The Utility of BRICS+ in a New Gulf Order

The recent BRICS Ministerial summit in New Delhi and the parallel diplomatic engagement between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump offered an important insight into the evolving nature of the emerging multipolar order. For many observers, the war against Iran represented the first major geopolitical test for the expanded BRICS+ grouping, particularly after the incorporation of Iran, the UAE, and Egypt into the bloc, and the participation of Saudi Arabia as an observer. Expectations quickly emerged that BRICS+ could position itself as a coordinated counterweight to the United States and its allies in the management of the regional crisis.

This, of course, did not happen; BRICS+ largely remained quiet throughout the war, avoiding taking a firm position on events in the Gulf. Yet the absence of a unified anti-American position should not necessarily be interpreted as a failure of the bloc to act collectively. On the contrary, the crisis revealed the bloc’s actual strategic utility, particularly for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. BRICS+ is not, and was never meant to become, an alternative alliance capable of replacing the U.S.-led security order. Rather, it operates as a diplomatic platform that allows regional actors to diversify partnerships, reduce overdependence on any single great power, and navigate an increasingly fragmented international system.

The Limits of the GCC’s U.S. Alignment

The messaging that emerged from the BRICS summit reflected caution rather than confrontation. While references to sovereignty, de-escalation, international law, and regional stability remained present, the bloc avoided directly aligning itself with Tehran’s position or openly challenging Washington. This outcome disappointed those who expected BRICS+ to operate as a cohesive anti-Western coalition. However, such expectations misunderstood the very nature of the organization. BRICS+ is neither a NATO-style military alliance nor an ideologically unified bloc. It is a heterogeneous grouping of powers whose members often share dissatisfaction with aspects of the Western-led international order, while simultaneously holding divergent, and sometimes contradictory, regional priorities.

The Iran war reinforced contradictions within BRICS+ that had already become apparent during the first direct U.S.-Israeli joint attack on Iran in the 12-Day War of June 2025. Tehran sought political legitimacy and diplomatic backing against American and Israeli pressure. Russia viewed the crisis through the broader lens of weakening U.S. global influence. China prioritized energy security, economic stability, and the avoidance of a prolonged regional escalation capable of disrupting global markets. Between 45 and 50 percent of China’s crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, leaving Beijing deeply vulnerable to any prolonged closure. India, meanwhile, continued pursuing its traditional policy of strategic autonomy, carefully balancing relations with Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf states simultaneously. India’s naval escort of Indian-flagged Liquefied Petroleum Gas carriers out of the Gulf under Operation Sankalp illustrated this balancing act in practice, securing its own energy flows without formally aligning with either side.

The Gulf members of BRICS+ approached the crisis from an entirely different perspective. Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not seek escalation against Iran, but neither were they willing to transform BRICS+ into an openly anti-American platform. Their priorities remained regional stability, economic continuity, energy market predictability, and the preservation of security ties with Washington.

This divergence is precisely why the GCC dimension of BRICS+ deserves closer attention. For the Gulf states, the strategic value of BRICS+ does not lie in replacing the United States as the region’s security guarantor. Despite years of discussions regarding American retrenchment, no external power currently possesses either the military infrastructure or the political willingness to assume Washington’s role in Gulf security. The current war underscores that the United States remains an indispensable partner for security amid regional escalation. Yet the conflict also exposes a central paradox: GCC states needed U.S. protection from Iranian retaliation triggered by the unilateral U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, making the GCC’s alignment with Washington both the problem and the solution.

Strategic Hedging and Flexible Alignment

The GCC states increasingly recognize that reliance on a single external security provider generates vulnerabilities. The post-Arab Spring environment, fluctuating U.S. regional commitments, tensions surrounding energy policy, and the growing uncertainty of global polarization have all encouraged Gulf monarchies to pursue more diversified foreign policies. For the GCC states, the recent war reinforced concerns that excessive dependence on Washington may also expose them to the consequences of confrontations over which they exercise limited control. In this context, BRICS+ functions less as a geopolitical alliance and more as an instrument of strategic hedging.

