Toward a New Order in MENA Regional Geopolitics

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This report is a byproduct of the workshop “Toward a New Order in MENA Regional Geopolitics: What’s Next for the Region’s Geopolitical Equilibrium?,” hosted in Singapore on February 9–10, 2026, by the Gulf International Forum in conjunction with the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and Waseda University. The report features contributions from Dania Thafer, David Des Roches, Aziz Alghashian, Keiko Sakurai, Murat Aslan, Tingyi Wang, Hosaka Shuji, Ivan Lidarev, Camille Lons, Abdullah Baabood, and Younes Abouyoub.

The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the series of regional conflicts that followed have introduced new variables that have reshaped threat perceptions across the Gulf. Gulf states have been forced to contend with the spillover from several war fronts between Iranian proxies and Israel in the first two years of the war, and later the U.S.–Israel war with Iran. Iranian attacks on all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Jordan, Syria, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have shifted the threat perceptions of most GCC states back toward Iran, after two years in which Israeli behavior in Gaza and the overreach of IDF military operations elsewhere in the region were increasingly viewed as a rising threat alongside earlier concerns about Tehran.

This dual threat perception from Iran and Israel, coupled with a U.S. defense policy that does not prioritize Gulf visions of de-escalation, has forced the GCC states to reassess their security priorities and broader assumptions about regional order, while heightening concerns about being dragged into an unwanted war. Yet Iranian attacks involving thousands of drones and missiles on Gulf territory have left GCC states with little choice but to strengthen their security and defense relations with Washington while simultaneously considering expanding defense ties with other international partners.

For the Gulf states, strategic autonomy no longer means distancing themselves from Washington, but expanding room to maneuver within a changing global order. By diversifying defense partnerships and deepening ties with global powers like China and regional powers such as Türkiye and Pakistan, GCC states are recalibrating rather than abandoning the U.S.-led system to gain greater leverage, flexibility, and security. At the same time, the military balance shaping Gulf calculations is increasingly defined by asymmetry rather than conventional deterrence alone.

The United States retains overwhelming military superiority over Iran, but its ability to manage escalation in the Gulf is constrained by geography, energy markets, operational realities, and the diverging agendas of Gulf states. Iran, meanwhile, does not seek a conventional victory. Its strategy is built around regime survival and economic disruption by targeting shipping and energy flows using missiles and asymmetric pressure. This creates a structural imbalance: Iran only needs to generate limited instability to impose global economic costs, while the United States and its Gulf partners must sustain far costlier efforts to maintain dominance and regional order.

Yet the war has also exposed the limits of Iranian power and raised new questions about the long-term stability of the Islamic Republic itself. The successful U.S. and Israeli military campaign targeting Iranian political and military leadership, as well as the defense capabilities of the Iranian military (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies, has significantly weakened Iran’s regional position. Iran is confronting its gravest crisis since 1979: a collapsing deterrence network, leadership loss, regional alienation, deepening domestic unrest, severe economic decline, and mounting pressure from the United States and Israel. Still, the Islamic Republic remains structurally resilient—anchored by the IRGC, parallel institutions, and coercive control over the population. To make matters more complex for the Gulf states, the danger from a stronger Iran would likely pale in comparison to the fallout from the instability that could emerge from a weakened and cornered one—or even the collapse of the central state, which could produce regional spillover and prolonged disorder. The result is a region moving toward extended volatility rather than strategic resolution.

Rather than producing a unified Gulf response, this instability is unfolding alongside renewed intra-GCC competition and diverging visions of regional order. While Iran’s attacks on Gulf infrastructure might be expected to push the region toward greater coordination, the weakening of Iranian power and differing threat perceptions have instead renewed intra-GCC competition. Despite shared concerns over Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are increasingly divided by competing visions of regional order, security, and economic influence. The result is a Gulf order defined simultaneously by competition and convergence, as regional insecurity increasingly overrides political and strategic differences.

These regional tensions are also unfolding amid a broader transformation in the Gulf’s global partnerships and economic orientation. The Gulf’s diversification strategy is being tested by a deteriorating regional order and declining confidence in U.S. security guarantees. GCC states are expanding economic, technological, and defense partnerships with Asia and beyond, seeking greater strategic autonomy while maintaining ties with Washington. Yet war, maritime disruption, and intra-Gulf divisions have exposed the limits of this approach. China and other external partners remain economically engaged but strategically cautious, leaving Gulf states trapped between dependence on the United States and the absence of a credible alternative security framework.

Nowhere is this transformation more visible than in Asia’s growing dependence on Gulf stability and energy security. Asia’s deepening economic integration with the Gulf is translating into exposure as instability in the Middle East increasingly threatens East Asian energy security, trade routes, and supply chains. China, India, Japan, and South Korea now depend heavily on Gulf stability, yet lack the security frameworks and regional influence necessary to shape outcomes. Beijing’s growing footprint reflects a shift from energy security to broader “system security,” but China remains reluctant to assume major security responsibilities. The result is an imbalance: Asia has become central to the Gulf economically, while the United States remains the indispensable security actor.

At the same time, middle powers closer to the region are pursuing their own recalibrations in response to the new emerging order in the Middle East. Similar to many Gulf states, Türkiye is recalibrating its foreign policy around strategic autonomy, flexibility, and crisis management as regional fragmentation and geopolitical competition intensify. Alienation from the West, domestic trauma, and overlapping regional conflicts have pushed Ankara toward a multidirectional strategy balancing NATO ties with engagement across the Middle East, Africa, BRICS, and Eurasia. Under President Erdoğan, Türkiye increasingly relies on mediation, proactive defense, and pragmatic normalization with rivals. Yet Ankara’s ambitions remain constrained by economic fragility, internal polarization, and a volatile regional order defined less by rules than by shifting power politics.

India, meanwhile, has adopted a similarly flexible but increasingly difficult balancing strategy across the Middle East. India’s rise in the Middle East reflects a pragmatic strategy built on flexibility, balancing, and diversified partnerships rather than rigid alliances. Driven by competition with China and its economic ambitions, New Delhi has simultaneously deepened ties with Israel, the Gulf states, Iran, and major global powers while pursuing economic connectivity and strategic influence. Yet mounting regional instability, intensifying U.S.–China competition, and the re-emergence of Pakistan are narrowing India’s room to maneuver. Even so, India is unlikely to abandon its multi-alignment approach, and New Delhi will likely see adaptation rather than strategic realignment as the best path to preserving influence in a fragmented regional order.

At the center of this evolving regional landscape remains Israel’s growing military and strategic dominance. Israel’s regional ascendancy is less the product of overwhelming power alone than decades of Arab fragmentation and failed collective strategy. At the same time, Iran’s weakened proxy network continues to anchor regional instability. The result is a Middle East defined by asymmetric power and prolonged instability rather than resolution.

For the Gulf states, these overlapping crises have produced an environment in which economic transformation can no longer be separated from regional insecurity. The Gulf is confronting a new regional order in which economic transformation collides with mounting insecurity from both Iran and Israel. Declining confidence in U.S. protection, intra-GCC divisions, and rising regional tensions are pushing Gulf states toward fragmented security diversification, while public anger and geopolitical instability increasingly complicate normalization, deterrence, and long-term economic ambitions.

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.