Assad is Gone: The GCC’s Role in Shaping Syria’s Future

Amid the abrupt developments in Syria, the GCC states face a pivotal opportunity: to lead a role in the transitional period in collaboration with Turkey and other major Arab countries, leveraging their collective influence to stabilize the region. Despite previous setbacks, the GCC’s current strategic alignment with U.S. interests and regional actors could pave the way for a new government that prevents chaos and secures long-term peace in the region. 

The situation in Syria is once again at a critical juncture, and the GCC states risk being sidelined as major stakeholders in shaping the future of the largest country in the Levant. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has sharply weakened the regional positions of his two primary backers, Iran and Russia, exposing vulnerabilities that present both challenges and opportunities for the region. The decapitation of Hezbollah, Iran’s diminishing deterrence capabilities across the Middle East, and the end of Assad rule across Syria—previously maintained through bloody repression and vast Iranian and Russian support—have upended the status quo and placed the future of the Syrian state in serious question.

The GCC States’ Strategy Evolution 

Since 2011, the GCC states’ political and diplomatic investments in Syria have failed due to three main factors: a failure to align their priorities with Washington’s, vast military and financial support to Assad from Russia and Iran, and internal divisions within the GCC over influence in Syria and among Syrian opposition factions. The first setback to the bloc’s Syria strategy came after it was unable to quickly remove Assad, despite considerable financial and political support to opposition groups. The second came when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Egypt conditioned normalization with Assad’s regime on resolving the crisis through a political solution—starting with the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2254—and on reducing Iranian influence in Syria, as well as curbing the smuggling of captagon and other drugs into Jordan and the GCC states. These conditions were never met, as Assad stubbornly refused to relinquish any power through a political settlement and leveraged his untouchability within Syria to build the world’s largest drug cartel as a critical source of revenue. Most recently, the GCC’s efforts have been overshadowed by Turkey, which has emerged as the main influencer of developments in Syria and has sidelined the Arab countries’ attempts to influence a change in the country through engagement with Assad’s regime.

However, the GCC states’ position on Syria gradually shifted between 2011 and 2024 due to changes in leadership across the Gulf and the transformation of the GCC states’ regional priorities. The new generation of Gulf leaders has adopted a broader vision that prioritizes economic development and global influence, showing less interest in engaging with the protracted conflicts of the Arab world. When the Syrian revolution began, the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, a staunch believer in Syria’s importance to the Arab fold, attempted to work with Assad to resolve the unrest through a political settlement. Alongside the Arab League, the GCC states presented multiple peace initiatives, urging Assad to pursue a diplomatic resolution and end the excessive use of force against protestors.

Assad consistently rejected these overtures, and Saudi Arabia’s strategy shifted accordingly. Following his rise to power in 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) focused Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy on serving the kingdom’s economic transformation plans, leading to minimal involvement in Syria. By contrast, the UAE viewed the post-2018 situation in Syria as a strategic vacuum caused by Arab reluctance to normalize relations with Assad, which it sought to fill by expanding Emirati influence with Damascus. Meanwhile, Qatar maintained relatively strong support for the Syrian opposition, but shifted its approach toward a more diplomatic and mediation-focused foreign policy.

In 2020 and 2021, the UAE and Jordan became the first Arab countries to normalize and engage publicly with the Assad regime on different levels. This engagement followed the Assad government’s gradual conquest of most of Syria’s disputed areas, including Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, Daraa, Homs, and other smaller towns and cities. Amman and Abu Dhabi justified their engagement through a realist lens, viewing Assad as the war’s de facto victor whose strategic importance could not be ignored due to Syria’s location, size, and its enduring ties with Tehran. For UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), Assad’s need to rebuild ties with Arab nations to secure reconstruction funds presented an opportunity to enhance Emirati influence in the region. Even MBS, who initially resisted re-engagement with Assad, found it useful to resume ties with Damascus. Among other factors, the crown prince reasoned that engaging with Syria was necessary to stabilize Saudi relations with Iran, push back against the UAE’s dominant diplomatic position in Syria, combat the captagon trade, and work to ensure regional peace and stability so that economic reform could continue without disruption.

