Russia, Iran, and the Limits of Great-Power Mediation

The war in the Gulf is reshaping Russia’s strategic position in the Middle East, particularly its approach toward Iran and its relationships with the Gulf states. Both kinetic warfare and the fragile ceasefire have benefited Russian President Vladimir Putin, as higher petroleum prices generate additional revenue for Moscow’s war-torn economy, helping offset Western sanctions and sustain Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. At the same time, Washington’s focus on Iran has further diverted its own attention from Ukraine. The U.S.–Israeli decision to attack Iran without consulting European allies has also aggravated U.S.-European relations, which was recently exacerbated by U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw 5,000 American troops from Germany following criticism from Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Yet these dynamics still carry risks for Moscow. Continued tensions in the Gulf and the prospect of renewed conflict threaten to undermine Russian interests. Iranian attacks, reportedly conducted with Russian targeting assistance, including the provision of satellite imagery for U.S. troop locations, have opened the door to expanded Ukraine–Gulf relations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently concluded a diplomatic tour of the region, working on security deals to help several Arab states defend themselves against drone warfare. This has increased Ukraine’s value to the Gulf states—something that Moscow is not at all pleased with.

The war has also exposed vulnerabilities in Tehran. Although U.S. and Israeli attacks did not produce the regime change that Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly anticipated, they have contributed to serious disagreements within the Islamic Republic’s leadership over how to approach a settlement with Washington. For Moscow, this raises the risk that elite divisions are weakening the regime from within. Further, as Russian opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky has argued, the war’s unpopularity among the American public threatens to undermine Trump domestically, potentially limiting his ability to work with Putin. These dynamics suggest that while Putin has benefited from the conflict, the risks of escalation and prolonged instability give him a strong incentive to see tensions between the United States and Iran ameliorated, at least to the point that the Islamic Republic is not weakened internally, the Gulf states do not turn further to Ukraine for their defense, and the Putin-Trump relationship is preserved.

The Uranium Proposal 

How compelling Putin’s motivations for seeking to ease U.S.-Iran tensions may be is uncertain. What is clear is that he has attempted to defuse the crisis by offering to transport Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium to Russia, thus preventing its potential use in nuclear weapons development. However, Tehran is not interested and has rejected Putin’s proposed solution to the crisis.

Since 2005, Putin has proposed that Russia supply Iran with the low-enriched uranium needed for a civilian nuclear reactor and take back its spent fuel, eliminating Tehran’s need to enrich uranium domestically. Tehran has consistently rejected these proposals, insisting on its right to enrichment. This refusal may have been a factor underlying Moscow’s decision to later support UN Security Council sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Tehran’s lack of enthusiasm about Putin’s recent offer, therefore, reflects a longstanding pattern. Further, when Putin described his offer during an April 2026 phone call with the U.S. President, Trump responded that he would prefer that Russia focus on ending the war in Ukraine.

Putin as the Peacemaker

Putin has also offered to mediate between the United States and Iran. For this effort to be effective, both Washington and Tehran need to be willing to let him play this role, though Washington already rejected such an effort last year.

Successful great-power mediation requires more than just dialogue facilitation; it depends on the ability to apply the right combination of incentives and pressure to persuade opposing parties to reach a settlement that the mediator helps to shape and enforce. Putin is incapable of exercising this leverage over either the United States or Iran.

If the U.S.-Iran case is simply a question of needing a mediator to pass messages back and forth, alternatives already exist. The United States and Iran have already utilized Pakistan for this purpose, and both Turkiye and Oman are also available as alternatives.

If Putin could, however, mediate successfully between Washington and Tehran, the benefits for Moscow would be significant. Russia would strengthen its standing as a legitimate actor, despite its ongoing war against Ukraine. This could also help mitigate the risks of Arab states growing closer to Ukraine, the Iranian regime becoming vulnerable to internal dissension, and Trump becoming politically weakened and less able to collaborate with Putin.

But Putin cannot mitigate these risks unless Washington and Tehran allow him to mediate between them or accept his proposal to transfer Iran’s highly enriched uranium to Russia. Moscow’s attempts to mediate between the U.S. and Iran are therefore likely to fail. As President Trump has suggested, Putin may be better off focusing on ending the war in his own backyard than trying to solve a complex geopolitical crisis in the Middle East.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.