Beyond Oil: India and Saudi Arabia’s Bid for a Multipolar Global Future

Saudi Arabia and India are forging a multipolar partnership rooted in strategic autonomy and economic pragmatism. Their expanding partnership reflects a broader shift among Global South powers seeking to diversify ties, balance great power rivalry, and shape a new international order independent of U.S.-China bipolar constraints. This broader strategic vision was clearly reflected in the outcomes of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Riyadh on April 23. During Modi’s short time in the Kingdom, the two sides agreed to expand gas supplies, cooperate on defense, and build stronger bilateral agricultural trade ties. The delegations signed more than 50 memoranda cementing their collaboration across these domains. Most notably, New Delhi and Riyadh also signed a comprehensive $100 billion strategic partnership agreement during Modi’s visit. Around $10 billion of the deal will go to the development of AI and space technologies. $20 billion will be earmarked for investments into India’s infrastructure, and the rest will be used to boost bilateral energy, industrial, and defense cooperation.

The strategic partnership agreement is only the latest in a series of actions that illustrate rapidly improving ties between the two countries. As a result of Modi’s visit, the joint Saudi-Indian Strategic Partnership Council has been expanded to include additional personnel and areas of cooperation. Riyadh and New Delhi have also agreed to coordinate certain moves in the international arena, including the G20, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

Growing Closer

The recent visit was Modi’s third to Saudi Arabia since becoming prime minister in 2014, but it marked a particularly major shift in bilateral relations. Until recently, ties between Saudi Arabia and India were almost entirely confined to commerce, motivated by India’s interest in securing a reliable source of oil for its rapidly growing economy. For Riyadh, India’s relative geopolitical independence made New Delhi a perfect trading partner. This transactionalism has transformed into a more comprehensive and cooperative partnership, which now encompasses space cooperation, green energy, infrastructure projects, and defense. The new scope of Saudi-Indian relations gradually elevated this relationship into one of the most impactful in the Global South.

The Kingdom’s expanding cooperation with India and South Asia overall fits into its sprawling Vision 2030, in which India’s flourishing technological sector will likely play a major role. So far, India’s investments in Saudi Arabia have already reached billions of dollars, covering such areas as financial services, the agricultural sector, and IT, drawing on the expertise of notable Indian firms like TCS, Wipro, and Infosys. Predictably, a state as rich as Saudi Arabia also invests in India. The Saudi Public Investment Fund has invested $1.5 billion in Jio Platforms, major technology company, and $1.3 billion in Reliance Retail.

The two countries have also pursued a burgeoning trade relationship that has transcended oil. Indeed, India has become the Kingdom’s second-largest trading partner, exchanging $42.98 billion in goods and services in 2023. Both countries have also expressed their interest in completing a free trade agreement. Reflective of the expanding depth and scope in their cooperation, Saudi Arabia and India are working together to grow their bilateral military cooperation, bolstered by joint cybersecurity and artificial intelligence initiatives. Even before Modi’s April visit, the two countries had held inaugural land and naval exercises near Al Jubail. These maneuvers are an important aspect of their cooperation: for India, they signal New Delhi’s ability to project power into the Indian Ocean, where China has held numerous naval exercises with Iran and Russia. For Saudi Arabia, the calculus is similar; joint exercises serve as a symbol of Riyadh’s commitment to counter Iran’s naval ambitions, which—despite the two countries’ warmer bilateral relations at the moment—are always a concern given their long history of enmity.

The Saudi-Indian partnership also promises to unlock transcontinental trade opportunities. For India, the Gulf Region is a natural transit corridor to connect the subcontinent to Europe. Since 2023, India and Saudi Arabia have been linked through the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which links the Indian Ocean to Europe via Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. The initiative aims to become a major corridor to rival the Suez Canal, the more traditional route. The project, however, has faced significant obstacles particularly due to the Gaza war. Nevertheless, India’s leaders have made it clear that they still see achieving IMEC as a priority, and Riyadh and New Delhi have continued to advance the ambitious initiative. India is particularly keen to work on advancing the IMEC, viewing it as a viable counter to China’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through which Beijing has made major inroads into the Indian Ocean and Pakistan.

Isolated Improvements, or Grand Strategy?

For India, closer ties with Saudi Arabia are a smart first step in its developing pivot toward West Asia. Before Modi took office in 2014, India’s foreign policy toward West Asia largely revolved around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relations with others, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, were limited. After 2014, this pattern began to change because the Indian PM attempted to court the Gulf region as a major source of investment and trade opportunities.

For its part, Saudi Arabia has historically viewed relations with India largely through the lens of Pakistan—with which New Delhi has long had a hostile relationship. But Riyadh’s relations with Islamabad have cooled significantly over the past decade. For example, Riyadh and New Delhi released a joint statement in 2019, which coincided with a series of military clashes between India and Pakistan and stressed the need for resumption of the comprehensive dialogue between the conflicting sides. The same year, Riyadh pledged to invest up to $100 billion in India, while only pledging $20 billion to Pakistan. In 2023, following the G20 summit in New Delhi, Saudi Crown Prince and de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman declined to visit Pakistan on his return trip to Saudi Arabia.

India’s engagement with the GCC states—and Saudi Arabia in particular—has shifted from a parochial, transactional relationship to an approach which takes into account the specifics of the entire region. This regional approach is reflective of the GCC’s growing importance on the global stage, where it has positioned itself as one of the pillars in an increasingly multipolar world. Geopolitically, the burgeoning India-GCC relationship also allows New Delhi to build a more multifaceted foreign policy based on a more balanced outlook. The very essence of this relationship is the concept of the “middle power”; though not first-rate powers, both Riyadh and New Delhi can influence events beyond their borders and strive to build a geopolitically friendlier order in their immediate neighborhoods.

The expanding ties between India and Saudi Arabia are also reflective of certain fundamental shifts in geopolitics, such as the rise of the Global South and the escalating great power competition between the United States and China. This, paradoxically, provides Saudi Arabia with greater room for maneuverability. Riyadh is fostering close ties simultaneously with several geopolitical centers—separately seeking good relations with Russia, Brazil, China, and the United States. Riyadh’s potential membership in BRICS+ is part of this strategic vision, which can be characterized as a form of balanced neutrality.

In short, for India, in contrast to other countries in the region, such as Iran, Turkey, and even Russia—all of which have sought to “pivot to Asia” for their future growth—has instead chosen to grow closer to the West for greater commercial opportunities and geopolitical advantage. The GCC in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, play an important role in this foreign policy strategy. A similar approach is characteristic of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy; Riyadh no longer wants to be dependent on any single power for security or economic stability. To this end, the pursuit of multiple partnerships represents a comfortable foreign policy path.

Crucially, neither Saudi Arabia nor India needs a formal treaty alliance, as it will rather constrain their respective foreign policy agendas. Instead, they seek to diversify their external ties—a sentiment particular to other middle and great powers across the Middle East and the wider Eurasia. All the nations of the region seek the benefit of choice in foreign policy. And under Trump’s administration, with the liberal international order likely to erode further, the India-Saudi Arabia partnership is likely to grow.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.