The concept of hedging has become central to contemporary Gulf foreign policy. Rather than choosing between competing global powers, states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar increasingly attempt to maintain simultaneous partnerships with multiple actors whose interests may not fully converge. Security cooperation with the United States coexists alongside expanding economic ties with China, pragmatic energy coordination with Russia, diplomatic engagement with Iran, deepening defense cooperation with actors such as Türkiye, South Korea, Pakistan, and Ukraine, and growing participation in multilateral frameworks beyond Western institutions.

The UAE offers perhaps the clearest example of this approach. Abu Dhabi has deepened economic and diplomatic engagement with China and actively joined BRICS+, while simultaneously preserving close security and defense cooperation with Washington and strengthening strategic and defense coordination with Israel after the Abraham Accords. Rather than replacing one partnership with another, the UAE has attempted to maximize strategic maneuverability across overlapping and sometimes contradictory geopolitical spheres.

The behavior of Gulf states during the Iran war reflected this logic clearly. While remaining deeply connected to the U.S. security architecture, Gulf capitals also supported diplomatic de-escalation efforts, avoided direct military entanglement whenever possible, and maintained communication channels with all major actors involved in the crisis. The GCC’s outreach to Pakistan for aid in facilitating the provisional ceasefire announced on April 8 was perhaps the clearest expression of this approach. Participation in BRICS+ complements this strategy by providing additional diplomatic space without necessarily requiring a rupture with Washington.

The Xi-Trump meeting reinforced this broader trend by signaling that even amid intensifying systemic competition, both Washington and Beijing still prioritize mechanisms of crisis management and strategic stabilization. For GCC states, this further confirmed that the emerging international order is unlikely to become fully bipolar. Instead, it is evolving into a more fluid and transactional system in which middle powers possess greater room for maneuvering.

This dynamic also explains why BRICS+ may remain attractive despite its internal contradictions. Its members do not need complete geopolitical alignment for the organization to retain relevance. In fact, the ambiguity and adaptability of BRICS+ may constitute part of its appeal. Unlike rigid alliance structures, the bloc allows states with partially conflicting agendas to cooperate selectively on issues such as trade, finance, development, energy coordination, and diplomatic consultation, while avoiding binding security commitments. Yet excessive ambiguity also limits BRICS+’s ability to operate as an effective crisis-management actor during moments of acute regional confrontation.

BRICS+ and the Future Gulf Order

The Iran war has not demonstrated the collapse of BRICS+ ambitions. Instead, it has clarified their limits and their purpose. For GCC states, BRICS+ is designed to operate within, around, and occasionally beyond the American order, offering additional diplomatic and economic options in a world where dependence on a single axis has become increasingly risky. The future regional order in the Gulf will not be defined by a binary choice between Washington and Beijing, or between Western alliances and anti-Western coalitions, but rather by overlapping partnerships, flexible alignments, and constant strategic balancing.

For Iran, the war has clarified both the possibilities and limitations of BRICS+. Tehran likely hoped that membership in the bloc would translate into stronger diplomatic backing against U.S. and Israeli pressure, particularly after framing the conflict as another example of unilateral Western military intervention. That did not fully materialize. Yet the absence of a unified anti-Iranian position inside BRICS+ may itself represent a strategic gain for Tehran. Unlike Western-led institutions, BRICS+ neither isolated Iran diplomatically nor compelled its members to align behind Washington’s position.

Most notably, Russia and China’s veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution on April 7th aimed at protecting commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrated how BRICS+ membership could translate into concrete diplomatic cover for Tehran within multilateral forums. For Iran, this reinforces the value of participating in a multipolar framework where strategic ambiguity and political diversification can help mitigate international isolation, even without formal alliance commitments. BRICS+ may not be able to take the place of the United States, but to write it off as an ineffective body with no ability to alter the Gulf’s strategic outlook would be a grave error.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.