The Gulf States’ Sudan Gamble

The conflict in Sudan erupted in April 2023 after Sudanese warlord Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti,” launched a coup attempt with his private military group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). With Hemedti at its head, the RSF attempted to take over Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, and to wrest power from the leader of the Transition Sovereignty Council (TSC) and head of state, army chief General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. For years, the Gulf states have been involved in Sudan both politically and militarily, affecting both the trajectory of the conflict and the fortunes of their preferred clients. 

The Balance of Power

The conflict between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has seen strife across the country. Only Sudan’s northern and eastern walayats (states)—particularly those along the Red Sea coast, where the RSF lacks a meaningful presence—have been spared. During its initial assault, the RSF managed to capture most of Khartoum and its twin city Omdurman. In response, the SAF and the Sudanese government moved most of the government apparatus to the city of Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. The fighting has also been particularly intense in the Darfur region in western Sudan. The RSF is now in control of nearly all of Darfur—a region still healing from a horrific campaign of ethnic cleansing between 2003 and 2005 by the “Janjaweed” militia, the RSF’s predecessor organization—and is locked in a battle with the SAF for the city of Al-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur.

The RSF has had greater success in the southwest; it has successfully conquered eight state capitals, including the country’s second largest city, Wad Madani. Wad Madani is also the capital of El-Gezira state, the “breadbasket” of Sudan and home to one of the world’s largest irrigation systems. Hemedti’s troops also control parts of Kordofan and Khartoum states, and they are beginning to move eastward to conquer more territory. 

Image from Al Jazeera. 7 July 2024.

The SAF has been able to retake some parts of Omdurman, yet it has failed to make any significant strategic breakthrough against the RSF, despite recent shifts in allegiance. The advances by the RSF in the Darfur region, as well as the reports of ethnically motivated mass killings by the group, have pushed Darfuri rebel groups to end their neutrality in the conflict and side with the SAF. However, this military situation on the ground significantly favors the RSF. The RSF continues to control Sudan’s borders with its southern and south-western neighbours, ensuring a steady influx of military supplies and fighters. 

The Role of the Gulf States

Since the start of the conflict, the Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have been engaged with the warring factions. Saudi Arabia initially played a leading role in the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan, and it later attempted to advance diplomatic efforts to mediate between the two sides, in coordination with the United States. This initiative led to peace talks between the representatives of SAF and RSF in Jeddah that resulted in a ceasefire. 

Yet, these commitments were never actually implemented on the ground. Two additional rounds of talks held in October and December of 2023  failed to yield any concrete results; neither side was prepared to make any concessions that might have given the other side a strategic advantage. At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s mediation attempts prioritized Saudi centrality to any future deal, and attempted to marginalize other regional players such as the UAE and Egypt, whose inclusion could have produced a breakthrough, owing Cairo’s deep connection with SAF and Abu Dhabi’s strong ties with RSF. 

Riyadh’s attempts to position itself as a mediator has not changed its inclination towards the preservation of the Sudanese state and its institutions. Consequently, it has provided diplomatic legitimacy to the Burhan-led government, with Saudi officials visiting Port Sudan and meeting with him both inside and outside Sudan. Meanwhile, Riyadh has not held any personal engagement with Hemedti atleast till now. Saudi Arabia’s preference for Burhan is easy to explain: the SAF continues to control Sudan’s Red Sea coastline, and thus has a greater impact on Saudi security calculations than the RSF. However, if the current trajectory of the conflict continues and the RSF consolidates its hold within the Sudanese hinterland and in states alongside the Nile and thereby a greater control over Sudan’s agrarian and livestock economy, Saudi Arabia will be compelled to deepen its political engagement with RSF.

On the other side, the UAE plays a crucial role in the conflict, owing to its links with the RSF. In fact, in order to aid Hemedti’s forces, Abu Dhabi allegedly created an air bridge between the UAE and the Chadian city of Amdjarass, where weapons and medical aid are delivered and then taken via land transport across the Sudanese border and to the RSF strongholds in Darfur. 

Enter Iran

Thus far in the conflict, the SAF has relied on its air superiority to target RSF forces across Sudan. However, its main regional backer, Egypt, has not been able to provide it with unlimited support, perhaps owing to its economic dependence on the UAE. The SAF’s demand has created an opportunity for Iran to re-enter Sudan, both politically and militarily. Since the start of the conflict, Iran has allegedly provided the SAF with drones, which the SAF deployed during its offensive to take back the state broadcaster’s headquarters in Omdurman. Tehran’s backing eventually led to the restoration of diplomatic ties between Sudan and Iran, and the return of the Iranian ambassador to the government’s seat at Port Sudan.

The entry of Iran into the conflict is strategically helpful for the SAF, as it helps it to diversify its support base outside Egypt, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia. For Iran, this foothold within Sudan will further the country’s geopolitical goals of regaining strategic relevance within the Horn of Africa and finding new customers for Tehran’s domestic arms industry. 

Though the current conflict is still far from decided, it appears to have delivered a lethal blow to the structure of the Sudanese state as it has existed since its independence. The war is also upending the traditional core-periphery nature of politics associated with Sudan. That is, the “core” of Sudan, namely Khartoum, Omdurman, and the twin cities’ immediate surroundings, has prospered peacefully, while the outer reaches of the country have been gripped by violence and disease. In today’s Sudan, the opposite pattern holds true: the core is increasingly devastated and depopulated and is now being dominated by the periphery. 

This shift in the political and geographical dynamics of Sudan is mirrored on the battlefield, where the balance of power remains precarious. The SAF and its allies have struggled to transform the military into a cohesive fighting force and roll back territorial gains made by the RSF. Even with military support from Iran and diplomatic support from other regional stakeholders, the SAF must turn the tide against the RSF on ground—a tall order given the RSF’s warfighting capabilities and foreign backing.

Still, the RSF does not offer a governance model of its own, beyond the death and destruction its forces bring. Hemedti’s troops have not established even the semblance of a stable political order based on a social contract between itself and the people they govern. This pattern has been most apparent within the Darfur region, which appears on the cusp of a second genocide only 20 years after the last. The governance system embraced by the RSF—dubbed the “Republic of Kadamol,” after the distinctive face scarves worn by RSF fighters—will be totally dependent upon external financial, military and political support and will never be able to create any structural state edifice accepted as legitimate in the eyes of the world. This is a key challenge for the RSF’s primary foreign backer. If the RSF manages to prevail over the SAF and takes control of Sudan, there is little expectation that it can form a functional government and deliver public services to the nation’s people. Instead, the dissolution of the state and its takeover by a family-led tribal confederacy will only breed anarchy, making Sudan a fertile ground for terrorists and ideologues of different ilk—and jeopardizing the security dynamics both within Horn of Africa and across the Middle East. 

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.