When Identity Politics Trumps Democracy: Iraq’s 2025 Election Dilemma

Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections are unfolding amid profound uncertainty about whether popular participation and religious leadership can resolve the country’s chronic governance challenges. Sectarian rhetoric remains potent, with clerics and politicians using identity-based appeals to mobilize voters, even as influential figures like Muqtada al-Sadr reject the legitimacy of the process itself. As Iraq grapples with mounting domestic crises—from intensifying drought and water shortages to persistent unemployment and deeply rooted political corruption—one question remains: will these elections yield meaningful change or simply reinforce the status quo?

Majority Rule and Sectarian Rhetoric

Sectarian rhetoric has been a defining feature of Iraqi elections since 2003, though its intensity and expression have varied across electoral cycles. In the early post-invasion period, sectarian identity became the principal organizing logic of the political order, with Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish blocs dominating the “Muhasasa” (quota-based) system. This arrangement institutionalized division rather than transcended it, embedding confessional-based competition into Iraq’s electoral framework.

In 2025, the Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights noted a “troubling rise in divisive identity-based rhetoric,” spread not only through clerics and politicians but via social media accounts and influencers amplifying sectarian messages. Shi’a cleric Jalal Aldeen Alsagheer reflected this rhetoric in an interview while asking “Do you want to go back to Abdulzahraa serving Omar?”—a phrase widely interpreted as a warning against Sunni political advances. Similarly, Al-Hikma Movement leader Ammar al-Hakim launched his “Do Not Waste It” campaign. The slogan was intended to unify Shi’a voters by portraying electoral participation as a collective duty to protect their community’s influence and solidarity. Similarly, slogans such as “Defending the Madhab” (“Defending the Shi’a Community”) underscore how sectarian identity remains a political instrument benefiting entrenched elites and militias. Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Shiite Badr organization and a key Iranian ally, framed abstention as disloyalty, claiming that “those who do not participate in the elections seem to support the [Ba’ath].” These incidents also underscore Iran and its allies’ recurring role in exploiting sectarian tensions to reinforce their political influence.

The return of Rafi al-Rifa‘i, Iraq’s Sunni mufti previously accused of inciting sectarianism, further underscores how identity politics continues to shape the electoral landscape. This reliance on sectarian appeals reflects the inability of elites to offer governance solutions, instead appealing to identity-based fearmongering to mobilize their bases. The 2025 elections will test whether religious leaders can still influence governance outcomes or if political fragmentation has surpassed their capacity to guide meaningful change.

According to Khairuldeen Makhzoomi, a geopolitical analyst specializing in Iraqi politics and violent non-state actors, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to boycott the elections marks a critical moment. Denouncing elections as corrupt and sectarian, Al-Sadr demanded militia disbandment, the restoration of state sovereignty, and an increase in government accountability. Al-Sadr remains an influential figure in the political scene as his followers’ absence from the ballot could depress voter turnout and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the results.

Sectarian rhetoric continues to shape elite competition and voter disengagement. While younger Iraqis and civil movements increasingly reject sectarianism, political elites remain invested in its preservation as it legitimizes their access to power and resources. Recent efforts to legally criminalize explicit sectarian incitement reflect growing recognition of its dangers, yet inconsistent and politicized enforcement has limited the law’s impact, allowing sectarian rhetoric to persist largely unchallenged.

Structural Barriers and the Muhasasa System

Amid longstanding governance issues, the rise of sectarian narratives has further eroded voters’ trust. The past few Iraqi elections have seen a dramatic decline in voter turnout, signaling growing public frustration with the current political system. The first post-Saddam election in 2005 achieved an impressive 76 percent turnout, reflecting hope in the promise of democracy; however, subsequent years have seen a steady erosion. In the 2021 and 2023 elections, turnout fell below 41 percent, highlighting widespread skepticism about the ability of elections to deliver genuine reform.

