Economic Ambitions Drive the Gulf’s Support for Diplomacy with Iran

The high-stakes nuclear talks between the United States and Iran in Oman and Italy remain in their nascent stage, and it is too early in the process to be confident about a breakthrough that produces a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA) “2.0.” Nevertheless, the talks appear to have positive momentum, justifying cautious optimism about a deal. Few states, if any, are as hopeful for a peaceful resolution to the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program as the Gulf’s Arab monarchies.

Oman’s Long History of U.S.-Iran Mediation

As a diplomatic bridge between the Trump administration and Iran, Oman is playing essentially the same role that it did for the Obama administration and Tehran in the 2012-15 talks that produced the JCPOA. The Sultanate’s critical role in those negotiations made it the “unsung hero” of the landmark nuclear deal, as Shohini Gupta wrote shortly after the accord’s signing. While the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) negotiated the JCPOA with Iran, Oman was so important to the diplomatic process that Trita Parsi quipped at the time, “One wonders if it should really be the Oman plus six.”

Still, there are some notable ways in which Oman’s current diplomatic efforts differ from the role it played between 2012 and 2015. Whereas the current talks began in Muscat on April 12 with much publicity and coverage by the international media, the Obama administration’s engagement with the Iranians in the Sultanate started in secret in July 2012, and only became public the following year.

More notably, this year’s bilateral nuclear talks take place in a markedly different regional context. One key factor relates to how Oman’s fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members see Muscat’s bridging role today, compared to the years leading up to the first Iran nuclear deal. During the Obama years, some GCC states were overwhelmingly suspicious of Oman’s role in hosting the talks. The fact that the negotiations began in secret—without Muscat consulting Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, or any of the other Gulf Arab capitals—led to perceptions among some of the Sultanate’s fellow GCC members that the Omani leadership was disregarding the interests and concerns of its regional allies with regard to Iran. Mindful of the extent to which Oman had, since the GCC’s founding in 1981, been the Arab monarchy on warmest terms with Tehran, there was a belief in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states that the Omanis had grown too close to Iran, at the expense of the Sultanate’s relations with its fellow GCC members and their security interests.

Abu Dhabi, Manama, and Riyadh were never enthusiastic about the first iteration of the JCPOA. Their fear was that the nuclear accord failed to address Iranian behavior not directly connected to the nuclear issue, such as its sponsorship of militias in the Arab world, its increasingly sophisticated missile program, and its perceived meddling in the internal affairs of its neighbors. In some GCC states, officials worried that lifting sanctions on Iran would drastically increase Tehran’s income—and thus its means to continue its malign activities and finance its allies and proxies throughout the region.

A Warm Reception

Ten years later, Oman’s bridging role between Washington and Tehran has elicited praise from across the GCC. The day after the first round of talks in Muscat, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan called his Omani counterpart, Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi. On the call, Sheikh Abdullah “expressed his appreciation for the constructive mediation efforts undertaken by the brotherly Sultanate of Oman, which aim to consolidate trust and reinforce stability in the region.” The foreign minister also said he was confident that “Oman’s efforts will succeed in bridging the gap between Washington and Tehran, fostering constructive conditions to rebuild trust, and strengthening initiatives aimed at promoting global peace, security, and stability.”

The same day, Abu Dhabi’s top diplomat also spoke to Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and “expressed appreciation for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s commitment to engaging in these talks, emphasizing the importance of this step in strengthening security and stability in the region and supporting efforts to uphold international peace and security.”

Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in support of the talks, which Riyadh said will “lead to supporting joint action to enhance security, stability, and peace in the region and the world,” adding that the Kingdom prefers dialogue as a way to resolve disputes between countries in the Middle East and beyond. Bahrain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs joined in, affirming Manama’s “appreciation for Oman’s diplomatic efforts and its support for initiatives to resolve differences and disputes through peaceful means” as well as its “hope that this step would contribute to consolidating security, stability, and peace at the regional and international levels.” For their part, Kuwait and Qatar also praised Muscat for hosting and facilitating the talks, hailing diplomatic efforts to ease tensions and bring greater peace and stability to the region.

Why the GCC States Now Want a Deal

Whereas Abu Dhabi, Manama, and Riyadh shared Israel’s concerns about the original JCPOA—and lobbied the first Trump administration to abandon the accord and apply “maximum pressure” on Iran—today these GCC states are prioritizing their own economic development and diversification than containing Tehran. For example, Saudi Arabia’s leadership has concluded that Vision 2030’s success hinges on regional stability. Policymakers in Riyadh learned a harsh lesson from the first round of “maximum pressure,” during which the September 2019 attack on the Abqaiq oil facility briefly devastated Saudi oil output. Evidently, Riyadh’s major takeaway was that Tehran could easily disrupt the Saudi economy, and the Saudi government had no foolproof way to prevent this. In short, as Riyadh has concluded, making Vision 2030 successful requires Saudi Arabia to address problems with Iran through diplomacy and dialogue rather than confrontation. Emirati decision-makers have apparently made the same calculation.

Aware that Israel, fresh on the back of regional tactical victories, might attack Iran with the backing of the United States, GCC members have taken care to avoid being caught in the crosshairs. To this end, Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman recently paid a landmark visit to Tehran, where he met with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This overture underscored Riyadh’s desire to convince the Iranians that any future attack on Iran would receive zero support or cooperation from the Saudis.

Within this context, the Gulf monarchies clearly see the American-Iranian talks under Omani auspices as the best way to avert a broader regional war. While authorities in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will likely be dissatisfied with certain aspects of a new agreement, their assessment seems to be that some compromise between Washington and Tehran on the nuclear issue is necessary to bring lasting stability to the Middle East. Ultimately, it is unsurprising that they have ceased to view Oman’s bridging role with suspicion and now view Muscat’s diplomacy as constructive and positive, from the standpoint of their own national interests.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.