America Must Avoid Picking Sides in the Saudi-Emirati Feud

Amid the Middle East’s evolving geopolitical landscape, the previously intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been partially overshadowed by the ongoing war in the Gulf. While recent escalation has temporarily shifted the two states’ attention toward shared security concerns related to Iran, underlying differences continue to shape Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s broader strategic competition. Despite shared security concerns, competition remains at the forefront between these two leading Gulf states. This is exemplified by the UAE’s recent and surprising departure from OPEC, a bold statement expressing its desire for full autonomy from, and possibly at the expense of, its larger neighbor.

These dynamics add another layer of complexity to U.S. interests in a region already marked by shifting alignments and competing regional priorities. Yet the United States would be wise to avoid any major involvement in this rivalry, instead choosing to adhere to universal principles of state sovereignty and international law while narrowing its focus to core interests in regional stability, trade, and development.

The Basis of the Saudi-Emirati Rivalry

Worsening relations between the two Gulf powerhouses do not necessarily present an entirely new challenge in the region, as overt competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE dates to at least 2021. Yemen has been a central arena for this competition, where the two have pursued different strategies and supported rival factions within the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). While that moment feels dated given a tumultuous first half of 2026, this dynamic later contributed to clashes in December 2025 and January 2026 between the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks an independent Yemen under Abu Dhabi’s patronage, and forces loyal to the IRG and Riyadh.

Other issues arose alongside the Yemen file. Amid the UAE’s increasing economic and touristic influence, Saudi Arabia opted for strict economic policies, such as demanding that major companies place their regional corporate headquarters in-country. Parallel geopolitical competition has intensified in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, with both countries vying for influence across Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. In the months prior to the ongoing war in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia moved to reassert influence across this space following the escalation of tensions in Yemen.

For Riyadh, Emirati efforts to fracture states across the region pose a threat to Saudi interests, which are tied to both traditional security and essential trade. For Abu Dhabi, expanding influence, despite natural constraints of limited territory and population, has proved increasingly essential for building geopolitical power. Riyadh prefers state unity and stability, viewing Emirati efforts as increasingly aligned with Israel, which is similarly interested in expanding its regional influence by supporting breakaway actors that may ultimately extend diplomatic recognition. A willingness to accept state fracture sits at the core of this approach, as the goals of influence and relative power dwarf that of a potentially or overtly unaligned, unified state.

The rift is also present in each country’s economic policy. Although both countries aim to diversify their energy markets, the UAE seeks to maximize oil production to fund its economy before a potential transition away from fossil fuels, while Saudi Arabia aims to maintain higher prices. This strategic divide was central in Abu Dhabi’s recent decision to leave OPEC, a move praised by Donald Trump and widely regarded as a direct blow to the Saudi-led energy bloc.

A New Era of Competition and Regional Blocs?

These diverging interests have led many analysts and some officials to suggest the formation of new blocs in the Middle East, potentially renewing an era of regional competition after a brief period of pragmatism and cooperation. On one side, Saudi Arabia appears to have aligned with Turkey and Qatar in support of state stability, alongside periphery actors like Pakistan. On the other, Israel and the UAE increasingly support the opposite, placing them in line with the United States. The issues of Palestine and Iran, alongside Syria’s transition and local instability in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia, are central to each bloc’s priorities. Relative power that advances regional hegemony ultimately constitutes the primary objective.

While it may be too early for such designations, there is clearly increasing coordination as these countries work to advance their respective regional visions during a transformative period. The Abraham Accords present one layer within this dynamic. For Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi, state fragmentation advances a hollow “peace” repeatedly promised in the Accords. This is reflected in rumors of breakaway factions within Yemen and along the periphery in countries like Somalia interested in recognizing Israel in exchange for similar diplomatic recognition and security support. This approach increases pressure on other Arab and Muslim states to similarly join the Accords, a prospect Riyadh is particularly reluctant to embrace given the strong support for Palestinian statehood within public opinion.

Navigating the Saudi-Emirati Split

U.S. officials should recall America’s mistakes during the Arab Spring and adopt a light approach. One of Washington’s most significant foreign policy missteps under the Obama administration was becoming overly involved in conflicts that grew out of revolutions in countries such as Libya and Yemen, while remaining comparatively restrained in Syria. By choosing sides in the geopolitical gamesmanship of a region intent on counterrevolution, Washington not only exposed its geopolitical limitations but prolonged brutal conflicts in ways that resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, deep impoverishment, and lasting instability. As a result, Washington’s mistakes expanded the influence of regional rivals like Iran at the expense of U.S. resources, lives, and political capital.

This is not an argument for isolation or for advocating autocratic stability at the expense of human rights and democracy. These remain important principles that warrant attention in any U.S. administration. Rather, the case is for more disciplined transactionalism as the guiding principle for Washington when navigating geopolitical competition in the Middle East. In a region where transactional diplomacy is a long-standing feature of international relations, the United States has at times given more than it receives, aligning closely with partners whose interests do not always overlap with its own. Picking a side in the Saudi-Emirati rivalry would risk reinforcing this dynamic.

The trajectory of the Saudi-Emirati rivalry remains uncertain, but competition is likely to persist alongside periodic cooperation. While the ongoing war will likely continue reinforcing both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s reliance on Washington as a security guarantor in the near term, it has also exposed the limitations of that relationship in fully protecting Gulf security interests. As a result, both states will demand more from Washington while continuing to deepen the hedging strategies they have pursued since the Obama administration. The evolution of this dynamic may encourage deeper regional coordination, an approach that leaders across the Middle East and in Washington would be wise to advance. Yet despite these pressures, strategic differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE will not fade anytime soon.

Further, Abu Dhabi’s departure from OPEC and its pursuit of a more independent energy strategy will likely deepen Saudi concerns over its relationship with the United States, placing Washington in a precarious position. As such, the Trump administration must utilize this moment to act as a stabilizing external actor without becoming directly involved in the rivalry itself. By avoiding unnecessary entanglements, Washington can safeguard its interests without repeating foreign policy mistakes that have previously contributed to regional instability and encouraged counterproductive behavior among regional actors. Hopefully, U.S. officials can recognize this dynamic and act accordingly.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.