered architectures centered on Patriot PAC-3 batteries and, in the Emirati and Saudi cases, THAAD systems. Yet the war demonstrated how these architectures were not designed to absorb prolonged campaigns dominated by drones, cruise missiles, and saturation attacks. Gulf states repeatedly employed expensive interceptors against comparatively cheap aerial threats while simultaneously confronting concerns over interceptor depletion, launcher capacity, and replenishment timelines for Western systems already strained by global demand linked to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Gulf states are therefore accelerating efforts to build more layered air-defense architectures combining strategic missile defense with cheaper interception layers, mobile counter-drone systems, electronic warfare, and medium-range platforms better adapted to modern attritional warfare. Developments surrounding SAHA Expo 2026 in Istanbul highlighted how Ankara is increasingly viewed as a broader defense-industrial partner capable of providing integrated layered-defense solutions, counter-drone systems, localization opportunities, and rapid industrial cooperation.

The Rise of Layered Defense

For decades, Gulf defense strategies focused primarily on acquiring high-end strategic systems capable of countering ballistic missile threats, with the United States remaining the backbone of this architecture. According to SIPRI, Washington accounted for 77 percent of Saudi Arabia’s arms imports, 48 percent of Qatar’s, 62 percent of Kuwait’s, and 42 percent of the UAE’s between 2021 and 2025. American systems also remain deeply embedded within Gulf command structures, training pipelines, maintenance ecosystems, and early-warning networks.

The recent conflict, however, exposed the limitations of relying too heavily on upper-tier systems poorly optimized for prolonged drone attacks. Gulf states therefore concluded that future defense architectures must combine strategic missile defense with cheaper and more scalable short- and medium-range interception layers capable of dealing with drones, cruise missiles, and saturation attacks.

South Korea, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom have all emerged as beneficiaries of the Gulf’s defense transformation. The UAE reportedly achieved significant interception results using the South Korean Cheongung-II (KM-SAM) system during the conflict, while Saudi Arabia and Iraq are also expanding interest in KM-SAM as part of future medium-range air-defense planning. At the same time, Ukraine’s experience confronting sustained Russian drone attacks has increased Gulf interest in low-cost counter-UAS systems, interceptor drones, and electronic warfare solutions. The United Kingdom has similarly expanded cooperation with Gulf partners through initiatives such as the Cambridge Aerospace Skyhammer program to focus on interceptor missiles and drones.

Türkiye, SAHA 2026, and the “Steel Dome” Logic

Within this broader shift toward layered and distributed air-defense architectures, Türkiye increasingly occupies the operational segment that Gulf states now appear most urgently interested in reinforcing: mature short- and medium-range defensive layers capable of addressing drones, loitering munitions, and low-altitude saturation attacks in a more sustainable and scalable manner than upper-tier ballistic missile-defense systems alone.

SAHA Expo 2026 in Istanbul offered the clearest demonstration of how rapidly Türkiye’s role in Gulf security is evolving. The exhibition showcased Ankara’s broader “Steel Dome” vision, integrating systems such as ASELSAN’s KORKUT anti-aircraft gun systems, the HİSAR-A+ and HİSAR-O+ systems, SİPER missiles, KALKAN radars, electronic warfare capabilities, and layered command-and-control architectures into a unified ecosystem designed for drone warfare and saturation attacks.

Türkiye is marketing not only isolated platforms, but integrated operational architectures combining interception, surveillance, radar fusion, and electronic warfare. At the same time, Gulf interest appears increasingly differentiated across capability tiers. While mature Turkish systems are already considered operationally deployable and immediately relevant to Gulf requirements, more ambitious projects associated with the Steel Dome architecture remain under maturation and are still largely viewed as longer-term options rather than direct substitutes for systems such as Patriot PAC-3 or THAAD in ballistic missile interception.

Compared to many Western suppliers, Turkish firms emphasize faster delivery schedules, industrial flexibility, localization, co-production, and operational adaptation opportunities increasingly valued by Gulf states. Türkiye’s broader defense-industrial transformation has itself become part of Ankara’s appeal. Over the past two decades, the country evolved from a heavily import-dependent defense actor into an increasingly autonomous and export-oriented ecosystem spanning drones, missiles, armored vehicles, naval systems, electronic warfare, and advanced aerospace projects. For Gulf states pursuing localization and diversification, Türkiye offers not only affordable, operationally proven technologies, but also a realistic model of defense industrialization built around co-production, flexibility, and export-oriented growth.

Counter-Drone Defense and Operational Adaptation

Saudi Arabia has emerged as the most important Gulf actor exploring Turkish short-range and counter-drone systems. According to reports surrounding SAHA 2026, ASELSAN’s KORKUT 100/25 short-range air-defense system attracted significant Saudi interest because it is optimized to engage FPV drones, loitering munitions, and other low-altitude threats. Türkiye has also reportedly proposed the KALKAN radar network integrated with mobile command-and-control shelters and sensor-fusion capabilities designed to strengthen low-altitude detection and feed real-time tracking data into Saudi layered air-defense architectures. Meanwhile, the GÖKBERK mobile laser weapon system remains under evaluation for potential deployment to protect strategic energy infrastructure from drone swarms.

