Assessing Iran’s Policy in 2024

For Iran, 2024 was a year of defeat. The escalating events in the aftermath of the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel—the ensuing war, the comprehensive assassination of Hezbollah’s high command, Tehran’s relative impotence in striking back at Tel Aviv, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—collectively mark a major setback for its strategy of “resistance” and the virtual elimination of its sway over its neighbors. For decades, Iran has based most of its achievements on the foundations of religion, the depth of its influence over the “Shiite crescent,” and the expansion of the discourse of resistance to economic goals. However, in 2024, the catastrophe of Israel’s attack on Gaza and the weakening of the “Axis of Resistance” across the Middle East led to a region-wide rout for Iranian influence.

A Weakened Iran

In early 2025, it appears likely that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is ready to sign a ceasefire deal with Hamas to end the 14-month war in Gaza and release the remaining Israeli hostages. Though the exact terms of the deal remain to be seen, they would almost certainly include a long-term Israeli military presence in the Gaza Strip, giving it the upper hand in preventing the formation of a Palestinian state while ensuring long-term Israeli control over Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Netanyahu’s victory in Gaza will mirror Iran’s defeat. In January 2020, after the assassination of IRGC Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared, “The era of hitting is over. If you hit, you will be hit.” Five years later, the reality has failed to match this rhetoric: since October 7, Israel has struck Iran and Iran-allied targets across the region with impunity, and Iran’s attempts to inflict pain on Israel have failed ignominiously.

The negative impact of the post-October 7 conflict of the “Axis of Resistance” is difficult to overstate. For years, the Islamic Republic of Iran built its deterrence capability on a network of alliances stretching from Tehran to Beirut in the Mediterranean, giving it coercive powers over its neighbors and ensuring the protection of its interests. However, at the beginning of 2025, that network lies in ruins: Iran now finds itself in a position of unprecedented weakness, and its security environment is apparently now limited to its actual borders.

In Lebanon, the death of Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah and Israel’s categorical destruction of its leadership and eliminating the group’s missile capability has left Iran bereft of an effective partner. To be sure, tens of thousands of the group’s fighters remain, but just as IRGC General Esmail Qaani was unable to recreate Soleimani’s success atop the Quds Force, Hezbollah now lacks a leader with Nasrallah’s charisma or influence, and its willingness to follow directives from Tehran—let alone its ability to strike back at Israel following the fiasco in September 2024—remains unclear.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Iran lost the transportation corridor to provide logistical and weapons support to Hezbollah. Syria, Iran’s only sovereign state ally, provided a place to ensure the security of resistance groups while allowing Iran to exert its influence and deterrent capabilities far beyond its borders. Moreover, Syrian territory was of strategic importance for proposed pipelines to transport Middle Eastern oil and gas to Europe. One such project involved a pipeline connecting the South Pars (Northern Dome) gas field of Qatar and Iran to Europe via Iraq, Syria, and possibly Lebanon. These plans are on indefinite hiatus; the new Syrian government is keenly aware of Tehran’s support for Assad during the war, and seems far less willing to engage with it either politically or economically

Some believe that Iran, although weakened by the developments after October 7, has not completely lost its deterrence tools. Khamenei made this point in a public speech after the defeat of the Assad government in Syria. “The resistance front is not hardware that can be defeated, dismantled, or destroyed,” he said, “but rather a thought and doctrine that will become stronger as a result of recent pressures.” Indeed, despite its virtual destruction of Gaza, Israel has been unable to defeat and eliminate Hamas, and with the same approach, there is a possibility of a ceasefire with it before the inauguration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Iranian leaders have also announced that they want to maintain relations with Syria based on a “far-sighted and wise approach,” raising the possibility that they intend to maintain some influence there into the future. In Lebanon, contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, Hezbollah will not agree to disarmament and will continue its military activities north of the Litani, including operating training camps in the Bekaa Valley. Despite recent losses and defeats, Hezbollah has retained power domestically. Hezbollah’s new Secretary General, Naim Qassem, recently announced that for each house destroyed by Israel, Lebanese citizens were paid $300-400, totaling $77 million—a clever way to make inroads among Lebanese suffering from Israeli bombardment. The Houthis in Yemen and resistance groups in Iraq have also remained united. Though the prevailing trend clearly remains against Iran, the wider conflict seems to have mostly died down, giving Tehran a chance to rebuild its influence networks.

Trump and Iran

In the field of foreign policy, Iran is also facing the second Trump presidency, which will be accompanied by great challenges but perhaps also opportunities. After Trump was elected, some of his inner circle—notably Mike Waltz, his pick for national security adviser—publicly advocated for a return to a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran. These sanctions could target Iran’s oil exports, currently estimated at 1.5 million barrels per day. Crushing sanctions under Trump’s first term reduced this number to less than 400,000 barrels per day, and it is possible they could do so again.

However, Trump is also well-known as a “dealmaker,” and has shown he is open to any negotiation he can claim as a “victory” for the United States. In the closing days of the Biden administration, incumbent national security adviser Jake Sullivan has been optimistic about the prospects for talks with Iran, saying Trump has the opportunity to reach a new nuclear deal with a “weakened Iran.” Trump has also repeatedly stated that he does not seek regime change in Iran and does not want to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, saying, “I would like to see Iran very successful. The only thing is that they can’t have nuclear weapons.”

Iran has also expressed a willingness to talk, at least in principle. During his election campaign, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, a relative reformist, called for managing relations with the United States and resolving international conflicts with the initiative of the Iranian side. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also stressed his willingness to enter into negotiations if Trump is willing to start talks. It is expected that given the changed circumstances compared to Trump’s first term, the new American president and Iran could be able to reach a common agreement, although it may take time and would face great domestic scrutiny in both countries.

Iran’s bargaining position is bleak. Domestically, the country is facing problems such as the extreme devaluation of the national currency against the dollar, inflation above 30 percent, power outages due to a lack of fuel in power plants during the height of the winter cold, severe domestic unrest and a decline in the regime’s legitimacy, and the domino-like effect of Assad’s fall in Syria. All of these are reasons for the government to show more empathy with the people. Indeed, the regime appears to understand its precarious position, and has taken steps to assuage popular anger and stabilize the political system. Following Assad’s fall, one of its first legislative moves was to suspend a proposed law that would have set severe penalties—up to and including execution—for refusing to wear a hijab. Following a popular backlash, the bill was abruptly removed from the agenda by the Supreme National Security Council for an indefinite period, highlighting the government’s fear of provoking anger during such a precarious time.

While the regime’s immediate actions suggest an attempt to navigate its internal crises, the broader challenges of balancing domestic stability with external pressures continue to cast doubt on Iran’s ability to manage these challenges in 2025. Pezeshkian’s strategy in 2025 is far from certain. He came to power with the promise of negotiations with the West, but some revolutionary radicals in positions of power continue to consider any negotiations detrimental to their goals. At the same time, Trump will not be willing to compromise with Iran unless he receives heavy concessions—which in turn will lead to further opposition from the radicals. Amid pressure from both sides, the government must create a common consensus between those prioritizing the welfare of society and those dedicated to the Islamic Revolution. This task will be exceptionally difficult, given the polarized atmosphere of society and the deep gap between the government and the people. In short, there are virtually no positive indicators for Iran in the coming year—only further deterioration of its position abroad, increasing economic pressure from the West, and an escalating crisis of legitimacy at home.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.