Evolving Ties: Saudi Arabia’s Political and Societal Engagement in Iraq

Saudi Arabia and Iraq continue to be key political players in an ever-changing Middle East. In recent years, both governments have attempted to improve the uneasy and dysfunctional nature of their relationship. This renewed engagement, which began post Arab Spring, has been driven by geopolitical shifts across the region, as well as domestic political developments within both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Given the history of Saudi-Iraq ties and the ideological identity of the post-2003 Iraqi State, this engagement has progressed incrementally and remains vulnerable to regional geopolitics.

Realignments Through the Decades

The bilateral relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iraq has long been shaped by political and ideological shifts. Following the assassination of King Faisal and the overthrow of the Hashemite Royal Family in the Officers Coup of 1958, Saudi-Iraqi relations entered a period of strained relations and mistrust. These tensions escalated with the rise of the Baathist government in Iraq during the early 1970s, and ties only began to normalize after the signing of the Algiers Accord in 1975. The 1979 Islamic Revolution shifted the regional balance with the new Iranian regime openly denouncing Saudi leadership and its monarchical rule. The emergence of this shared threat, along with the sectarianization of the Saudi-Iran relationship, temporarily improved Saudi-Iraq ties. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Saudi Arabia, understanding the threat posed by the Islamic Republic regime in Iran, sided with Iraq. Yet this alignment was brief, with relations collapsing again in 1990 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Viewing Saddam Hussein’s regime as a major threat, Saudi Arabia was forced to revise its national security calculus and close its borders with Baghdad.

The 2003 U.S. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent process of de-Baathification significantly weakened Iraqi state institutions, creating a power vacuum that opened the Iraqi political landscape to Iran’s influence. The eventual democratization of Iraq brought to power its Shi’ite majority. Leveraging its links with various factions within the Iraqi Shi’ite political sphere, Iran was able to transform Iraq from adversary to ally, particularly under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

For Saudi Arabia, the new political environment in Iraq presented a challenge with few viable solutions. The Saudi leadership at the time was particularly concerned about Iran’s growing influence in Iraq and the resulting shift in the regional balance of power in Tehran’s favour. However, the United States—Saudi’s key defence and political partner—was also a central stakeholder in Iraq and opposed any Saudi policy framed as against the new government in Baghdad. For Saudi Arabia, the prospects for engagement were far from promising. The Kingdom had traditionally maintained links with Sunni tribal elites, but these relationships were never strategic in nature and did not afford the Kingdom significant political clout within the country. In Saudi policymaking circles, Iraq was increasingly viewed as a lost cause: the Shi’ite political establishment was unwilling to engage with Saudi Arabia, while Sunni factions were too weak and fragmented to serve as effective partners.

This practical resignation was reflected by the absence of diplomatic ties between the two states and underscored that the Saudi approach towards Iraq following the U.S. invasion remained deeply intertwined with its stance toward Iran and, indirectly, with sectarian dynamics. A shift in Iraq’s political landscape in 2014—marked by the rise of ISIL, the departure of Prime Minister al-Maliki, increasing anti-Iranian sentiment, and the formation of a nationalist government under Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi—paved the way for a breakthrough in Saudi-Iraqi relations. This development coincided with the transfer of power in Saudi Arabia, as King Salman and his son, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, ascended the throne. This culminated in Saudi Arabia appointing an ambassador to Iraq for the first time in 25 years. Yet this did not fundamentally change Saudi Arabia’s Iran-centric approach towards Iraq. Bilateral ties suffered a setback when Iraq requested the replacement of the Saudi ambassador following his public criticism of Iran-backed Shi’ite militias. This incident revealed that a strong faction within Iraq’s political establishment continued to view Saudi attempts to engage with Iraq as part of a broader strategy to undermine Iranian influence in Iraq.

Bridging Divides Through Soft Power

The setbacks of the previous decade served as a reality check for Saudi Arabia regarding the futility of its attempts to undermine Iranian influence within Iraq. Since then, Saudi Arabia has largely followed a soft power-oriented approach towards Iraq—one characterized by pragmatic political engagement based on actors’ political capital rather than sectarian identity. Successive Iraqi governments—including those led by Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, and current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani—have continued this positive engagement with Saudi leadership, resulting in the creation of an Iraqi-Saudi Coordination Council. Moreover, Iraq, specifically under the premiership of PM Al-Kadhimi, facilitated negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This emerging Iraqi role as a regional mediator helped streamline and stabilize Saudi-Iraq ties. The 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia has further reinforced this positive trend, with both sides citing Iraq’s role as instrumental.

In 2024, Saudi Arabia took a significant step by sending its ambassador to visit two holy Shi’ite shrines in Najaf and Karbala. During this visit, the Saudi ambassador met with Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir al-Najafi and Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Ishaq Al-Fayyad—two most important and respected clerics within the Najaf’s al-Hawza Al-Ilmiyya, the most prestigious center of Shi’ite theological learning in the world. According to Dr. Fouadh Kadhem, an international relations expert at the Al-Nahrain University in Najaf, these visits by the Saudi ambassador marked a historic first: never had a Saudi ambassador in Iraq visited these shrines before or engaged with senior leadership of Najaf’s Hawza. He elaborated that while previous Saudi visits had been confined to the formal political sphere, this signalled a clear intent to go beyond politics and directly connect with the Iraqi people across sectarian lines. This is notable given the Saudi religious establishment’s historic apprehension towards these shrines.

This rapprochement was also accompanied by the start of direct flights between the Saudi city of Dammam and the holy city of Najaf, further indicating a Saudi policy aimed at facilitating religious travel for its Shi’ite citizens to Iraq. These developments highlighted the linkage between Saudi Arabia’s external and internal political domains, while also emphasizing the declining influence and marginalization of the Kingdom’s religious authorities. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has maintained working relationships with prominent Iraqi Shi’ite leaders, such as Moqtada Al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Movement in Iraq, and Ammar Al-Hakim, the head of Iraq’s Wisdom Movement.

Saudi Expectations Amid a Changing Iraq

Despite recent progress, Saudi engagement with Iraq is unfolding amid geopolitical shifts, as Iran’s grip on Baghdad is loosening and its influence across the Levant has significantly weakened. For decades, this influence was reinforced by the regime of Bashar Al Assad in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon; however, the fall of the Assad regime and the weakening of Hezbollah have undermined Iranian power projection and simultaneously enhanced Saudi political influence.

As evidenced by the Arab League Summit in Baghdad in May 2025, this shifting balance of power has also affected Saudi’s engagement with Iraq, as the Saudi Crown Prince was one of the prominent Arab Gulf Leaders who evaded the event. It had been reported that the Gulf leaders had encouraged Iraq to invite the new Syrian President, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, but the invitation instead sparked controversy within the country over his past involvement within the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. This episode underscores how, following the strengthening of its regional position, Saudi Arabia’s expectations of Baghdad have also shifted.

While Saudi Arabia appears happy to move beyond the political and cultural taboos that once contained its engagement with Iraq, it now also expects more reciprocating gestures. Beyond closer engagement, Riyadh expects Baghdad to adopt a more autonomous foreign policy and to chart a political outlook less constrained by Iran.  The extent to which Iraq is capable of balancing these new expectations with its own domestic needs and regional shifts will ultimately be decisive in shaping its future relations with Saudi Arabia.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.