Turkey’s Balancing Act Following the 12-Day War

Since early 2025, the balance of power between Iran and Turkey has shifted decisively in Ankara’s favor. The brief 12-Day War between Iran and Israel placed two of its main competitors in direct confrontation, leaving Ankara in a comparatively stronger position.

The war marked the culmination of a broader regional shift that had already been unfolding for some time. Iran’s weakening regional influence, and the ensuing rise of power vacuums across the Middle East, have created space for Turkey’s resurgence as a powerful regional actor. Given that Ankara and Tehran compete across multiple arenas—from Syria and Iraq to the South Caucasus—Turkey’s influence has grown in parallel with Iran’s declining regional clout.

As Iranian Influence Grows Weaker, Turkey Picks Up the Slack

The onset of the war in Gaza, and the ensuing debilitation of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” by Israel and the United States, have undermined the Islamic Republic’s ability to project power in the region. While all major members of the Axis had been weakened through aerial and overland military campaigns in the post-October 7 period, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria dealt the most significant blow. The land bridge connecting Tehran to the Mediterranean through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—maintained by Iran since the early 2000s and essential for sustaining Hezbollah—has effectively collapsed. Turkey is filling the gap, positioning itself as a lead actor in Syria’s reconstruction and planning to establish a series of military bases across the country. Ankara views Syria as a buffer state and a means to project power deep into the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey is simultaneously strengthening its position in Iraq through expanding political and economic engagement. The work on the Development Road, linking Turkey to the Gulf, presents an alternative to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), sponsored by the United States, the European Union, India, and several Gulf states. Although the Development Road has been discussed for decades, Iraq’s instability and Turkey’s shifting priorities have consistently stalled progress. Iran, whose geography lends itself to east-west connectivity, regards the Development Road project as an attempt to bypass its territory and diminish its role in regional connectivity.

Tensions between Iran and Turkey are sharpened by conflicting approaches to the Kurdish issue. Neither side wants to see the emergence of an independent Kurdish state—in 2019, they notably collaborated in a joint operation against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). However, Iran’s alleged support for the PKK as a way to counter Turkish ambitions has often strained bilateral relations. Earlier this year, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan accused Iran of backing Syrian Kurdish forces in ways that would undermine peace in the neighboring country. The disagreement prompted both Ankara and Tehran to summon their respective ambassadors to de-escalate tensions.

In the South Caucasus, Turkey’s influence has grown following Azerbaijan’s victories over Armenia in 2020 and 2023, which saw the end of the Armenian-backed self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Iran has long been wary of the close relationship between Ankara and Baku, but Armenia’s recent defeats have greatly deepened Tehran’s concerns. Iranian officials increasingly warn that Turkey is expanding its influence in the South Caucasus at the expense of the Islamic Republic. Recent developments on the transport route known in Azerbaijan as the Zangezur corridor, which runs through Armenia’s southernmost territory of Syunik, have become another major point of contention.

Iran considers its short border with Armenia as a reliable land link into the South Caucasus, free from Turkish-Azerbaijani influence. The route to Armenia is also a corridor for Iran to access Georgia’s Black Sea ports, and by extension, European markets. A corridor through Armenia could strip Tehran of its longstanding geopolitical leverage over Azerbaijan, namely the Aras corridor connecting Azerbaijan proper with its exclave of Nakhchivan via Iran’s northern territory. The Aras corridor, stretching for 107 km, was formalized in 2023 when Baku and Tehran reached an agreement to expand infrastructure along the route, envisioning a transit flow of 15 million tons of cargo by the early 2030s.

Cooperation Amid Competition: A Strategic Calculus

Beyond regional competition, Iran and Turkey continue to have common interests and often respect each other’s red lines. They both oppose Israel’s war on Gaza and largely disagree with the United States’ unconditional support for the Jewish state. Ankara and Tehran were also unequivocal in their condemnation of the Israeli attack on Doha in September. Turkey also supports Iran’s ambition to possess civilian nuclear energy and supports a peaceful solution to the nuclear program. Furthermore, Turkey was among the harshest critics of Israel’s aerial onslaught on the Islamic Republic in June, calling it a blatant violation of international law.

Moreover, Iran and Turkey are ardent followers of the principle of regionalism—the idea that regional affairs should be shaped by the countries that dominate them. In the South Caucasus, for instance, Ankara and Tehran oppose the growing involvement of non-regional actors such as the United States and the European Union. Alongside Russia, Iran and Turkey argue that their geography and historical ties to the South Caucasus grant them a significant role in shaping the region’s political and security dynamics. This logic underpins the “3+3 format,” which brings together the three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, though the latter refuses to participate) with their three larger neighbors (Turkey, Iran, and Russia).

On a practical level, Iran and Turkey are seeking to expand bilateral ties and security cooperation. In late October, Iran’s Interior Minister Eskandar Mo’meni met Turkey’s Deputy Interior Minister Munir Karaloğlu during the 4th Meeting of the Interior Ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) held in Tehran. The two sides stated their willingness to deepen bilateral ties, emphasizing that their cooperation had no limits. This followed the visit to Turkey in early October by Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, when the sides discussed defense cooperation and border security.

Economic cooperation is also set to grow. Both sides pledged to expand bilateral trade to $30 billion in the coming years, circumventing sanctions through local currencies and bartering. Supporting this transition, the two countries unveiled the Gürbulak-Bazargan border crossing point in Turkey’s Ağrı province in September. Energy remains another pillar of cooperation, with Iran continuing to supply Turkey natural gas and oil through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline.

Turkey Sees a Need for Regional Balance

Though Turkey benefited strategically from seeing its two regional competitors clashing in June, it now faces new challenges with the weakening of Iran and the consequent rise of Israeli influence. Maintaining a delicate balance in the Middle East remains a top priority for Ankara, as a further weakening of Iran would invite greater power projection by Israel—a scenario it is seeking to avoid at all costs. A weak Iran would also exacerbate Turkey’s border uncertainties, including the potential flow of refugees from the southeast and cross-border attacks from Kurdish groups.

At the same time, with Iran’s nuclear ambitions now curtailed, Ankara is no longer concerned that a military parity with Tehran might be lost. For Turkey, the existence of a stable Iran that is still capable of resisting Israeli influence is essential to preserving a shaky regional equilibrium. Ultimately, though Iran and Turkey have a longstanding and often bitter historical rivalry, evolving regional dynamics might be nudging them closer together.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.