U.S. Interests and Challenges in the Gulf Cooperation Council amid an Increasingly Multipolar World

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Even as the United States turns its focus toward great power competition with China and Russia, it cannot afford to ignore its strategic interests within the Gulf region. This area will continue to be vital to U.S. national security interests, as it holds almost half of the world’s proven oil reserves and around 40% of its proven gas reserves, and lies at the center of key global trade routes. In the past, U.S.-GCC relationships have suffered from a “security first” mentality and a benign neglect that will no longer be tenable as China and Russia increase their interests in the region and as Saudi Arabia and the UAE pivot away from their traditional reliance on the United States.

After several years during which Israeli relations with the GCC and the broader Arab world decoupled from the resolution of the Palestinian question, Hamas’ October 7 attack and Israel’s response brought the issue to the fore. GCC publics overwhelmingly oppose Israel’s military campaign in Gaza and Washington’s unwavering support for Tel Aviv. To diminish the likelihood of domestic unrest, GCC rulers have taken their citizens’ views into account and have largely condemned Israeli actions.

The war has stalled efforts to establish formal diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel and sparked fears of a dangerous regional escalation. Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping threaten the most significant waterway between Europe and Asia, which carries roughly 12 percent of global trade and almost one-third of global container traffic. According to the International Monetary Fund, trade volume transiting the Red Sea in mid-November 2024 decreased by roughly 80 percent from the year before. Despite their dependence on this waterway, the GCC states—with the exception of Bahrain—have declined to publicly join U.S. efforts to protect shipping, largely as a reaction to U.S. support for Israel during the ongoing Gaza war.

The Gulf states remain the world’s most important sources of oil and vital natural gas production, too. GCC states made up just under 30 percent of global oil exports and about one-fourth of global liquified natural gas (LNG) exports. Although the United States imports less oil from the region than it once did, America remains sensitive to global oil prices and, as a result, how much the GCC states, Iran, and Iraq export. More directly, two of America’s Asia-Pacific allies, Japan and South Korea, depend heavily on Gulf oil, as does its major strategic competitor, China. In 2022, European countries relied on Gulf crude for 19 percent of their energy imports, second only to Russian hydrocarbons. Because Washington has a vital strategic interest in the energy security of its allies and partners, it must care about geopolitical issues affecting the Gulf. Although the global transition away from oil and gas continues unabated, the region produces the world’s cheapest hydrocarbons, so it will remain a significant player in the energy economy for the foreseeable future—and will thus retain its geopolitical importance.

Though the U.S. will likely remain the predominant external military power in the Gulf region for the coming decades, its ability to exert influence is increasingly challenged. The GCC’s two most powerful member states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are attempting to balance their relations between the U.S. and China, both for their own reasons and over concerns about American abandonment. Economically, the GCC states already look eastward; around 85% of GCC oil and 79% of GCC gas exports go to the Indo-Pacific region, with China a steadily growing market. China is also the largest trade partner for every GCC country and an important source of the technologies GCC countries require to advance their economic development agendas. Despite Russia’s less important economic relationship with the Gulf monarchies, it plays a key leadership role with Saudi Arabia in the “OPEC+” group.

For its part, today China is playing a larger political and diplomatic role in the region to complement its economic engagement. Reports suggest that Beijing has offered to help the Gulf states develop their own military industries, and is building its own naval base at Abu Dhabi’s Port Khalifa. In a demonstration of its newfound clout, China also successfully mediated the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023. Although most of the heavy lifting had reportedly been done by Oman before China’s involvement, Beijing was happy to take credit for pushing the agreement over the finish line in the Chinese capital.

In the future, the U.S.-GCC relationship will continue to drift unless the U.S. takes active steps to manage its diminished role and influence. Given continued strong U.S. interests in the region and stretched military resources as it shifts forces and attention to the Asia-Pacific, the United States should consider a few key foreign policies that will shore up its position in the Gulf. It must also be noted that some of America’s current engagements with the region run serious risks of escalation. Drawing down these hazardous policies and adopting a more sustainable approach to the Gulf will advance core U.S. interests in the long term.