Saudi interest extends beyond air defense. Baykar has reportedly proposed a package involving 12 Bayraktar Akinci UAVs configured for maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions over the Eastern Province coastline and Red Sea approaches. These developments fit within a broader Saudi-Turkish defense-industrial convergence already underway. In 2023, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and Baykar signed an agreement involving localized Akinci drone production, while firms such as the National Company for Mechanical Systems, ASELSAN, and Roketsan were involved in UAV system integration, electro-optics, and guidance kits.

Qatar has moved along a similar trajectory, expanding interest in Turkish short-range counter-drone systems capable of complementing higher-end missile-defense layers. Doha also reportedly signed contracts involving the KORKUT system at SAHA. Qatar’s long-standing strategic relationship with Ankara, including Türkiye’s permanent military presence in the country and extensive bilateral defense exercises, further facilitates operational integration and interoperability. Doha has also explored integrating Turkish systems, such as the HİSAR family, into broader Steel Dome-inspired defensive architectures.

Beyond the Gulf, Iraq is also looking to develop a new layered-defense model partially built around Turkish anti-drone systems. Baghdad reportedly nears completion of a procurement of 20 Turkish air-defense systems intended to complement other systems the Iraqi Air Defense Command relies on, such as the U.S.-supplied AN/TWQ-1 Avenger, Russian Pantsir-S1, and upgraded Soviet Igla-S man-portable air defenses. This procurement forms part of Iraq’s broader effort to rebuild a layered air-defense architecture centered on KM-SAM as a possible medium-range backbone. In this framework, Baghdad will likely use the Turkish systems to protect the Korean batteries from close-range attacks, creating an additional defensive layer around its most strategic assets.

Expanding the Medium- to Short-Range Layer

Gulf and regional states are increasingly prioritizing medium-range defensive layers as part of broader post-war procurement recalibrations, with Türkiye potentially playing a pivotal role in these evolving architectures. According to reports surrounding these discussions, ROKETSAN has proposed to Riyadh a six-battery HİSAR-O package configured for fixed infrastructure defense around oil stabilization facilities and eastern airbase corridors. This system is being evaluated within the kingdom’s existing layered air-defense C2 architecture, which includes legacy MIM-23 Hawk batteries, South Korean KM-SAM systems, and Patriot-linked elements. In this framework, HİSAR-O is viewed as a medium-range complement capable of reinforcing lower defensive layers and gradually replacing older systems, but not as a substitute for upper-tier platforms such as Patriot PAC-3 or THAAD.

Kuwait is also a potential customer for Türkiye’s medium-range defensive systems. While Kuwait already operates Patriot systems as part of its upper-tier defensive architecture, recent regional tensions accelerated interest in medium-altitude systems such as the HİSAR family. At SAHA, Kuwaiti Defense Minister Sheikh Abdullah Ali Abdullah Al Sabah signed a government-to-government sales protocol with Türkiye’s Defense Industry Agency focused on defense industries, logistics, technical coordination, and expertise exchange involving firms such as ASELSAN, HAVELSAN, Baykar, Otokar, and Yonca Shipyard.

Kuwaiti interest also extends to Baykar’s Akinci UAVs, potentially configured similarly to the SATCOM-enabled package proposed to Riyadh. These developments build upon an already expanding bilateral defense relationship. In 2023, Kuwait signed a $367 million agreement with Baykar for the procurement of Bayraktar TB2 drones, including mobile ground-control stations, electronic-warfare systems, and Roketsan-produced munitions.

More broadly, the growing Gulf interest in Turkish systems reflects a wider transformation in regional defense planning, where procurement is increasingly tied not only to operational necessity, but also to industrial flexibility, localization, technological cooperation, and long-term strategic autonomy. In this environment, Türkiye is becoming not simply a supplier of drones and air-defense systems, but an important partner in the Gulf’s search for layered, scalable, and sustainable security architectures.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.

Issue: Defense & Security
Country: GCC

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Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an independent Middle East analyst and consultant specializing in the international relations and security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf. His expertise includes military and diplomatic interventions by international actors in the Middle East and North Africa and the military technologies of some of the leading Middle Eastern actors in this sector. He is a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute of Switzerland (MEIS), and advisor to the Rome Office of TRENDS, Research & Advisory, and a contributor to several international outlets, including Al- Monitor, Amwaj, The New Arab, and the NATO Defense College Foundation. Previously, he was a researcher at the Middle East and North Africa Centre of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies and a coordinator of the scientific team for “Rome MED – Mediterranean Dialogues” for five years. From 2023-24, he also served as an advisor to the Steering Committee for the Euromesco Annual Conference, organized by the European Institute of the Mediterranean in partnership with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


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