Despite these efforts, all three countries failed to achieve their objectives. The drug flow from Syria continued unabated, Assad’s behavior remained stubbornly unchanged and no political resolution to the conflict was ever started. Notably, before the regime’s collapse, Russian and Iranian influence in Syria diminished, but this was due to external factors—the devotion of Russia’s resources to the Ukraine war and Iran’s to its conflict with Israel—rather than through Arab engagement.

Russia and Iran: Waning Dominance

Until recently, Iran and Russia were the dominant powers in Syria. However, Israel’s relentless targeting of Iranian-backed militias, and Russia’s overextension due to its war in Ukraine, have weakened their grip. Moreover, as hostilities within Syria waned from 2017 onward, Tehran and Moscow increasingly shifted from allies in the fight to prop up Assad to competitors for influence with his government. The two nations long maintained contrasting approaches to the conflict in Syria; Russia favored a more pragmatic policy of diplomacy and a political resolution to the conflict, while Iran pushed for a return to pre-2011 conditions by victory through strength. Assad’s strategic preference between the two has long been clear, and his resistance to Moscow’s overtures underscores his regime’s reliance on Iranian support.

But the shortcomings of Tehran’s approach became apparent in November 2024 after rebel forces in Idlib launched a counteroffensive against Assad, ultimately leading to the regime’s collapse and Assad fleeing the country on December 8. Some regional observers have suggested that the offensive was initially formulated as a political maneuver to pressure Assad into negotiations on the future of Syria and to implement UNSCR 2254. Turkey has had many reasons to enable the rebels: its need to create a safe zone for refugees return and Iran’s proxy activity has come very close to its southern border, with Tehran actively positioning militias in cities on the western side of the Syrian-Turkish border and engineering demographic changes in those areas. On the eastern side of the border, Kurdish groups are positioned, with the support of U.S. forces, to combat ISIS and Iranian groups. These conditions are unwelcome for Turkey, and Turkish defense planners likely saw an opportunity to regain control over parts of Aleppo and Idlib and secure the country’s frontier with Syria—though when it became clear that the offensive could achieve far more, Ankara happily expanded the scope of its objectives.

America and Working with Gulf Partners

For the U.S. State Department, if there is any lesson to be learned from the current situation, it is that ignoring a problem in the Middle East does not make it disappear. Since the closing days of the Obama administration, the U.S. policy toward Syria has unofficially been “no policy”; lacking a strategy to deal with Assad, Washington has simply preferred to ignore him altogether. However, this hands-off approach has failed to address the profound humanitarian catastrophe there—with over half a million killed and 14 million displaced—and has reduced the U.S. role in the conflict to a narrow focus on counterterrorism, neglecting the root causes of brutality and tyranny.

With the creation of a new political order in Syria and the likely formulation of a transitional government in the coming days, U.S. and GCC foreign policymakers should be working together to secure a peaceful transition and their interests in the new Syria. Achieving these objectives aligns directly with both players’ interests. Ending militia dominance over Syria and establishing security nationwide would mitigate threats to the region, including the ongoing menace of ISIS in eastern Syria. This stability would in turn provide a conducive atmosphere for post-war reconstruction efforts, allowing GCC states to leverage financial support and investments to gain economic and strategic influence. The new Syrian government would almost certainly align far more closely with U.S. and Gulf interests than the Assad regime, creating a counterbalance to their regional rivals. Moreover, the successful reconstruction of Syria could help the GCC countries bolster their international image as supporters of peace and development. The key to such an outcome is intensive engagement: the GCC states must pursue vigorous proactive diplomacy beyond statements and establish links with the new authority in Damascus. 

For the sake of the Syrian people, the GCC’s national security, and America’s standing in the region, Washington, Doha, Riyadh, Amman, and Abu Dhabi must act now. A vacuum is forming in Syria, and it would be a grave mistake for the interests of both the GCC and the United States to delay diplomatic communication with this new status quo out of concern that the new authorities are tainted or imperfect. The Gulf states have a unique opportunity—and, indeed, a responsibility—to ensure the stability and unity of the Syrian state and a peaceful transition. Collectively, the GCC hosts the largest number of former Syrian statesmen, defected officials, businessmen, and expatriates—particularly in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Working together with these individuals to form a national transition government serves not only regional stability, but also the core interests of the Gulf region.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.