The Rise of Pan-GCC Sentiment Amid Regional War

The U.S.–Israel war with Iran has exposed the vulnerability of the Gulf’s security model. For decades, the region was defined by its role as an energy hub, a center for logistics and global connectivity, a host of U.S. military bases, and a credible mediator in global disputes. The war has challenged the assumption that these sources of influence also provided protection from regional escalation. Energy infrastructure, aviation networks, ports, financial centers, diplomatic platforms, and foreign partnerships have all become sources of exposure.

For Gulf societies, the central question is not whether Iran, Israel, or the United States is gaining the upper hand. It is why the Gulf should bear the consequences of conflicts it did not initiate and negotiations in which its security is often secondary. Consequently, the war has produced a distinct pan-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sentiment rooted in a shared frustration that Gulf territory is often treated as a strategic arena for wider conflicts, despite Gulf states having limited influence over the decisions that create them.

An Economic Model Under Pressure

For years, external actors have viewed the Gulf through strategic interests. For the United States, it has been a security partner and energy stabilizer. For Iran, it has often been a space where pressure can be applied without necessarily inviting full-scale war. For Israel, it has increasingly become part of the wider regional balance against Iranian influence. For global markets, its stability matters because energy, shipping, aviation, and investment depend on it. For Gulf societies, however, these strategic considerations are inseparable from their own security and economic well-being.

The war has exposed the gap between these perspectives. External actors often frame regional escalation in terms of deterrence, retaliation, or negotiation, but Gulf societies experience the consequences more directly: disruptions to daily life, concerns over sovereignty, and risks to the stability that underpins the region’s economic model. This shared recognition is reflected in the way Gulf states view security as increasingly interconnected. An attack on one airport affects the credibility of regional aviation, a threat to one energy facility affects the perception of Gulf energy reliability, and a strike at one port raises concerns about shipping, insurance, and supply chains across the region.

This is where the war challenges the Gulf model of prosperity. The region’s economic success depends on the uninterrupted operation of its infrastructure and its reputation for stability. Any disruption to aviation, energy, shipping, or investment flows can affect confidence in the Gulf’s reliability as a place for business and investment. In this sense, Gulf societies are reacting not only to physical danger but also to the reality that instability could undermine the conditions that support the region’s economic growth. This does not, however, mean the Gulf model has failed. Rather, the war has shown how closely the GCC’s economic success is tied to the wider security environment.

One Crisis, Six Different Realities

The war has produced a shared sense of vulnerability across the GCC, but each country experiences and interprets that vulnerability through its own history, geography, and strategic priorities. For Qatar, the war is viewed through the paradox of mediation. Doha’s influence has long depended on its ability to maintain relations with adversaries, facilitate negotiations, and provide diplomatic channels in moments when other actors could not. But this role also creates vulnerabilities. A state can invest in de-escalation and still become vulnerable to the coercive behavior of actors who benefit from its diplomacy. The lesson for Qatar is that mediation does not guarantee protection.

Kuwait reads the war through the experience of a small state that has experienced the consequences of violated sovereignty. The 1990 Iraqi invasion remains central to Kuwait’s security outlook, reinforcing the importance of sovereignty and the dangers small states face when regional actors are not constrained by law. Kuwait understands, perhaps more than others, that once sovereignty becomes negotiable, small states become vulnerable to invasion, coercion, and pressure.

Bahrain’s experience reflects the domestic implications of the war. Manama’s perception of the crisis cannot be separated from its proximity to Iran and long-standing concerns over Iranian influence in Bahraini affairs. For decades, Bahrain has lived with the political weight of Iranian claims, interference narratives, and attempts to frame Bahraini domestic politics through a sectarian or external lens. For Manama, the war raises the prospect that regional conflict could reopen longstanding questions over sovereignty, political loyalty, and external influence. In this situation, the war becomes a test of national cohesion.

Saudi Arabia faces a different challenge. As the largest Gulf state, it cannot separate regional security from its domestic transformation agenda. The kingdom’s economic ambitions depend on a stable regional environment, making prolonged instability a direct challenge to its long-term plans. At the same time, its position as the leading power within the GCC creates pressure to respond to regional security threats. Riyadh is therefore challenged with the need to balance deterrence with restraint, avoiding both a response that invites further challenges and one that risks prolonging regional instability.

For the UAE, the war highlights the security risks of a highly connected economic model. Its reputation is built on the promise that the country is a predictable global node: safe for capital, aviation, shipping, tourism, technology, finance, and elite mobility. Abu Dhabi’s model depends heavily on perceptions of stability and reliability, and disruptions to airspace, trade routes, or investor confidence therefore become both security and economic concerns. This helps explain why the UAE may favor stronger deterrence while still resisting open-ended conflict.

Oman’s challenge is shaped by geography and its tradition of diplomatic balancing. Unlike other Gulf states, Muscat’s strategic identity has long rested on quiet diplomacy, restraint, and the ability to speak to opposing sides without becoming absorbed by their conflict. But Oman’s proximity to the Strait of Hormuz limits its ability to distance itself from regional escalation. The war therefore tests the central assumption of Omani statecraft that neutrality can create distance from conflict.

These differences do not undermine pan-GCC sentiment. Instead, they show why it exists. Gulf states do not face identical security challenges, but they increasingly recognize that their vulnerabilities are connected.

Rethinking Gulf Security

Taken together, these national perspectives point to a broader reassessment of Gulf security. Across different national experiences, the war has challenged several assumptions that shaped the region’s approach to security. The first is the assumption that external protection is sufficient. Gulf states maintain deep partnerships with global powers, namely the United States, but the crisis has shown that external actors do not always define escalation in the same way Gulf societies do. What may be seen as deterrence by outside powers can carry immediate security and economic costs for Gulf states. This divergence does not mean partnerships are useless. It means they must be recalibrated around Gulf priorities, not only external strategies.

The second assumption is that de-escalation alone is enough. Gulf states have strong incentives to avoid war, but restraint becomes dangerous when it is interpreted by others as tolerance. The Gulf needs to combine diplomacy with credible deterrence and greater GCC coordination.

The third assumption is that economic growth can be sustained independently of regional security. The war has shown how quickly threats and attacks on airports, ports, energy facilities, desalination plants, digital infrastructure, and shipping lanes can affect broader economic activity. Protecting this infrastructure is no longer only an economic priority but also a central component of Gulf national security.

The broader significance of this pan-GCC sentiment is not that Gulf states should abandon diplomacy or external partnerships, but that they are reassessing the conditions under which both operate. The war has reinforced the need for stronger regional coordination, more credible deterrence, and a greater role for Gulf states in shaping the decisions that directly affect their security. Rather than focusing primarily on managing regional crises, Gulf states are increasingly focused on reducing their exposure to them. As a result, the war may ultimately be remembered less for its military outcome than for the way it reshaped Gulf security thinking.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.