Parallel, Not Replacement: Why China Can’t Supplant U.S. Security in the Gulf

The Gulf states face a pivotal moment after Israel’s strike on a Hamas compound in Doha last month. On October 2, President Donald Trump issued an unprecedented order pledging to defend Qatar, following the GCC’s activation of its collective defense mechanisms and, for the first time, invoking its Joint Defense Agreement to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Yet Washington’s inability—or unwillingness—to prevent Israel from attacking in the first place underscored a hard truth for Gulf leaders: U.S. security guarantees, even Trump’s recent defense commitment to Qatar, have limits when tested against American support for Israel.

Confidence in Washington is fraying, and Gulf states are leaning more heavily toward collective mechanisms to insulate their security from regional shocks. This dynamic creates a space for new actors to leverage their influence over regional affairs—such as Beijing and its Global Security Initiative (GSI), which emphasizes empowering regional actors toward collective security and reducing dependence on Western security umbrellas. While Gulf leaders are unlikely to entrust their security fully to China, the principle of diversification—broadening security partnerships beyond Washington—is gaining traction.

Diversifying Security Partners

For GCC countries, moving away from the U.S. security umbrella was once unthinkable. For decades, Washington has been the anchor of Gulf security, but recent regional shifts have begun to change that calculus. Saudi Arabia’s normalization with Iran opened deconfliction channels that have helped stabilize the relationship, even amid surges of Israeli–Iranian–U.S. escalation. At the same time, Israel’s intensifying retaliation against Iran and its regional proxies hastened the collapse of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria. While that outcome reduced immediate pressure from Iranian militias, it substituted one risk for another: the rise of a more assertive Israel, increasingly willing to escalate in post-Assad Syria and to launch unilateral strikes—including, for the first time, within the GCC itself. These attacks, sometimes undertaken without U.S. approval or knowledge, have raised uncomfortable questions in GCC capitals: can Washington still guarantee security, even if that threat includes Israel, or is the Gulf merely facing one destabilizing force after another’s demise?

GCC states are now seeking to strengthen their own collective defense cooperation and diversify the Council’s defense partnerships—both to broaden access to military equipment and, if necessary, to secure alternative allies willing to intervene directly in the event of an attack. Saudi Arabia has taken the lead in this effort. On September 18, Riyadh announced a mutual defense pact with Pakistan, which included provisions for military cooperation and an opening for Saudi nuclearization with Pakistani support. Saudi officials have pushed Washington for a similar treaty, but U.S. negotiators continue to condition any such agreement on Saudi normalization with Israel—a linkage Riyadh has on its part linked to the establishment of the Palestinian State. Beyond Pakistan and the United States, other partners, such as Türkiye and Jordan, already maintain bilateral defense cooperation with individual GCC states and could emerge as important actors in a diversified Gulf security network.

The turn toward diversification does not mean the GCC is abandoning the U.S. security umbrella altogether, but it does mean keeping the door open to alternative frameworks—including those to be found to the East.

A Chinese Security Solution for the GCC

For Beijing, stability in the Gulf is critical to China’s national security. For decades, the U.S. military presence in the Gulf has provided a degree of regional stability, allowing Chinese economic interests to thrive. But China’s leaders increasingly see America’s presence in the Gulf as a catalyst for regional tensions—especially in the wake of the 12 Day War in June, which directly affected China’s interests. Beijing is instead offering an alternative vision of regional security, outlined under the Global Security Initiative (GSI).

Xi Jinping’s 2014 Comprehensive National Security Concept (CNSC) established regime stability as the cornerstone of China’s security vision. It broadened security beyond the military domain to include political, economic, and resource security, and emphasized the ways external shocks could undermine domestic stability. By fusing internal and external security, the CNSC made clear that safeguarding China’s rise required insulating the country from vulnerabilities abroad.

China’s GSI framework aims to project this logic outward. Where the CNSC treated domestic stability as the end goal, the GSI aims to prevent external shocks from destabilizing China internally. For Beijing, Gulf security sits at the heart of this equation. The region’s energy flows sustain China’s domestic development and, by extension, regime legitimacy. Over the past decade, Beijing has poured billions of dollars into new and traditional energy cooperation with the GCC. But this increased engagement exposes China to the risk of turbulence in the Middle East, which the CNSC noted and warned against.

