Türkiye’s Delicate Balance: Navigating the Iran-Israel Conflict

After the years-long Iran-Israel shadow war gave way in April to direct confrontation between the two states, all of Iran’s neighbors have been attempting to understand what the new rules of engagement mean for the Middle East. Sharing a 335-mile border and a complicated relationship with Iran—perhaps best described as a competitive rivalry—Türkiye has much at stake when it comes to the possibility of a full-blown war between Iran and Israel that draws in the United States. 

The messaging from Turkish leaders has reflected Ankara’s desire to maintain a safe distance from the hostilities. In response to Israel’s military strikes against Iran on October 26, formally known as “Operation Days of Repentance,” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared, “I extend my best wishes to our neighbor Iran and the Iranian government, which were the target of Israeli aggression last night.” Erdogan also blasted Western governments that backed the attack on Iran and accused Tel Aviv of “attempting to ignite a regional conflict.” The Turkish president further warned that Iran must not fall into the “trap set by Israel and its supporters.” Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry accused Israel of “genocide in Gaza” and condemned its airstrikes against Iran.

While Iran and Israel continue to climb the escalation ladder, Türkiye’s leadership is determined to ensure that Ankara embraces a careful strategy that protects Türkiye’s strategic position in the region. In the event of an all-out war between the two rivals, Türkiye, which shares borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, could face a series of economic and security disasters.   

Security Concerns

A key concern in Türkiye is that a full-scale Iran-Israel war would jeopardize Ankara’s ongoing military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Iraq and Syria. “Ankara’s latest [campaign] in Iraq has a major Iranian element, with Türkiye engaging with Iran-aligned actors in Baghdad to pursue strategic goals against the PKK,” Batu Coşkun, a political analyst who specializes in Turkish affairs at the Libya-based Sadeq Institute, told Gulf International Forum. “Ankara is cautious of the Kurdish geopolitical space becoming embroiled in the conflict,” he continued. The increase in tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran “comes as Ankara is seeking to massively counter the PKK in Iraq and subsequently capitalize on the possibility that U.S. policy in Syria in favor of the [Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)] will shift.” With President-elect Donald Trump coming back to the White House in January 2025, there is some optimism among officials in Ankara about the incoming U.S. administration taking steps to improve Washington’s alliance with Türkiye, including withdrawing U.S. support for the PKK-linked People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria.

Reported discussions between Türkiye’s government and the PKK may suggest that Ankara is concerned that Israel could bring the militant Kurdish organization and its regional offshoots under its influence in the event of a full-blown war between Iran and Israel. Amid mounting tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, Türkiye’s leadership would obviously loathe such a scenario.

Indeed, the Turkish government blames Israel for the chaos that has gripped the region since October 7, 2023, especially given the growing human toll of Israeli campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. “As long as Israel does not heed calls for a ceasefire and continues these atrocities,” said Gökhan Ereli, the Gulf Studies Coordinator at ORSAM, an Ankara-based think tank, “the conflict will remain a source of instability, affecting Türkiye and other countries in the region.” 

Of course, Türkiye continues to have concerns about Iran’s influence across the Arab world, where Ankara and Tehran have a history of competing for influence. Ankara often views the Islamic Republic’s regional conduct as a contributing factor to regional instability that threatens Türkiye’s interests in the Levant and the wider Arab region. Additionally, Türkiye would not like to see Iran acquire nuclear weapons, and Turkish policymakers likely worry that Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iran-aligned groups throughout the region—and against Iran itself—could push the leadership in Tehran to develop nuclear weapons to ensure the regime’s survival.

Securing Türkiye’s Economic Future

Regional instability also threatens Türkiye’s economic interests. At a time in which the fragile Turkish economy has faced serious challenges, a full-scale Iran-Israel war would severely harm the region’s economic outlook. “This shift from an environment of economic opportunities and regional cooperation to one dominated by security concerns, military conflict, and heightened tension would likely place significant strain on Turkish markets,” noted Ereli. “Regional instability has historically disrupted economic collaboration, and such a conflict would further damage the climate for economic engagement, resulting in a challenging economic environment for Türkiye.”

Defne Arslan, senior director and founder of the Atlantic Council in Türkiye, agreed. “[The] Turkish economy is barely on the path to recovery from a high inflation, high budget, and current account deficit period.” A regional war would “lead [Türkiye’s] defense expenses to grow, further [increasing] government spending.” 

Türkiye also stands to lose important commercial revenue in an all-out conflict. Bilateral trade with Iran reached $5.49 billion in 2023. Türkiye mainly exports autos, manufactured goods, and machinery, to Iran. In the opposite direction, Iran sends natural gas, petrochemicals, and agricultural products. With both Türkiye and Iran facing economic problems of their own, ensuring peaceful trade is a priority for both Ankara and Tehran.  A more decisive direct confrontation could also threaten Türkiye’s trade with Iraq (Türkiye’s third largest export market) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. “The Turkish sponsored Development Road project would cease to be feasible, as Iraqi security would become significantly challenged,” in the event of an Israeli-Iranian war, commented Coşkun. 

Additionally, such a war being fought on Iranian soil could trigger a large wave of refugees from Iran coming into Türkiye, which would result in new financial burdens for Türkiye to withstand. With Türkiye already hosting roughly four million refugees, the majority being from Syria—and most of the others from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Ukraine, officials in Ankara would very much like to avoid having another country in the neighborhood undergo destabilization with its citizens coming into Türkiye as refugees in much greater numbers.

The Trump Factor

Like other regional countries, Türkiye is preparing for changes in U.S. foreign policy, given Trump’s return to the White House in early 2025. Considering that Trump’s second administration appears set on advancing a “maximum pressure 2.0” campaign against Iran, Ankara must prepare for the potential fallout. 

Thus far, Türkiye has rhetorically supported Hamas, while also condemning Israel’s strikes against Iran and Lebanon, and its killing of high-ranking figures in the “Axis of Resistance.” It is reasonable, therefore, to assess that Ankara and Tehran have come into closer alignment as a consequence of Israel’s behavior. But it is worth considering how a second Trump administration’s perceptions of Türkiye‘s relationship with Iran may impact the Washington-Ankara alliance in the months and years ahead.

Such unknown variables will require Türkiye to carefully navigate developments in the region as Ankara comes to terms with the new rules of engagement in Iran-Israel hostilities and the agenda of a second Trump administration. Although Türkiye will continue to have serious concerns about aspects of Iran’s foreign policy in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East, Ankara will likely stand by Tehran while staunchly opposing any Israeli military strikes against Iran. Similarly, just as Erdogan’s government strongly opposed the first Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, Ankara will probably make it clear to the new Trump administration that Türkiye would oppose any second round of “maximum pressure” imposed on the Islamic Republic.

Given its independent foreign policy and its significant interests in maintaining regional stability, Türkiye will likely continue to urge other countries to avoid actions that might increase the risks of an all-out war involving its powerful neighbor to the East. “Maintaining a careful equilibrium among major regional powers in the region is a priority for Türkiye,” concluded Ereli. Türkiye will hope to ensure “that its diplomatic stance remains one of constructive engagement rather than any military confrontation,” preserving the status quo that serves Ankara’s interests.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.