The Splintering of the Axis of Resistance

Two days before the sixth round of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in Oman, Israel launched a series of strikes on June 13, 2025, abruptly halting the diplomatic process and pushing its long-standing confrontation with Tehran into the open. Following on from the decimation of Hezbollah’s leadership and capabilities in Lebanon, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and targeting Hamas leaders in Gaza and Tehran, Israel brought its long-simmering hostilities with Iran into the open on June 13, 2025. After years of engaging in a “shadow war” with Iran over its nuclear and missile programs, as well as its regional proxy groups, Tel Aviv calculated that it could decisively shift the balance of power in its favor.

The recent escalation raises important questions about the future of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Established throughout the tumultuous years of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the formation of Hezbollah in 1982, the Axis has been a mainstay of Iran’s regional foreign policy. Though this constellation of violent non-state actors previously aligned with Iran to fight Israel, during the current conflict they have largely remained on the sidelines.

Different Priorities

Since Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks, Israel has systematically dismantled critical parts of the Axis of Resistance. Unable to effectively defend its proxies, Iran has been isolated and humiliated by Israel’s military campaign. Whether the tenuous new Israel-Iran ceasefire will hold is yet to be determined, but what does look inevitable is the splintering of the Axis and a reorientation of Iran’s foreign policy away from relying on proxy groups to project power and international influence.

Since 2005, Iran has emphasized building partnerships with Asian powers, Russia and China in particular, through its “Look East” policy. Over time, this policy has transformed to reflect the interests of all parties as the global order became more multipolar. Indeed, Iran’s engagement with middle-income countries seeking to shape international politics culminated in Iran joining the BRICS grouping on January 1, 2024. Iran and Russia signed a wide-ranging treaty in 2025, but this agreement did not contain any provisions that would obligate either party to come to the defense of the other—including in the event of hostilities like those between Iran and Israel. Instead, like Iran’s 2021 comprehensive partnership accord with China, it dealt mainly with trade, sanctions relief, and the shared struggle against U.S. hegemony. Iranian support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the transfer of drones, further demonstrates that its priorities had begun to shift from its Axis of Resistance partners.

Now, with the Iranian regime still not out of the woods, the remnants of the Axis of Resistance have done little to defend their backers in Tehran. Like Iran, perhaps they have begun to look elsewhere for security.

Standing on Their Own

The Houthis, perhaps the strongest remaining Axis member, show that Iran’s proxies have begun to deepen their ties with other violent extremist groups to continue to fight against Israel. While the group has adhered to a ceasefire deal it signed with the United States that ended Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, attacks against Israel were not part of the deal.

With Iran on the back foot, the Houthis have developed relationships with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) giving it a greater ability to consolidate territory under its control. However, amid continuing internal instability inside Yemen, there is potential that if the Houthis were to become too strong, groups such as AQAP might balance or coalesce with other groups to offset the power differential. So far, AQAP has generally targeted the Southern Transitional Council forces in the south of the country.

The Houthis also have a partner across the Gulf of Aden, in Somalia—Al Shabaab. For centuries, religious, socioeconomic and political connections have tied the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa. Houthi relations with Al Shabaab and other smugglers represent shared interests in maintaining illicit trade networks, from which the Houthis have benefited tremendously. As these groups’ capabilities expand, so too will their influence. Al Shabaab is already building its influence through improving its funding from illicit activities and access to weapons, often in partnership with the Houthis. However, it is debatable whether these non-state actors will be able to band together and expand to replicate the type of complex coalitions such as those found in conflict networks in West Africa.

If the brittle ceasefire—already violated by both parties—suffers the same fate as the Gaza truce, it could mark a turning point for the Axis of Resistance. A destabilized Islamic Republic would likely shift its focus inward—prioritizing regime survival and military reconstruction—diminishing its capacity to project power through proxies across the region.

The Israel-Iran confrontation may represent a strategic rupture in the regional order long shaped by Iran’s proxy networks. The unraveling of the Axis of Resistance—once central to Iran’s asymmetric warfare doctrine—suggests a shift in the balance of power away from Tehran’s regional influence. As Iran grapples with internal vulnerabilities and recalibrates its foreign policy toward economic and geopolitical alignment with Russia, China, and other non-Western powers, its traditional model of power projection is under severe strain. Meanwhile, the fragmentation of its allied non-state actors underscores the limits of ideological unity in the face of changing priorities and emerging local dynamics. These groups may now seek alternative alliances, local power bases, and transnational networks to sustain their relevance without direct Iranian support. Whether this marks the end of the Axis of Resistance or its transformation into a more diffuse, decentralized threat remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the region is entering a new phase—one defined less by proxy unity and more by fragmentation, recalibration, and uncertain realignment.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.