Is ISIS Targeting the Gulf?

On July 15, three men opened fire on the Imam Ali mosque in Muscat as worshippers gathered for prayers on the eve of the Shiite mourning festival of Ashura. The attack, which was later claimed by ISIS, killed at least six people and wounded thirty others. In the aftermath, many commentators noted with surprise that the three gunmen hardly fit the pattern of stereotypical ISIS recruits; they were well-educated brothers from a wealthy family who held good-paying jobs—one even working for the Omani government after earning a PhD. In addition, the men had managed to obtain restricted firearms, and were able to engage in a ten-hour standoff with Omani security services, suggesting that they had received some form of military training, despite having never served in the Omani armed forces. 

The fact that ISIS was able to establish a presence in the country and recruit men of Omani descent is shocking to many. The majority of the sultanate’s citizens are Ibadi Muslims, which do not seek Islamic governance of the state. Although the country’s Ibadi demographic has been instrumental in Oman’s ability to limit ISIS recruitment, the group has still managed to carry out attacks in areas with even more limited recruitment, such as Iran and Russia. Despite the government’s ability to remain neutral in regional conflicts, while maintaining a reputation for low crime rates and religious tolerance, ISIS was still able to conduct an attack in the Sultanate. 

Implications for Oman 

While it is unlikely that Oman will transform into a focal point for ISIS activity in the near future, some analysts, both Omani and American, who spoke with the author under conditions of anonymity, commented that ISIS ideology could gain a foothold due to shifting domestic dynamics in Oman. Indeed, the fundamental ideologies of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah have been gaining traction; a rise of a patriarchal and conservative brand of Ibadi religious discourse; and popular frustration over the ongoing Gaza war and the failure of regional mediators to confront it. These factors have created an environment more conducive to anti-American and anti-Western sentiment than at any time in the Sultanate’s modern history, which ISIS and other extremist organizations could take advantage of if it remains unchecked. 

The Foreign Connection 

Some American analysts have speculated that the ISIS affiliate in Yemen may have played a role in the attacks due to its proximity, as well as past communications in which ISIS’ central command asked its Yemeni branch to conduct attacks inside Oman. Yet ISIS-Y has been largely dormant in Yemen since mid-2020, and current estimates give its strength as only 100 fighters concentrated in sleeper cells in Aden and al-Bayda. Tellingly, even before the group’s activity tapered off, it had never successfully conducted an operation outside of Yemen, despite explicit requests from ISIS leadership. 

While it is unclear which, if any, ISIS affiliate played a direct role in the planning and execution of the attack, it is important to note that the attack closely mimics others connected to the organization’s notorious Afghanistan branch, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). Since the group’s territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria five years ago, ISIS-K has emerged as one of the few ISIS affiliates capable of conducting transnational attacks and has been implicated in operations targeting civilians in countries that previously were not epicenters of ISIS activity. In January, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bombing at a memorial ceremony for Qasem Soleimani in Kerman, Iran, killing over 100 people. Only two months later, ISIS-K fighters assaulted Moscow’s Crocus City Hall auditorium shortly before a concert there, killing 145 civilians. Both attacks have since been linked to the Afghanistan affiliate.

Moreover, the operation in Muscat targeted a Shiite mosque where predominantly Pakistani migrants were gathered, seemingly to embarrass the government in Muscat and paint it as unable to protect its migrant population and its Shiite minority. This strategy is very reminiscent of ISIS-K attacks in recent years, which often target Shiite neighborhoods and mosques in Afghanistan to sow discontent among the Shiite population against the Taliban-led government.

Implications for the Gulf 

Although the Gulf region has been largely spared from ISIS attacks, the attack in Oman—a country known for contributing few foreign fighters to ISIS and one that has consistently ranked as one of the safest countries in the Middle East—is a stark reminder that other Gulf countries could be a target for future operations. While ISIS is still recovering from the loss of its territorial caliphate, the storming of the Imam Ali Mosque underscores that conducting shocking terrorist attacks is still a vital part of the organization’s strategy. 

While the government in Muscat will likely be focused on strengthening the security sector, especially around the key economic projects in Duqm, and making necessary reforms, the rest of the region will undergo similar efforts to ensure they are not the next target. Adding to those concerns are continued threats from ISIS against past high-profile events like the Paris Olympics, the Champions League games in Madrid, Paris, and London, and even the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. Knowing this, large-scale events like the F1 races in Saudi Arabia and Qatar planned for later this year could be particularly under threat.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.