A core reason for this malaise is the Muhasasa ta’ifia, Iraq’s sectarian quota system, which allocates power and government positions according to ethnic and religious identity. Designed to ensure inclusivity after 2003, it instead deepened corruption and patronage. Major parties led by established Shia, Kurdish, and Sunni leaders dominate government institutions, making it nearly impossible for new actors to break through. A survey from 2016 showed that a majority of Iraqis viewed ending the quota system as essential for political reconciliation. As scholar Mieczysław P. Boduszyński notes, many Iraqis view sectarianism as a tool created and sustained by ruling political parties “to maintain their privileges and power, reinforced by their affiliated armed groups.” This sentiment has only intensified over time, contributing to widespread political apathy and dissatisfaction with the political system, especially among the youth.

Role of Religion, Exclusion, and Violence

Since 2003, Shi’a religious influence, particularly through Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has reflected broader tensions between traditional religious authority and modern democratic governance. This influence has recently extended into controversial legal realms, as seen with the newly implemented Mudawana, known as the Ja’fari code, that was put forth and approved by Shi’a parliament members. Critics argue that the new code institutionalizes sectarian division and undermines women’s and children’s rights. For example, the new Shi’a-backed Ja’fari code legalizes child marriage and further degrades the human rights of women and children. For many Iraqis, this legislation symbolizes how theocratic influence continues to shape both state policy and citizens’ private lives.

Political violence and assassination attempts against Iraqi election candidates persist, undermining security and electoral credibility. Recently, Sunni candidate Safaa al-Mashhadani was killed by a car bomb in Baghdad after criticizing Iran-backed armed groups. His death, attributed on social media to Shi’a militias, has heightened sectarian tensions and raised concerns about electoral security.

Earlier elections have also seen candidates attacked or killed, predominantly in Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. In the pre-2009 provincial elections, at least three politicians were murdered and several others were wounded or kidnapped. After the March 2010 elections, a wave of assassinations left more than 150 politicians, civil servants, and party officials dead.​ In 2013, two Sunni candidates were killed in separate attacks less than a week before local elections, and in 2018, three candidates were killed within the first 15 days of campaigning.

Alongside assassinations, previous Iraqi election seasons have been marred by threats, intimidation, and a widespread culture of violence.​ Ahead of Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has excluded hundreds of candidates, mainly citing former links to the Ba’ath Party, criminal records, or violations of laws around “good conduct” and respect for religious beliefs. The disqualification process, supported by the Accountability and Justice Commission, echoes earlier elections, such as in 2021, when figures like Jamal al-Halbousi were disqualified under similar claims. These decisions have sparked debate across sectarian lines and political blocs, with accusations of selective and politically-motivated exclusions.

The Limits of the Ballot

While some candidates were barred for past regime ties, others, such as candidate Sajjad Salim of the al-Badeel Coalition, faced exclusion for allegedly insulting religious practices. This political maneuvering extends beyond sectarian speech: under Article 372 of the Iraqi Penal Code, offenses against religious beliefs can carry up to three years in prison. In an interview, Salim stated that al-Mashhadani’s death came under sectarian tensions, warning that “the weapons [held by Iran-backed militias] parallel to the state will inevitably clash with the state or settle personal and economic scores with other individuals, citizens, or politicians who oppose their political path.”

Meanwhile, ongoing lawsuits seek to bar parties with affiliations to armed groups, reflecting deeper concerns over constitutional prohibitions on militias’ political roles and the integrity of the electoral process. This contradiction violates Article 9 of Iraq’s constitution—which prohibits armed groups outside the state framework and forbids military personnel from engaging in politics—underscoring the gap that remains between Iraq’s legal frameworks and its political reality.

Despite a projected surge in voter turnout, Iraq’s ballots alone cannot deliver meaningful change. Sectarian divisions, corruption, and exclusionary politics still dominate, shaping party strategies and obstructing reform. Until sectarianism and corruption are addressed, elections will remain limited in their ability to transform Iraq’s future.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.