Consequently, China has sought to manage Middle Eastern tensions through the framework of the GSI. Over the past decade, Beijing has pushed Middle Eastern states to reduce dependence on Western defense partnerships—and instead develop regional security mechanisms where Middle Eastern states can resolve their own disputes without the need for foreign intervention. In 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed a Gulf security platform that would give both Iran and the GCC a venue to manage disputes without outside pressure. These ideas were formalized in a Chinese proposal for a “New Security Architecture for the Middle East,” explicitly tying Gulf stability to the GSI. The March 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, formalized in Beijing, was presented as early proof that such an architecture could deliver results. President Xi later pointed to the Iran–Saudi deal as evidence that the GSI’s conflict management model could work in practice.

Testing China’s Security Vision in the Gulf

China’s GSI model for the Gulf is a double-edged sword that, in reality, fails to deliver on its intended goals. The largest challenge remains trust in Beijing, which comes with an entirely different set of risks than trust in Washington.

China’s insistence on neutrality and non-interference may appear attractive, but it risks ignoring the security challenges of the region. China has often struggled to balance regional rivalries—particularly between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and more recently between Israel and Iran. The 2023 Saudi–Iran rapprochement seemingly proved that under the right conditions, China could deliver diplomatic breakthroughs that enhance its credibility as a mediator. However, Beijing’s more recent inability to take a clear position during the 12 Day War undermined its previous successes. Israel read China’s silence as tacit complicity in Iran’s attacks, while GCC states saw it as evidence of Beijing’s reluctance to intervene despite the stakes. The episode was a blow to China’s image in the region, underscoring the limits of its ability to mediate when violence is already underway. While China has demonstrated that it can build platforms that mitigate tensions and facilitate dialogue during peacetime, it has yet to prove it can stop a crisis after it begins.

Even with these constraints, China’s approach still appeals to the Gulf states. The GSI’s predominant strength is that it offers a clear alternative—but not a replacement—to the United States. China’s role can complement or coexist with that of the United States as a security guarantor, but it cannot substitute for U.S. military capabilities or replicate Washington’s hegemonic influence in the region. Beijing’s growing reliance on Gulf energy has created shared interests and given Gulf states leverage in their dealings with China. If GCC leaders feel increasingly exposed, whether by Israel’s willingness to strike without restraint or by Iran’s march toward a nuclear capability, they may be compelled to look beyond Washington for security guarantees. China is unlikely to sign a formal mutual defense treaty with Gulf states, but it may deepen its security role through other avenues. This could include intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, training programs, and the sale of advanced missile defense systems.

More specifically, the GCC may begin to weigh Chinese options alongside American ones. Such a shift would mark a significant expansion of Sino–GCC relations from economics to defense, a development that Washington would likely view with far deeper concern than economic ties. Indeed, GCC states have previously shown interest in layered defense systems, but U.S. and European suppliers remain dominant. While Chinese systems are cheaper than their Western counterparts, integration with the existing American platforms that dominate Gulf arsenals is limited. For this reason, Gulf militaries are more likely to view Chinese systems as supplements or hedging options rather than outright replacements.

Will the GCC Abandon a U.S. Posture?

In the end, China’s push to reduce GCC reliance on the United States has often fallen on deaf ears. The depth of U.S. defense architecture in the Gulf, and its proven ability to deter regional threats, continues to anchor the Gulf’s regional stability. Yet Beijing’s aim is not about immediate replacement, but rather a gradual and deliberate embedding: establishing the GSI as a parallel framework that normalizes the idea of Gulf security architecture outside U.S. orbit.

For now, the GSI represents a vision of parallel order, rather than an outright realignment. Gulf leaders are not seeking to abandon their allies in Washington, but to diversify their partnerships, hedge against American dominance, and prepare for a future where the United States is no longer the sole guarantor of their security. Whether the GSI will ever evolve into something more substantial remains to be seen.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.